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ix 
Summary 
The development of nuclear energy technologies in the second half of the 20th 
century came with great hopes of rebuilding nations recovering from the devas-
tation of the Second World War or recently released from colonial rule. In 
countries like France, India, the USA, Canada, Russia, and the United Kingdom, 
nuclear energy became the symbol of development towards a modern and 
technologically advanced future. However, after more than six decades of experi-
ence with nuclear energy production, and in the aftermath of the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster, it is safe to say that nuclear energy production is not without its 
problems. 
 Some of these problems have their origins in the very materiality of the 
technologies involved. For example, not only does the use of highly radioactive 
materials give rise to risks for the current generation (e.g., in the potential for 
disaster when reactors melt down) but high-level radioactive waste from nuclear 
energy production presents a serious intergenerational problem for which an 
acceptable final solution or its implementation remains elusive. Moreover, 
nuclear energy technologies have specific social and political consequences. For 
example, they have been said to be authoritarian technologies (Winner, 1980), 
requiring centralized authority, secrecy, and technocratic decision-making.  
 While some of these problems could have been foreseen before nuclear 
energy technologies were introduced, others only arose after these technologies 
were already integrated into the social and infrastructural fabric of our lives. 
Additionally, new technologies (e.g., Generation III, III+ and IV reactors) are 
still being developed, bringing with them new and uncertain hazards and risks. 
Ignorance and uncertainty about the possible deleterious effects of introducing a 
new technology are inevitable, especially if the technology is complex, large 
timescales are involved, or risks depend on social or political factors unforeseen 
in the design stage. However, this should not deter us from developing and 
introducing new technologies. Rather, it should motivate us to organize these 
‘experiments’ with new technologies in society in such a way that we can learn 
about their possible hazards and risks as effectively and responsibly as possible 
(van de Poel, 2011, 2015). In this way, it is possible to minimize risks and avoid 
unwanted moral, social or political developments. However, organizing such 
experiments responsibly also means that one could come to the conclusion that 
 x 
continuing an experiment is no longer responsible or desirable. Should we be 
prepared for such a scenario, and if so, how could we do that? One possible 
strategy to tackle this issue is that the technology and its introduction should be 
reversible. The aim of this thesis is to further explore this strategy by answering 
the following main research question (RQ) and accompanying subquestions 
(SQ): 
 
 RQ:  What are the implications of reversibility for the responsible development 
and implementation of nuclear energy technologies? 
 
SQ1:  Under what conditions can nuclear energy technologies be considered re-
versible? 
 SQ2:  Why should nuclear energy technologies be reversible? 
 SQ3:  If so, how could the reversibility of nuclear energy technologies be achieved? 
 
After the introductory chapter 1, the chapters that form the main body of this 
dissertation each provide a distinct contribution to answering the three subques-
tions and, by extension, the main research question. Guided by three historical 
case studies of nuclear energy technology development (i.e., India, France and 
the USA), chapter 2 answers the first subquestion by formulating the two 
conditions under which it can be considered reversible, i.e., 1) the ability to stop the 
further development and deployment of a that technology in society, and 2) the 
ability to undo the undesirable outcomes (material, institutional or symbolic) of 
the development and deployment of the technology. Chapter 3 subsequently 
tackles the second subquestion by establishing the general desirability of techno-
logical reversibility by virtue of its relation to responsibility in Emmanuel Levinas’ 
ethical phenomenology. It argues that technology development is a legitimate 
response to responsibility but inevitably falls short of the responsibility that 
inspires it, incessantly calling for technological and political change in the 
process. Having thus argued that nuclear energy technologies should ideally be 
reversible, chapters 4 and 5 work towards specific strategies to achieve techno-
logical reversibility. Chapter 4 first investigates the processes that make it difficult 
to stop the further development and implementation of a nuclear energy technology in 
society, thus providing input on how to fulfill the first condition for the reversibil-
ity of nuclear energy technologies. To do so, it presents a phenomenological 
perspective on technology and its adoption based on the work of Alfred Schutz. 
It also explores different ways in which technology adoption drives the processes 
xi 
of path dependence towards technological lock-in. Chapter 5 examines the 
history of geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste in the USA. It 
identifies a number of concrete policy pitfalls that could lead to lock-in and that 
should consequently be avoided. It also presents a number of general design 
strategies that could facilitate the undoing of undesirable consequences of a technol-
ogy, thus providing input on how to fulfill the second condition for the 
reversibility of nuclear energy technologies. 
 Chapter 6 summarizes the central findings of the thesis and explains how 
these help to answer the research questions. On top of this, it reflects on a 
number of complications connected to reversibility considerations. Based on 
this, it is concluded that the question of irreversibility and reversibility is context- 
and technology-specific and a matter of degree. The chapter concludes with a 
reflection on generalizations and limitations of the results. Finally, chapter 7 
discusses the implications of this dissertation’s results for responsibly experi-
menting with nuclear energy technologies in society.  
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1 Introduction 
The development of nuclear energy technologies1 in the second half of the 20th 
century initially came with great hopes of rebuilding nations recovering from the 
devastation of the Second World War (WW2) or recently released from colonial 
rule. Despite continuing work on military nuclear applications, taming nuclear 
fission and putting it to peaceful use constituted a triumph over its hitherto 
exclusively destructive potential. In countries like France, India, the USA, 
Canada, Russia, the United Kingdom, etc., nuclear energy became the symbol 
for development towards a modern and technologically advanced future.  
 While these lofty aspirations have now lost much of their initial splendor, 
proponents of nuclear energy still appeal to a number of its other concrete 
advantages (Teräväinen, Lehtonen, & Martiskainen, 2011). For one, nuclear 
energy is able to provide reliable base-load power (Brook et al., 2014) from 
comparatively small amounts of fuel. Moreover, it produces this power with low 
climate impacts per unit of energy produced, comparable to renewable energy 
technologies (Lenzen, 2008; Sovacool, 2008). These low climate impacts have 
led some to propose an important role for nuclear energy in our transition to 
more sustainable energy systems (e.g., IAEA, 2016). On top of all this, nuclear 
energy could contribute to some nations’ energy independence by increasing 
domestic energy production and reducing dependence on foreign fossil fuels. 
However, nuclear energy does also come with its own particular set of risks, for 
both current as well as future generations. These risks present a number of 
ethical concerns, which entail but are not limited to issues of radiological protec-
tion (Eggermont & Feltz, 2008; Hansson, 2007a; Shrader-Frechette & Persson, 
2002) including environmental and health hazards due to harmful emissions 
across the nuclear fuel cycle (e.g., Cardis & Richardson, 2000), proliferation of 
____________________________________________________________________ 
1  What does and does not constitute a “nuclear energy technology” is not set in stone, since the 
definitions, possible degrees and boundaries of what is ‘nuclear’ are constantly shifting and 
subject to negotiation (Hecht, 2006, 2007). However, this dissertation focuses on a number of 
technologies  that are so central to nuclear energy infrastructures that their nuclearity is not 
really in question, i.e., nuclear power plants, spent fuel and radioactive waste reprocessing plants and 
high-level radioactive waste disposal facilities. And while the latter may not be unique to nuclear 
energy production (e.g., high-level radioactive waste from medical or military applications also 
needs to be managed through such facilities), they are nevertheless integral to it. 
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potentially dangerous radioactive materials (Nwosu, 1991; Taebi & Kloosterman, 
2008), the intragenerational and intergenerational distribution of risks and 
benefits in radioactive waste management and disposal (Shrader-Frechette, 
2000; Taebi, 2012; Taebi & Kadak, 2010) and safety during power plant opera-
tion, the latter having the potential for catastrophic meltdown so graphically 
illustrated in Chernobyl and Fukushima. 
 The two undesirable outcomes most symbolic for nuclear energy, i.e., the risk 
of catastrophe due to reactor meltdown and the risks connected to long-lived 
radioactive waste, are still fraught with uncertainty2 despite several decades of 
nuclear energy production experience (Downer, 2015, 2017, van de Poel, 2011, 
2015). First, there is always residual uncertainty concerning the risk of cata-
strophic meltdown in existing reactors3, since simulations and lab experiments 
can never fully account for the context-dependent complexities of real-world 
implementation (especially for extraordinary circumstances such as earthquakes 
and/or tsunami’s) and empirical statistics on the occurrence and process of 
meltdowns in power plants are, luckily, rather scarce (van de Poel, 2011). Never-
theless, new reactor types (e.g., Generation III, III+ and IV reactors) are 
currently being developed and implemented that are, among other things, 
allegedly able to lower or even eliminate the chance of a core meltdown due to 
passive or inherently safe design (Taebi & Kloosterman, 2015). Still, even if melt-
down is no longer a possibility, uncertainty would persist about the other mor-
ally relevant and risky aspects of these new reactor types and the nuclear fuel 
cycles they require (ibid.). Secondly, there are large uncertainties involved in 
current approaches to the management and disposal of long-lived radioactive 
waste (Bredehoeft, 2003; Shrader-Frechette, 1993). Not only are the chemical 
and physical processes difficult to reliably predict on the immense timescales 
involved (5000-200.000 years depending on fuel cycle (Taebi & Kloosterman, 
2008)), but the way in which future peoples will deal with nuclear waste reposi-
tories (if at all) remains difficult, if not impossible, to accurately foresee. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
2  Van de Poel (2011, 2015, 2016) distinguishes between different types of uncertainty, 
indeterminacy and ignorance. However, for the purposes of this introduction, I collapse that 
distinction once more under the term ‘uncertainty’. 
3  Despite the development of increasingly sophisticated methods and models for risk 
assessment (e.g., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1975), such uncertainty will likely 
persist due to inherent limitations to predictability (Krohn & Weyer, 1994). 
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 On top of these risks, nuclear energy also tends to import a number of 
worrisome social and political developments. Most pertinently, nuclear energy 
technologies are said to invite an authoritarian organization of parts of social and 
political life (Winner, 1980)4. In order to implement and operate them safely and 
successfully, they tend to invite secrecy, technocratic ideology in decision-
making, centralized political authority, and the subordination of challenges to 
that authority in at least some parts of the institutional landscape (Sovacool & 
Valentine, 2010; Valentine & Sovacool, 2010; Winner, 1980), often combined 
with a discourse of national revitalization through indigenous technological 
progress (e.g., Adler, 1988; Hecht, 1998; Sarkar, 2014).  These very characteris-
tics may subsequently hinder democratic governance of these technologies and 
the consideration of values beyond safety, security and efficiency (see chapter 5). 
To make matters worse, one can expect these characteristics to play out even 
more strongly in countries where the division between civil and military nuclear 
programs and/or fuel cycles is not absolute (compare the nuclear energy pro-
grams discussed in chapter 2). In spite of these general tendencies, however, the 
specific social and political implications of nuclear energy will differ substantially 
depending on which nuclear energy technologies are introduced and the social 
context into which they are introduced (ibid.). As such, it is also difficult to 
predict exactly what institutional, political and discursive structures would result 
from the development and implementation of nuclear energy technologies in a 
given society at a given time. Nevertheless, despite this uncertainty, such ‘soft’ 
outcomes (Swierstra & te Molder, 2012) of nuclear energy technologies should 
surely matter when determining whether nuclear energy technologies are 
acceptable in a given context. 
 In all, uncertainties about the risks and socio-political consequences of novel 
nuclear energy technologies spell trouble for any attempt to determine the 
desirability of these technologies based on weighing their costs and benefits 
____________________________________________________________________ 
4  Winner seems to imply that such authoritarian organization could well permeate all of 
national politics, creating a ‘nuclear state’, a popular argument in the 1970’s and 1980’s. 
However, experience over the past decades has shown that the fear of such all-encompassing 
effects was largely overblown (van de Poel, 2015) and that authoritarian organization of social 
and political life usually has it boundaries institutionally (see chapter 2) and geographically 
(Felt, forthcoming). 
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(Kneese, 2006; van de Poel, 2013)5. In lieu of the possibility of establishing 
desirability based on outcomes, however, how does one decide on whether to 
proceed with new nuclear energy technologies? One approach that explicitly 
deals with these difficulties conceptualizes new technologies as social experiments 
(van de Poel, 2016). It aims for continued learning about risks and other morally 
relevant outcomes after the implementation of a technology in society, and it 
diverts attention away from the desirability of the technology itself and more 
towards the acceptability of the process by which the technology is developed and 
implemented. 
1.1. Nuclear Energy as a Social Experiment? 
The inability to fully apprehend the outcomes of the development and imple-
mentation of new technologies beforehand is not at all unique to nuclear 
energy6. Learning about the side-effects of any sufficiently novel technology 
before it is actually put into practice is inevitably limited7. As such, learning 
about risks and hazards of new technologies often occurs beyond the boundaries 
of the laboratory (or field tests): it happens in society. This has led some to argue 
that society has also become a sort of laboratory, and the introduction of a new 
technology in society constitutes a social experiment (Felt et al., 2007; Jacobs, 
Van De Poel & Osseweijer, 2010; Krohn & Weyer, 1994; Levidow & Carr, 2007; 
van de Poel, 2011, 2013, 2016). As such, in a technologized world like ours, “we 
are in an unavoidably experimental state” (Felt et al., 2007 p. 68).  
 However, there are some important differences between laboratory and social 
experiments with new technologies (van de Poel, 2011). First, since social 
____________________________________________________________________ 
5  Next to such practical difficulties, there are also principled reasons why cost-benefit analysis is 
a problematic method for determining the desirability of projects. Of these, problems of 
prediction and control over future actions are especially applicable to the case of nuclear energy 
(Hansson, 2007b). 
6  However, the fact that nuclear energy technologies usually involve complex infrastructures 
does exacerbate the problem of prediction (Downer, 2017; Krohn & Weyer, 1994) 
7  This limitation has practical reasons (e.g., limited budgets and time, insufficient quality of 
data, etc.), but also principled ones. Learning about the risks of a new technology in the lab is 
necessarily limited because it cannot sufficiently take into account long-term cumulative and 
interaction effects and recursive non-linear systems dynamics, laboratory and field tests are 
often not representative of actual technological practice, and some risks are simply not 
foreseen due to ignorance of their existence (Krohn & Weyer, 1994; van de Poel, 2011). 
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experiments are not always recognized as such, monitoring and data gathering is 
often less organized or in some cases even absent. Secondly, social experiments 
are less controllable, in no small part due to their societal embedding and lack of 
clear experimental boundaries. For example, the global fallout of the Chernobyl 
and Fukushima nuclear disasters should attest to the difficulty of containing the 
effects of experiments gone awry. Last but not least, since social experiments 
take place beyond the laboratory, they involve many more and different people 
than standard experiments do. Indeed, experiments with nuclear energy tech-
nologies can involve whole societies through their political consequences (see 
chapter 2) and experimenting with high-level waste management technologies 
involves members of hundreds if not thousands of future generations. At the 
same time, social experiments with new technologies are routinely “deleted from 
public view and public negotiation. [Yet, if] citizens are routinely being enrolled 
without negotiation as experimental subjects, in experiments which are not 
called by name, then some serious ethical and social issues would have to be 
addressed” (Felt et al., 2007 p. 68). 
 Indeed, while conscious learning through deliberate social experimentation 
with new technologies has the potential to overcome uncertainty and ignorance 
of risks and hazards, it also implies that one is experimenting with human 
subjects. As such, analogous to the way standard experiments with human 
subjects are subject to rather stringent ethics considerations based on principles 
like non-maleficence, beneficence, respect for autonomy, and justice 
(Beauchamp & Childress 2013), experimenting with new technologies in society 
has a number of important normative implications for the way in which such 
social experiments are to be organized. Concretely, van de Poel (2011, 2013, 
2016) has suggested a set of conditions for responsible experimentation with 
new technologies in society (see table 1.1), which experiments with nuclear 
energy technologies would also have to fulfil if they are to be responsible. 
 
Table 1.1 An ethical framework for experimental technology (van de Poel, 2016) 
1 
Absence of other reasonable means for gaining knowledge about risks and 
benefits 
2 Monitoring of data and risks while addressing privacy concerns 
3 Possibility and willingness to adapt or stop the experiment 
4 Containment of risks as far as reasonably possible 
5 Consciously scaling up to avoid large-scale harm and to improve learning 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
6 
6 Flexible set-up of the experiment and avoidance of lock-in of the technology 
7 Avoid experiments that undermine resilience 
8 Reasonable to expect social benefits from the experiment 
9 
Clear distribution of responsibilities for setting up, carrying out, monitoring, 
evaluating, adapting, and stopping of the experiment 
10 Experimental subjects are informed 
11 The experiment is approved by democratically legitimized bodies 
12 
Experimental subjects can influence the setting up, carrying out, monitoring, 
evaluating, adapting, and stopping of the experiment 
13 Experimental subjects can withdraw from the experiment 
14 
Vulnerable experimental subjects are either not subject to the experiment or 
are additionally protected or particularly profit from the experimental 
technology (or a combination) 
15 A fair distribution of potential hazards and benefit 
16 Reversibility of harm or, if impossible, compensation of harm 
 
 However, it may be argued that nuclear energy is no longer experimental 
since there is over six decades of experience with nuclear energy production. 
Still, there are both epistemic as well as moral reasons to think that the experi-
mental framework can be meaningfully applied to nuclear energy technologies 
(van de Poel, 2015). 
 The first epistemic reason lies in the fact that uncertainty is still very much 
an issue with nuclear energy technologies, thus making at least some of them de 
facto experimental. For one, a number of nuclear energy technologies are still 
being developed or have not yet been widely implemented, technologies with 
which operating experience is accordingly lacking and uncertainty about their 
real-world impacts is thus significant. As such, these technologies can be rea-
sonably considered experimental. For example, novel nuclear reactor designs 
(Generation III, III+ and IV) import new uncertainties, as does the geological 
disposal of long-lived radioactive waste8. However, even technologies with which 
____________________________________________________________________ 
8  Despite the fact that we have decades of experience with geological disposal, that experience 
only covers a fraction of the time a waste repository is supposed to contain harmful radionu-
clides (van de Poel, 2015), with containment after repository closure being more difficult to 
guarantee far into the future (Barthe, 2010; Shrader-Frechette, 1993) due to practical and 
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there is already considerable experience may encounter novel uncertainties 
when implemented into a new geographical, institutional or cultural context or 
simply when their current context changes considerably (e.g., in the 1970’s in 
the USA. See chapter 2). This could alter the potential impacts of the technology 
or invite adjustments to the technology itself, resulting in new uncertainties. As 
such, ‘old’ nuclear energy technologies can also be considered experimental, at 
least to the extent that their context is new or in flux. The second epistemic 
reason for considering nuclear energy technologies as experimental is that doing 
so allows for deliberate experimentation with them. Experimenting deliberately 
increases the possibility to learn from an experiment with nuclear energy 
technologies. This would not only help to overcome uncertainty about their 
impacts as discussed above (impact learning) but supports learning about the 
proper institutions for embedding such technologies in society (institutional 
learning) and about the relevant values, norms and moral issues (normative 
learning)(van de Poel, 2015 p. 190). 
 On top of these epistemic reasons, there are a number of moral reasons for 
considering nuclear energy technologies as experimental. First, it would recog-
nize uncertainty as an important factor in the moral debate, especially those 
uncertainties that cannot be clearly expressed in terms of risks. Secondly, 
considering nuclear energy technologies as experimental shifts the focus of the 
debate away from the inherent acceptability of the technology itself and towards 
the conditions (if any) under which an experiment with these technologies in 
society would be acceptable. This could soften the current stalemate between 
nuclear opponents and proponents. Third, recognizing nuclear energy technolo-
gies as experimental can help to develop a moral framework to perform such 
experiments responsibly and revise it based on deliberate normative learning. 
Based on these reasons, we can consider at least some contemporary nuclear 
energy technologies as social experiments9. However, as explained above, this 
insight comes with important normative implications. One of these implications 
is that for such an experiment with a nuclear energy technology in society, we 
have to be prepared for learning that the experiment has gone wrong. 
                                                                                                                                          
inherent limits to predictability, including the possibility of future human intrusion (Krohn & 
Weyer, 1994; van de Poel, 2011). 
9  This is not to say that past nuclear energy technologies were not experimental. Rather, they 
were only de facto experimental, whereas contemporary technologies can be made deliberately 
experimental. 
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1.1.1. Experiments gone wrong and the need for reversible technologies 
Among van de Poel’s conditions for morally responsible social experimentation 
(see table 1.1), there are some that are meant to be able to deal with experiments 
that have gone wrong10. That is, they are meant to prepare an experimenter for 
learning what she would rather not: that it is no longer responsible or desirable 
to continue the experiment, or at least certain aspects thereof. These conditions 
are of two kinds. On the one hand, some are meant to deal with the undesirable 
outcomes of the experiment: a) the containment of risks as far as reasonably 
possible and b) the reversibility of harm or, if impossible, compensation of 
harm. The others are concerned with the possibility of making necessary adjust-
ments to the experiment. These are c) the flexible set-up of the experiment and 
the avoidance of lock-in of the technology and even d) the possibility and will-
ingness to stop the experiment. What binds these conditions is the focus on 
‘undoing what has been done’, reversing previous decisions and outcomes of the 
social experiment. In turn, it stands to reason that ensuring the reversibility of 
the experiment requires the reversibility of the technology being experimented 
with. 
 However, how would one go about making nuclear energy technologies 
reversible? For example, does the issue of long-lived radioactive waste not 
already prove problematic for such an approach? Obviously, such questions are 
hard to answer without a good understanding of what it actually means for a 
nuclear energy technology to be reversible in the first place. In the following 
sections, the use of reversibility and other concepts similar to it in nuclear 
energy are briefly discussed. As this discussion shows, notions like reversibility 
are not new to the nuclear energy debate. In spite of this, the current literature 
does not provide a conceptualization of reversibility that is sufficiently encom-
passing to cover the relevant conditions for responsible experimentation with 
nuclear energy technologies in society. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
10  The going ‘wrong’ of such an experiment is to be read in light of the initial hopes the 
technology was meant to realize. Of course, discovering previously unknown hazards that 
disqualify a technology is likely a sign of a successful social experiment in its own right. 
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1.2. Current Approaches to the (Ir)reversibility of Nuclear Energy  
Technologies11 
The notion of reversibility (or in its opposite form: irreversibility) is not new to 
discussions of nuclear energy and its hazardous byproducts (see section 5.2 for 
an overview). In such discussions, it is most often encountered in descriptions of 
physical processes. That is, it is generally used to describe (ir)reversible me-
chanical/chemical/thermo-dynamic processes in nuclear energy production or 
radioactive waste management. For example, there is a lot of attention for 
irreversible flows and migrations of radioactive isotopes in technical, envi-
ronmental or geological systems, which is relevant for the storage and disposal 
of radioactive waste. On top of this, one finds it used to distinguish some conse-
quences based on their irreversible nature, e.g., irradiation causing mutations 
and other cell damage, or damage to the environment and its ecosystems. Some 
have also categorized long-lived radioactive waste as essentially irreversible. 
 Such uses of the notion of reversibility help us to understand the physical 
processes involved in nuclear energy production and are indispensable for 
successfully developing and implementing nuclear energy technologies as well 
as monitoring and managing their effects. Nevertheless, since they only describe 
physical processes, they do not provide much guidance for setting up responsi-
ble experiments with nuclear energy technologies in society. Indeed, at first 
glance, no notion of reversibility seems to be available in the literature on 
nuclear energy that is also sufficiently encompassing and technology-oriented to 
inform such responsible experimentation. However, inspiration for the devel-
opment of such a notion of reversibility can still be drawn from a) literature on 
radioactive waste management policy and b) concepts from the economic and 
innovation studies literature such as a technology’s inflexibility (Collingridge, 
1980, 1983; Genus, 1995) or path dependence and lock-in (Arthur, 1990; 
Cowan, 1990; David, 2007). Both are briefly discussed below. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
11  Parts of this section (especially 1.2.1) are based on section 5.2 of this dissertation, which 
investigates the use of the notion of reversibility in nuclear energy. 
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1.2.1. Undoing what has been done: reversibility in radioactive waste  
management policy 
The development and implementation of geological repositories for high-level 
radioactive waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF)12 have not generally 
exhibited the same momentum as some other nuclear energy technologies have 
in the past, in spite of increasing global stockpiles of HLW and SNF (IAEA, 
2008) and a general agreement that geological disposal is the most appropriate 
strategy for dealing with these byproducts of nuclear energy production (OECD 
Nuclear Energy Agency, 1995; U.K. Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, 2008, 
2013).  
 To remediate this problem, the past decades have seen an increasing interest 
in two reversibility-related considerations in radioactive waste management 
policy generally and the geological disposal of HLW and SNF in particular 
(Cézanne-Bert & Chateauraynaud, 2010; OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 2012). 
First, reversibility refers to the possibility in principle to change or reverse deci-
sions made during the implementation process of a waste storage or geological 
disposal facility. Secondly, retrievability refers to the possibility in principle to 
retrieve radioactive waste from a waste storage or geological disposal facility. The 
combination of reversibility and retrievability is supposed to increase intergen-
erational equity by keeping options open for future generations, facilitate 
remedial action in case of lower-than-expected repository performance, and 
increase social acceptance of waste disposal facilities (OECD Nuclear Energy 
Agency, 2011). 
 For the purpose of responsible social experimentation with nuclear energy 
technologies (or technologies more generally), however, these considerations are 
too narrowly defined13. For one, while retrievability is a legitimate strategy for 
dealing with possible undesirable consequences of geological disposal, it is also 
decidedly technology-specific and thus less applicable to other nuclear energy 
technologies such as power plants or reprocessing facilities. In turn, reversibility 
as understood in the context of radioactive waste disposal is restricted to revers-
ing decisions within the confines of the implementation of a specific waste 
disposal facility. The question of whether to (continue to) implement that facility 
____________________________________________________________________ 
12  See section 5.2. 
13  Of course, this is not surprising given that they were never actually meant to serve that 
purpose. 
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or, more importantly, whether we should stop experimenting with this technol-
ogy entirely does not fall under the rubric of this notion of reversibility. If it is to 
be appropriate for responsible social experimentation, however, these questions 
should be included in reversibility considerations. 
 In the next section, I introduce two concepts that are central to understand-
ing this difficulty of adjusting or stopping further implementation of nuclear 
energy technologies: inflexibility and path dependence.   
1.2.2. Increasingly irreversible: the path towards inflexibility and lock-in 
Technologies have a tendency to become less susceptible to deliberate human 
control the more they become enmeshed in the social and technological fabric of 
daily life. That is, when technologies are new, they are more open to change 
based on deliberate human intervention. As time goes by and they get more 
integrated into larger systems, technologies come to exhibit a more deterministic 
character. Such “technological momentum” (Hughes, 1969, 1994) has probably 
been presented most emblematically in the form of the Collingridge dilemma, 
also known as the ‘dilemma of control’ (Collingridge, 1980). The dilemma of 
control posits this tendency of technology in terms of a discrepancy between 
knowledge and power. That is, in the early stages of a technology’s development 
and/or implementation, the power to make changes is at its greatest, but infor-
mation about the impacts of the technology is lacking. By the time this 
information becomes available, changing or controlling the technology has 
become difficult. In other words, the technology has become inflexible 
(Collingridge, 1980; Genus, 1995).  
 However, not all technologies are equally inclined to become inflexible. A 
number of factors increase the chance and extent to which technologies become 
inflexible. Some of these factors are technology-related, namely a dependence on 
extensive and complex infrastructures, long lead time, massive unit size and 
high capital intensity. Since nuclear energy technologies generally exhibit these 
characteristics, they have a large tendency to become inflexible (Collingridge, 
1983). Other factors that contribute to inflexibility are more social in nature, such 
as centralized decision-making, a widely shared technical mission, an organiza-
tional concentration of expertise, which could together lead to the formation of 
strong coalitions in favor of the status quo (Collingridge & James, 1991). Most if 
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not all of these social factors also apply to nuclear energy technologies14. There-
fore, nuclear energy technologies can be said to have a strong propensity for 
inflexibility. 
 However, for a technology to reach the point of inflexibility, actors have to 
commit to it and it has to go through an extended process of development and 
implementation (as per the dynamic of technological momentum or the di-
lemma of control). Such a process of repeated technology adoption15 can under 
certain conditions lead to inflexible technologies even if the technology does not 
have a strong tendency for inflexibility. According to the theory of path depend-
ence16, once a specific technology gains a small but significant lead over 
alternatives, this technological ‘path’ gets reinforced if the adoption of the 
technology exhibits positive feedback (Arthur, 1989, 1994; David, 1985), i.e., 
when adopting the dominant technology makes it comparatively more (or 
alternatives technologies less) attractive to future adopters (David, 2007; Page, 
2006; Vergne & Durand, 2011). Through positive feedback mechanisms such as 
increasing returns to scale, network economies or learning effects, increasing 
adoption can then lead to an inflexible outcome: the technology becomes locked-
in (Arthur, 1994). Such positive feedback mechanisms have been shown to 
contribute to the lock-in or inflexibility of nuclear energy technologies (Bergen, 
2016a, 2016b; Cowan, 1990). 
 The implications of inflexibility and path dependence for nuclear energy 
technologies indicate that responsible experimentation with such technologies 
would not be easy. Specifically, they give reason to suspect that stopping the 
experiment or even changing the experimental set-up will be especially difficult 
for these technologies, and increasingly so as the experiment continues. How-
ever, understanding how and why nuclear energy technologies fall prey to 
inflexibility and lock-in may nevertheless help to avoid such difficulties. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
14  For the applicability of the technical and economic factors to nuclear energy technologies, see 
(Collingridge, 1983). For the applicability of the social factors, see chapters 2 and 5 of this 
dissertation. 
15  See chapter 4 for an exploration of how these steps involve repeated adoption of the 
technology. 
16  For a more elaborate discussion of the theory of path dependence, see chapters 4 and 5. 
Introduction 
13 
1.3. Objectives and Research Questions 
This dissertation’s point of departure lies in two of the themes identified above. 
First, given the nature and extent of the risks connected to nuclear energy, it 
recognizes the potential of the notion of social experiments for the responsible 
development and implementation of nuclear energy technologies. This shifts the 
focus away from the question of the desirability of nuclear energy technologies 
themselves and towards the conditions under which experiments with these 
technologies are acceptable (van de Poel, 2013, 2015). Secondly, it acknowledges 
that some of the conditions for experimenting responsibly with nuclear energy 
technologies in society might be particularly difficult to fulfill. Specifically, it 
targets those conditions related to reversibility, i.e., the possibility of adjusting or 
even stopping the experiment (due to a propensity for inflexibility and lock-in) 
and the containment of risks and reversibility of harm (due to the longevity of 
some radioactive waste products).  
 In light of these observations, a better understanding of the reversibility of 
nuclear energy technologies should increase our ability to experiment responsi-
bly with them. Likewise, it might improve the public debate on the acceptability 
of such experiments by providing useful conceptual resources to discuss reversi-
bility-related conditions. As such, the main goal of this dissertation is to explore 
the implications of the concept of reversibility for responsibly experimenting 
with nuclear energy technologies in society. To do so, it seeks to answer the 
following main research question (RQ) and accompanying subquestions (SQ): 
 
 RQ:  What are the implications of reversibility for the responsible development 
and implementation of nuclear energy technologies? 
 
SQ1:  Under what conditions can nuclear energy technologies be considered  
 reversible? 
 SQ2:  Why should nuclear energy technologies be reversible? 
SQ3:  If so, how could the reversibility of nuclear energy technologies be achieved? 
 
Answering the three subquestions is vital to understanding the implications of 
reversibility for the responsible development and implementation17 of nuclear 
____________________________________________________________________ 
17  While the distinction between development and implementation is made to highlight the 
importance of both phases for reversibility considerations, it does not necessarily hold so 
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energy technologies. The first subquestion asks under what conditions nuclear 
energy technologies can be considered reversible. In so doing, it calls for the 
development of a novel notion of technological reversibility that is also appropri-
ate for social experimentation with nuclear energy technologies in society. This 
dissertation develops such a notion in the form of conditions for technological 
reversibility against which technology development, policy and practice can 
actually be assessed. Doing so should promote compatibility with the practice-
oriented conditions for responsible experimentation found in table 1.1, while also 
facilitating the articulation of specific strategies to make nuclear energy tech-
nologies more reversible. In chapter 2, two such conditions for technological 
reversibility are proposed, supported by historical case studies of early nuclear 
energy development in India, France and the USA. These cases are studied 
through the lens of a new conceptualization of technology development that is 
receptive to the technological and social factors contributing to inflexibility as 
well as to the positive feedback dynamics behind path dependence. 
 Once the conditions for technological reversibility are clear, further inquiry is 
possible into the implications of reversibility for responsibly experimenting with 
nuclear energy technologies in society. These implications are in turn deter-
mined by two factors: its desirability on the one hand, and its feasibility on the 
other. The desirability and feasibility of reversibility of nuclear energy technolo-
gies are represented in the second and third subquestions respectively. 
 The second subquestion asks why nuclear energy technologies should be 
reversible. This dissertation took its prima facie interest in reversibility because 
its desirability is implied by the conditions for responsible experimentation in 
table 1.1. However, these conditions are themselves subject to change based on 
what is learned in these experiments (van de Poel, 2016). As such, chapter 3 
aims to provide normative support for the desirability of technological reversibil-
ity that is independent of (yet compatible with) the social experimentation 
framework. To do so, it develops a Levinasian conceptualization of technology, 
innovation and its relation to responsibility. The resulting framework helps to 
explain why technologies (and, by extension, nuclear energy technologies) 
should indeed be reversible, at least to a degree. 
                                                                                                                                          
strictly in actual practice. Especially for complex and interdependent technologies, develop-
ment and implementation might significantly overlap. 
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 The third subquestion looks into the feasibility of reversible nuclear energy 
technologies by asking how such reversibility could actually be achieved. An-
swering this question means outlining how to fulfill the conditions for 
technological reversibility that were formulated in response to the first subques-
tion. Given nuclear energy’s propensity for inflexibility, chapters 2, 4 and 5 
investigate the socio-technical dynamics that make it difficult to fulfil the first 
condition for technological reversibility. They do so by adapting and applying 
existing theory on the structuration of technology (chapter 2) and path depend-
ence and lock-in (chapters 4 and 5). Based on these insights, a number of 
strategies can be formulated for avoiding irreversibility. Chapter 5 studies the 
case of geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste in the USA and shows 
how the technology became locked-in. In addition, it proposes a number of 
strategies for undoing GD’s undesirable consequences. These can be used as 
heuristics for assessing the extent to which the second condition has been 
fulfilled and as design strategies for maximizing its potential. 
1.4. Overview of Chapters 
The four chapters that form the body of this thesis were originally devised for 
publication in peer-reviewed journals. Their abstracts are presented below and 
serve as short summaries for the different chapters. Chapters 2, 3 and 5 have 
already been published. Citations are provided in the corresponding footnotes. 
 
Chapter 2: Reversibility and Nuclear Energy Production Technologies: A Framework 
and Three Cases18 
Recent events have put the acceptability of the risks of nuclear energy production 
technologies (NEPT) under the spotlight. A focus on risks, however, could lead 
to the neglect of other aspects of NEPT, such as their irreversibility. I argue that 
awareness of the socio-historical development of NEPT is helpful for under-
standing their irreversibility. To this end, I conceptualize NEPT development as 
a process of structuration in which material, institutional and discursive ele-
ments are produced and/or reproduced by purposive social actors. This 
conceptualization is used to structure an analysis of how irreversibility arose in 
____________________________________________________________________ 
18  This chapter has been published as Bergen, J. P. (2016) ‘Reversibility and Nuclear Energy 
Production Technologies: A Framework and Three Cases’, in Ethics, Policy & Environment 19 
(1): 37–59. 
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the first decades of NEPT development in India, France and the USA, and how 
some NEPT have been reversed or partially reversed. Lastly, two general condi-
tions for reversible NEPT are formulated based on this analysis. 
 
Chapter 3: Responsible Innovation in Light of Levinas: Rethinking the Relation 
between Responsibility and Innovation19 
To date, much of the work on Responsible Innovation (RI) has focused on the 
‘responsible’ part of RI. This has left the ‘innovation’ part in need of conceptual 
innovation of its own. If such conceptual innovation is to contribute to a coher-
ent conception of RI, however, it is crucial to better understand the relation 
between responsibility and innovation first. This paper elucidates this relation by 
locating responsibility and innovation within Emmanuel Levinas’ phenomenol-
ogy. It structures his work into three ‘stages’, each described in terms of their 
leading experience and objectivation regime. This analysis identifies a need for 
constant innovation of political and technological systems, originating from and 
motivated by our responsibility to others. It also shows the relation between 
responsibility and innovation to be threefold: foundational, ethical, and struc-
tural. These insights could help RI to avoid some pitfalls of ‘regular’ innovation, 
and provide moral grounding for important aspects of RI. 
 
Chapter 4: Path Dependence, Agency and the Phenomenology of Technology Adoption 
The theory of path dependence remains a popular explanation for why markets 
or societies become locked into specific technological trajectories that become 
increasingly inflexible over time. However, a number of scholars have become 
skeptical of the value of historical case studies for studying path dependence (the 
dominant method up to this point) and instead recommend other approaches 
like lab experiments and simulations. Nonetheless, the ‘thick’ description of 
actual cases may still have significant value for the study of technological path 
dependence. First, thick socio-technical descriptions of the environment in 
which technology adoption occurs reveals normatively problematic aspects of 
path dependence beyond inefficiency. Secondly, a thicker, structurational notion 
of agency in path dependent processes could help to alleviate concerns about 
____________________________________________________________________ 
19  This chapter has been published as Bergen, J. P. (2017) ‘Responsible Innovation in light of 
Levinas: rethinking the relation between responsibility and innovation’, in Journal of Respon-
sible Innovation. Available online at: 
  http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23299460.2017.1387510 
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path dependence’ allegedly excessive determinism and its reliance on contin-
gency for path creation. This paper aims to contribute to such a structurational 
notion of agency by developing conceptual resources for agent-centered descrip-
tions of technological path dependence. It does so by reinterpreting the basic 
evolutionary building blocks of path dependence (i.e., technology adoption, 
technology and the social selection environment) through the lens of Alfred 
Schutz’ social phenomenology. The resulting perspectives provide a number of 
conceptual resources that should allow for better describing why and how agents 
make the technology adoption decisions that they do, and the way in which 
technology and the social selection environment mediate those choices and their 
consequences. 
 
Chapter 5: Reversible Experiments: Putting Geological Disposal to the Test20 
Conceiving of nuclear energy as a social experiment gives rise to the question of 
what to do when the experiment is no longer responsible or desirable. To be able 
to appropriately respond to such a situation, the nuclear energy technology in 
question should be reversible, i.e. it must be possible to stop its further develop-
ment and implementation in society, and it must be possible to undo its 
undesirable consequences. This paper explores these two conditions by applying 
them to geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste (GD). Despite the fact 
that considerations of reversibility and retrievability have received increased 
attention in GD, the analysis in this paper concludes that GD cannot be consid-
ered reversible. Firstly, it would be difficult to stop its further development and 
implementation, since its historical development has led to a point where GD is 
significantly locked-in. Secondly, the strategy it employs for undoing undesirable 
consequences is less-than-ideal: it relies on containment of severely radiotoxic 
waste rather than attempting to eliminate this waste or its radioactivity. And 
while it may currently be technologically impossible to turn high-level waste into 
benign substances, GD’s containment strategy makes it difficult to eliminate this 
waste’s radioactivity when the possibility would arise. In all, GD should be 
critically reconsidered if the inclusion of reversibility considerations in radioac-
tive waste management has indeed become as important as is sometimes 
claimed. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
20  This chapter has been published as Bergen, J. P. (2016) ‘Reversible Experiments: Putting 
Geological Disposal to the Test’, in Science and Engineering Ethics 22 (3): 707–733. 
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2 Reversibility and Nuclear Energy  
Production Technologies:  
a Framework and Three Cases 
Recent events have put the acceptability of the risks of nuclear energy production 
technologies (NEPT) under the spotlight. A focus on risks, however, could lead 
to the neglect of other aspects of NEPT, such as their irreversibility. I argue that 
awareness of the socio-historical development of NEPT is helpful for under-
standing their irreversibility. To this end, I conceptualize NEPT development as 
a process of structuration in which material, institutional and discursive ele-
ments are produced and/or reproduced by purposive social actors. This 
conceptualization is used to structure an analysis of how irreversibility arose in 
the first decades of NEPT development in India, France and the USA, and how 
some NEPT have been reversed or partially reversed. Lastly, two general condi-
tions for reversible NEPT are formulated based on this analysis. 
2.1. Introduction 
The nuclear disaster in Fukushima is still vivid in our collective memory. The 
subsequent uproar and far-reaching policy debates (e.g. in Germany) have put 
nuclear energy back on the agenda and under critical examination. One of the 
central questions is, of course: should the development and implementation of 
nuclear energy production technologies (NEPT) be continued and, if so, in what 
way? In considering this question, the nature and acceptability of the risks and 
benefits of NEPT have received much attention (e.g. Hale, 2011; Parkins & 
Haluza-Delay, 2011; Roeser, 2011; van de Poel, 2011). However, a focus on risks 
can result in failing to appreciate other aspects of NEPT that are relevant to the 
question whether to continue them, and requires comprehension of the socio-
historical process of NEPT development. This paper contributes insights into a 
specific feature that arises as NEPT are developed, namely technological irre-
versibility. Irreversibility has received attention in the literature on nuclear power 
and emerging technologies (e.g. Cowan, 1990; van Merkerk & van Lente, 2005) 
and has been implicitly present in some of the socio-technical literature, for 
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example in social embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985), entrenchment (e.g. Koch & 
Stemerding, 1994; Mulder & Knot, 2001), and path dependence and lock-in (e.g. 
Arthur, 1989, 1994; David, 2007; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995). The issue of 
irreversibility is of great importance for whether to continue developing or using 
NEPT. There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, NEPT are characterized by 
a degree of residual uncertainty and ignorance concerning risks, even after risk 
analysis has been performed and implementation in society has already begun 
(van de Poel, 2011). However, as learning about the technology continues, 
possibilities for making changes to the technology generally decrease.21 With this 
in mind, Collingridge (1980, 1983) argued that keeping NEPT flexible is para-
mount to optimal outcomes from its development.22 Secondly, better 
technological solutions for achieving the same goals as NEPT might be found. 
Replacing NEPT with another technology requires some degree of reversibility. 
Finally, even democratic considerations could drive one to reverse NEPT devel-
opment. 
 However, before it is possible to actually incorporate technological reversibil-
ity/ irreversibility as a useful variable in considering the acceptability of NEPT, it 
must first be properly identified and analysed. And while the above-mentioned 
frameworks and concepts could be helpful in this regard, they generally leave 
black-boxed the question what technology is, and uphold a distinction between 
agency and technology that arguably does not do justice to their co-constitutive 
relation (e.g. Orlikowski, 1992, 2007). This paper provides a framework that 
incorporates these points by characterizing NEPT development as a process of 
structuration. Building on some of the basic tenets of structuration theory 
(Giddens, 1984), augmented with insights from the sociology of expectations 
(e.g. Borup, Brown, Konrad & van Lente, 2006), this paper presents technology 
as a structural property of social systems. This is further elaborated upon in 
sections 2.2 and 2.3. In sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, the first decades of the NEPT 
development in India, France and the USA are analysed. Finally, what insight 
this analysis provides into the reversibility and irreversibility of NEPT is ex-
plained in section 2.7. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
21  This is part of the famous Collingridge Dilemma, or the dilemma of control (Collingridge, 
1980). 
22  Admittedly, Collingridge’s notion of flexibility is less severe in its outlook than reversibility as 
such. It is, however, to a certain extent comparable in what I mean by ‘partial reversibility’ 
below. 
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2.2. Technology Development as a Process of Structuration 
Reflection on technology often focuses on material artefacts and ‘hard’ aspects 
such as risks and benefits (Sørensen, 2004; Swierstra & te Molder, 2012). In 
what follows, a different conceptualization of technology is introduced in order 
to further our understanding of technological irreversibility. This conceptualiza-
tion is essentially a social one, since technology development is not detachable 
from its social context and is wrought with subjectivity and contingency (Pinch & 
Bijker, 1987). Additionally, technology is developed by people with certain goals 
in mind. These goals are neither pre-given nor random; they are based in socially 
constructed, subjective human aspirations. Aspirations entail hopes and ambi-
tions, held by individual human agents. They are the discursive23 result of an 
agent’s reflexive monitoring of its actions and inner motivations as well as its 
social and physical surroundings. These aspirations can be shared between 
agents and then function as expectations24 that determine the direction of 
technology development by mobilizing actors and resources and by setting a 
development path through promising and visioning (Borup et al., 2006). And 
while these aspirations guide the direction of technology development, technol-
ogy in turn influences our aspirations. 
 The theory underlying this idea – the theory of structuration – was first 
proposed by Anthony Giddens (1979, 1984). It builds on what Giddens calls the 
‘duality of structure’, meaning that ‘the structural properties of social systems 
are both the medium and the outcome of practices that constitute these systems’ 
(Giddens, 1979, p. 69), wherein the continuous reciprocal reproduction of 
structure and agency is what he calls the ‘structuration process’. The structural 
properties of social systems are ‘institutionalized features of social systems, 
stretching across time and space’ (Giddens, 1984 p. 185). Orlikowski (1992) 
suggests that technology is a prime example of such a structural property.25 
Based on Giddens’ ‘duality of structure’, Orlikowski proposes a recursive notion 
____________________________________________________________________ 
23  That is, they can be uttered in language. As such, they are operationalizable as guides for 
action, and can be shared with other agents. 
24 
 Such expectations and their effect on technological development are the subject of the 
‘sociology of expectations’ (see Brown & Michael, 2003). 
25  This is arguably more in line with the ‘duality of structure’ than Giddens’ own idea of 
technology, which did not extend much beyond a ‘means of material produc-
tion/reproduction’, or resources implicated by actors in structures of domination (Giddens, 
1984 p. 258). 
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of technology in the form of the ‘duality of technology’ (p. 405). Material tech-
nology is created through action and enables humans to do things that were 
previously not possible. On the other hand, it constrains human agents by 
making certain options for action more or less attractive or affordable.26 By 
habitually calling these technologies into play, actors objectify and institutional-
ize them (Orlikowski, 1992). This is crucial, since the stability implied allows 
actors to make sense of technologies and discover how to use them, and are 
thereby able to take advantage of technologies to do 'work'. 
 What sorts of structural elements give rise to technology as a structural 
property of social systems through reproduction and transformation by agents? 
Arts, Leroy and Tatenhove (2006, p. 99) present a framework for the analysis of 
policy domains that is based on the duality of structure. It identifies four dimen-
sions: actors, discourses, rules of the game and resources. In light of 
Orlikowski’s ‘duality of technology’, I have revised this division resulting in a 
different topography of the structural elements implicated in a duality of tech-
nology, as shown in table 2.1. 
 
____________________________________________________________________ 
26  Be it by having limited functionalities (e.g. nuclear reactors producing weapon-grade 
plutonium or not), by having negative outcomes other than intended functionality (e.g. 
producing hazardous wastes in the process of producing electricity) or by seemingly necessitat-
ing certain institutional arrangements (e.g. NEPT requiring a strong authoritative state as 
argued by Winner (1980)). 
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Table 2.1 Structural elements implicated in the duality of technology 
Structural dimension Discursive Institutional Material 
    
Space for action 
constituted and 
constrained by 
Discourse Rules 
Material  
affordance 
    
Resources drawn upon 
Discursive 
resources 
Authoritative 
resources 
Allocative  
resources 
Technology-specific 
Shared aspira-
tions, specific 
content of 
documents, and 
identification/ 
symbolic 
features of a 
technology... 
Solid work 
routines, codes, 
procedures for 
decision-making, 
organizations 
responsible for the 
technology’s 
working... 
Material re-
sources, means of 
material produc-
tion and 
reproduction, 
produced goods... 
General 
Larger symbolic 
orders 
Larger institu-
tional features, 
such as the State, 
market, etc. 
Material features 
of the envi-
ronment, 
including other 
technologies 
 
 In the discursive dimension, I distinguish between a) discourse as agents' 
shared views and narratives as enabling and constraining agency, and b) discur-
sive resources drawn upon in developing technology (including shared 
aspirations). The institutional dimension of technology includes rules and 
authoritative resources, namely the elements implicated in the regulation and 
coordination of human action. The material dimension of technology includes 
allocative resources, as well as a technology’s material affordance, namely the 
idea that the specific material structure of a technology makes certain actions 
more or less affordable than others. As such, material elements are made 
functionally analogous to discursive or institutional ones, and the three dimen-
sions can be taken up in parallel for an analysis of technological irreversibility. 
Lastly, while actors are always implicated in the reproduction and transformation 
of NEPT, an analysis of the elements that make up NEPT focuses on structure 
rather than agency. As such, actors and their actions and interactions are treated 
here as a necessary background condition for the historical analysis of the 
production, reproduction and transformation of the elements of NEPT. 
 In sum, a technology consists of relatively stable sets of elements of all three 
structural dimensions, stretching across time and space through recursive 
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implication by social actors, delineated from the rest of the social system by their 
discursive identification as belonging to a specific technology.  
2.3. Structuration and Technological Irreversibility 
The continual reproduction and transformation of social structure through 
action gives rise to the longevity of institutions. Indeed, the structural properties 
of social systems (like technology) can exhibit amazing tenacity due to the 
structuration process involved exhibiting positive feedback, or as Giddens calls 
this phenomenon, ‘circuits of reproduction’ (Giddens, 1984 p. 190). When this 
dynamic is sufficiently strong, technology development can 'get caught' in 
circuits of reproduction and a technology becomes more and more irreversible. 
That is, stopping its development or undoing its constitutive structural elements 
(see table 2.1) becomes increasingly difficult. My conception of such a circuit of 
technology reproduction is shown in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Circuit of technology reproduction 
 
According to Giddens, one important aspect contributing to the continuation of 
circuits of reproduction is the absence of contradiction, or as I call it here, the 
absence of disalignment. When it is difficult or practically impossible for agents 
to reproduce a set of elements because acting upon one element would weaken 
the other(s), there is disalignment between these elements. As I will show in the 
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cases below, it is often disalignment between structural elements27 that incite 
conflict and offer opportunities for disruptive interventions in the development 
of NEPT, possibly reversing the technology or elements thereof. However, not all 
disalignment leads to disruptive events. One reason for this is that the introduc-
tion of new elements (e.g. renewable energy sources, innovative legislation or a 
redefinition of sustainability) is difficult, because it is also likely to be disaligned 
with a system structured ‘around’ the old technology. Another important reason 
for this phenomenon is the asymmetrical distribution of resources in favour of 
those supporting the status quo, which allows them to prevent others from 
acting upon disalignments (e.g. by secrecy or sanctions) or to limit the effective-
ness of counter-efforts (e.g. by being in powerful networks with significant 
decision-making power). In the end, the consequences of disruptive events 
might be limited to undoing only some elements of a technology, and leaving 
the majority of elements in place. In this case, one might speak of the partial 
reversal of that technology. 
 In what follows, this conceptualization of technology and its development is 
applied to explore the development of NEPT in India, France and the USA in the 
period between 1945 and 1980. These specific countries were selected because a) 
they have all developed domestic NEPT, which is interesting for a framework 
conceptualizing technology development; b) they started doing so at more or less 
the same time, which makes the global background conditions similar; and c) 
their specific socioeconomic, cultural and political backgrounds differ consid-
erably, which provides some interesting divergences in technology development 
trajectories28. In this analysis, a combination of material, institutional and 
____________________________________________________________________ 
27  Note that Giddens (1984) is principally interested in contradiction at a much more 
fundamental level (p. 198). 
28  One might expect here, rather than India, France and the USA, countries in which nuclear 
energy has been successfully abandoned like Italy or Germany. However, given the extraordi-
nary and traumatic nature of the events that eventually triggered this abandonment (the 
Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters respectively), it seems that it is basically the difficulty of 
abandoning NEPT (i.e. irreversibility) that must first be understood in order to then under-
stand how it can be overcome. Moreover, neither Italy nor Germany have really indigenously 
developed NEPT and as such, could not adequately showcase the theory presented in this 
paper of how irreversibility arises during technology development. I suspect, however, that 
applying the theory of technological irreversibility (sections 2.2 and 2.3) and the conditions for 
reversible technology (section 2.7.4) developed in this paper to these cases could shed light on 
why these countries were successful in abandoning NEPT as well as on the extent to which the 
indigenousness of a technology contributes to its irreversibility. 
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discursive elements of NEPT are brought together with the socio-historical 
context in which they arose. As such, the analysis consists of building a socio-
historical narrative for each country’s NEPT development trajectory, structured 
according to the three structural dimensions, and a discussion of the main 
elements involved in the circuits of NEPT reproduction and their disturbance, if 
applicable.  
2.4. India 
The birth of the Indian nuclear energy programme can be traced back to the 
years after the country gained independence from British rule in 1947. Under 
Nehru (India’s first prime minister), development and independence became 
themes that guided both state policy and popular sentiment. One important part 
of development policy was a domestic nuclear energy programme. The govern-
ment began by setting up the Tata Institute for Fundamental Research in 1948. 
Its director, Homi Bhabha, can be called the father of the Indian nuclear energy 
programme, since his three-phase plan guides NEPT development to this day. In 
1954, the programme gained pace and importance with the creation of the 
Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and by 1956, the first test reactor was 
running. In 1957, what would become the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre 
(BARC) was set up and by 1969, India’s first commercial reactors were online.  
 Nuclear energy development continues to this day (although nuclear energy 
provides only about 4% of India’s electricity) and is expanding rapidly as the 
programme enters the second of its three planned phases. The first phase 
consisted of pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) to generate energy and 
the necessary plutonium fuel for the second phase, in which fast breeder reac-
tors (FBRs) will burn this fuel, thus generating the plutonium and uranium 
isotopes necessary for a thorium-based29 reactor fleet by 2050 (phase three), by 
which time 25% of India’s electricity needs should be met by nuclear fission 
(World Nuclear Association, 2012a).  
____________________________________________________________________ 
29  India’s thorium reserves are markedly larger than its uranium reserves. 
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2.4.1. Discursive 
When identifying the discursive elements of the early Indian nuclear energy 
programme, three main themes seem to play an important role: the pro-
gramme’s socio-historical roots in a post-colonial state, Bhabha and his three-
phase plan for nuclear development, and the lack of distinction between civil and 
military nuclear applications. 
 The nuclear energy programme originated shortly after India’s independ-
ence, when the values of national pride, development and independence took 
centre stage across society as well as in government policy. There was a trend 
towards the large-scale nationalization of heavy industries and a general agree-
ment that government was best at taking economic policy decisions and could 
bring about progressive change (Sovacool & Valentine, 2010). In this spirit of 
nationalization, the nuclear energy programme was seen as a prerequisite for 
modern development and energy independence. Indeed, supporting Bhabha’s 
ideas for Indian nuclear energy, Nehru held the view that India’s development 
should be articulated through techno-scientific advances and rationalization, of 
which nuclear energy was the Holy Grail. In other words, a centralist, techno-
cratic ideology was at play in the making of the Indian nuclear energy 
programme (Sovacool & Valentine, 2010). 
 The idea of ‘development towards independence’ was a leading discursive 
element in the setup of the nuclear energy programme. The three-phase plan 
proposed by Bhabha in 1954 has proven to be a robust guideline: it still dictates 
the planning of Indian nuclear energy development, which is still aimed at 
increased energy independence through the eventual use of thorium. One 
reason the spirit of the early years of the programme lives on is the idea that 
‘[o]ne has to attribute these achievements [in nuclear energy] entirely to the 
vision of Bhabha and Nehru, the tenacity of their successors in staying the 
course against all adversities’ (Gopalakrishnan, 2002 pp. 391-392). 
 Another discursive aspect that characterized the Indian nuclear energy 
programme was the strict secrecy surrounding it. Nehru defended this secrecy, 
stating that it prevented sensitive information and/or technology getting into the 
wrong hands (Gopalakrishnan, 2002), be they those of competing nuclear 
energy developers or military opponents (e.g. Pakistan or China). Whether this 
exhausts the reason for secrecy, however, is debatable. In all, it has to be said 
that this secrecy seems to have helped ‘protect’ the programme by limiting the 
opposition’s access to discursive resources. 
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 The drive for domestic development and self-reliance led to a focus on 
indigenous technology (with international help early on). Thus, the nuclear 
energy programme was aimed at capacity building in Indian industry, in addi-
tion to energy production. Although limited reliability gave rise to several 
significant incidents during the first decades of the programme (Ramana, 2007; 
Tomar, 1980), secrecy and faith in central government control minimized their 
impact on the programme. 
 When asked in 1948 why both civil and military applications were cloaked in 
strict secrecy, Nehru had to confess: ‘I do not know how to distinguish between 
the two’, confirming the non-distinction between civil and military NEPT. This 
non-distinction has been seen as leaving open the possibility to use the nuclear 
energy infrastructure for military applications, a suspicion that gained credibility 
after India’s ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ in 1974, for which plutonium from civil 
reactors was used. After 1974, international cooperation was hampered by the 
weapons test, since India had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Building 
on the imagery of self-reliance and domestic development in the face of interna-
tional adversity, however, the Indian nuclear energy programme kept receiving 
national support (Ramana, 2007).  
2.4.2. Institutional 
Many of the discursive aspects described above were aligned with the institu-
tional arrangements through which the Indian nuclear energy programme took 
shape, and those institutional configurations have helped to carry the original 
aspirations into the present. 
 NEPT in India before 1983 was almost completely managed and regulated by 
the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE, established in 1954) and the Atomic 
Energy Commission30 (AEC, established in 1958). The Bhabha Atomic Research 
Centre (BARC), which is part of the DAE, and its subsidiaries undertake most 
civil and military nuclear research. The permanence and power of this central-
ized nuclear establishment are partly a result of how it is organized: the AEC 
answers directly to the Indian prime minister, and the prime minister and his 
cabinet have generally had a ‘virtual lock on policymaking’ due to the govern-
____________________________________________________________________ 
30  Set up in 1958, the AEC became the intermediary between the DAE and the prime minister 
and is responsible for implementing government policy on nuclear matters and creating policy 
and budgets for the DAE. 
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mental structure (Sovacool & Valentine, 2010 p. 3807). Although the importance 
of the nuclear energy programme was already recognized in 1948 (roughly one-
quarter of all Indian R&D spending was directed towards nuclear research from 
the 1950s to the 1980s (Tomar, 1980)), it was the 1962 Atomic Energy Act that 
really consolidated the institutional embedding of the establishment’s power and 
the justification of secrecy. The fact that civil and military nuclear applications 
had not been conceptually distinguished repeated itself on an organizational 
level, where the DAE was responsible for both domains and BARC did most of 
the research into both domains. This management and research monopoly 
corresponded to the nuclear plant ownership and exploitation, whereby only 
central government or government-run institutions could engage in these 
activities, and had majority ownership. 
 One more institutional aspect of NEPT reinforced the reliance on Indian 
engineering and the focus on self-reliance: liability. The 1962 Atomic Energy Act 
did not mention liability or compensation in the event of an accident. This was 
not necessarily problematic for Indian nuclear power plants, as the government 
was officially liable in the end. Foreign nuclear technology sellers, however, 
would face full liability, which would make the economics of operating nuclear 
power plants uncompetitive, and were thus demotivated from entering the 
Indian nuclear energy field. All of this kept India on its three-phase technologi-
cal trajectory. 
2.4.3. Material 
The material level of Indian NEPT corresponds to the discursive and institu-
tional dimensions sketched above. Most of the Indian nuclear reactor fleet 
consists of PHWRs, which produce high ratios of plutonium as a fission product 
useable for energy production. This plutonium is necessary for the FBRs of the 
second phase. In addition, Indian PHWRs can run on natural uranium, which is 
important for self-reliance and independence from other countries. By choosing 
PHWRs for the Indian nuclear energy programme, the way to military applica-
tions was left open, as the plutonium from the PHWRs allowed for the 
construction of nuclear weapons. 
 India’s nuclear energy programme relies on a closed fuel cycle (World 
Nuclear Association, 2012a). This allows for greater fuel efficiency by recycling 
in mixed oxide fuel (MOX), and is necessary for separating plutonium from 
spent fuel as input for the FBRs in phases two and three. This closed fuel cycle 
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will, at least in principle, increase resource efficiency and independence, and 
lower the total volume and long-term risks of long-lived waste (Taebi & 
Kloosterman, 2008). Until then, however, spent fuel is stored for later use. 
However, as with all nuclear energy programmes, hazardous and long-lived 
waste is still produced as a by-product of nuclear energy production, which India 
plans to manage using deep geological disposal (Wattal, 2013). 
 India’s PHWRs were the result of consciously domestic, centralized nuclear 
technology development, resulting in plants containing a high degree of Indian 
engineering. Development of the material elements of Indian NEPT has not 
been without its own set of difficulties, however, as not all materials and person-
nel education have always been up to par, leading to unsafe situations (Ramana, 
2007; Tomar, 1980). In all, the material elements presented and the discursive 
elements – like national development, independence and technocracy (the 
intricate fuel cycle fitting well with a centralized and technocratic governance 
structure) – were well-aligned. 
2.5. France 
The early period of what could be called the most successful nuclear energy 
programme in the world (more than 75% of French electricity comes from 
nuclear fission (World Nuclear Association, 2012b)) presents a case of partial 
reversibility. 
 The French nuclear energy programme officially started in 1945 with the 
creation of the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (CEA) under the auspices of 
the Prime Minister, Charles de Gaulle. By 1956, the CEA’s first real reactor was 
running (Hecht, 1998). The nuclear programme was part of rebuilding France 
after the economic devastation caused by WW2, of regaining the ‘radiance of 
France’ (Hecht, 1998). This also led to the nationalization of energy provision 
under government-owned Électricité de France (EDF) in 1946. The CEA and 
EDF had serious disagreements on France’s nuclear future. This led them to 
different reactor designs, in which the ambitions of the agencies took material 
form. After two and a half decades of nuclear energy development, EDF man-
aged to make the pressurized water reactor (PWR) the favoured reactor 
technology for the French nuclear programme. 
Reversibility and Nuclear Energy Production Technologies 
31 
2.5.1. Discursive 
A number of discursive elements have been important to the development of the 
nuclear energy programme in France: the ‘Radiance of France’ that had to be 
regained, the connection of the programme and its artefacts to historical tradi-
tion and politics, French  independence (including energy independence) and 
the limited distinction between military and civil nuclear activities. 
 After WW2, the Fourth Republic maintained the technocratic, managerialist 
and state-centric tendencies of the Third Republic. It aimed to restore the 
‘Radiance of France’ (Hecht, 1998). This French ‘radiance’ was supposed to 
connect modern France with a more glorious past, a past of Louis XIV, chateaus 
and cathedrals, the now broken empire. Nuclear reactors were described in 
terms of modern cathedrals and chateaus, or were compared in size to the Arc 
de Triomphe (Hecht, 1998). Nuclear energy was not a break with the past; it was 
a modern continuation of French traditional ingenuity and grandeur. For this 
project to succeed, ‘une attitude prospective’ (an attitude of inventive spirit) was 
needed, relying on ‘large new technologies’31 like nuclear technology. This 
necessitated systemic central planning but would allow France to once again 
become a successful, independent, flourishing nation (Hecht, 1998). National 
prowess, redevelopment and independence32 became the values that would play 
an important role in the programme. 
 These values made the nuclear programme ideal for rebuilding a radiant 
France in more than one way. Even early on, military and civil nuclear applica-
tions were seen as benefitting from each other in a mutual dependence 
relationship (Schneider, 2010). Regaining the radiance of France through 
nuclear development and gaining increased independence meant achieving both 
energy independence and nuclear military prowess, which legitimated the State 
as responsible for the programme. 
 Nuclear energy’s link with national pride meant that NEPT needed to be 
thoroughly ‘French’ and had to contribute to a radiant France. How that was to 
be done, however, was still open for discussion. Despite the original ‘French’ 
technology being uranium naturel graphite gaz (UNGG; natural uranium gas 
____________________________________________________________________ 
31  Technology was also conceptually separated from politics. It was supposedly neutral and 
rational. This is ironic, as the political dimensions of NEPT in France have had such impact on 
the programme’s development (Hecht, 1998). 
32  This drive for energy independence explains the drastic response to the 1973 oil crisis in the 
Messmer Plan, which aimed at lowering France’s dependence on foreign oil. 
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graphite) reactors, the CEA and EDF disagreed on the intricacies in designing 
these reactors. Whereas the CEA developed its reactors from a more nationalistic 
and dual use (civil and military) perspective, EDF (without military objectives) 
redirected justificatory discourse in the 1960s towards economic factors (e.g. the 
‘competitive kilowatt-hour’), since it held that economically competitive nuclear 
energy was the best way to rebuild France (Hecht, 1998). 
 Lastly, access to information about nuclear issues was relatively limited 
(Schneider, 2010). Whereas general communication about nuclear energy was 
largely positive and often interwoven with nationalistic sentiment, critical voices 
often went unheard or unappreciated. As such, the discursive resources available 
to the public were limited and rather one-sided. This situation held at least until 
the substantial expansion of the nuclear energy programme in the 1970s, when 
more critical voices and public dissent arose. 
2.5.2. Institutional 
Much of the decision-making power over industrial and economic matters was 
in the hands of a technocratic elite: the ‘Corps des Mines’, a select group of 
polytechniciens33 (engineers) that held important positions inside government and 
industry (Hecht, 1998; Schneider, 2010), with a clear distinction between policy 
insiders and outsiders (Teräväinen, Lehtonen & Martiskainen, 2011). This was 
also the case in the organization of the CEA (1945) and EDF (1946). The CEA 
was responsible for R&D concerning nuclear energy for both civil and military 
applications (in mutually beneficial configurations), including fuel cycle and 
nuclear reactor development. Its craving for the ‘Radiance of France’ explains its 
nationalism and the intricate connection between its nuclear activities and the 
then prevalent French politics (Hecht, 1998). EDF, on the other hand, was 
responsible for energy production and distribution, which included the design, 
construction and operation of nuclear power plants. However, EDF’s activities 
had little or no military connection. Their idea of how the nuclear programme 
was to help achieve national goals was more liberal, international and generally 
much more focussed on the economics of nuclear energy (Hecht, 1998). 
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33  These engineers were being trained to be leaders, combining engineering, national pride and 
public service as values guiding their work (Hecht, 1998). 
Reversibility and Nuclear Energy Production Technologies 
33 
 Since the French nuclear energy programme has largely escaped democratic 
parliamentary control34 (Schneider, 2010), CEA and EDF engineers were in-
volved in what Hecht (1998) describes as ‘techno-politics’; that is, through the 
creation of institutional arrangements and technical artefacts, they were able to 
push their agendas for French radiance. This political conflict, hidden in tech-
nology, culminated in the ‘guerre des filières’ (war of the systems), from which 
EDF’s more ‘apolitical’, economically oriented programme emerged victorious 
with the PWR as dominant reactor technology at the end of the 1960s35 (Hecht, 
1998). Despite this victory for EDF, the rest of the nuclear fuel cycle, including 
mining, reprocessing and some enrichment, remained under the control of the 
CEA or its subsidiaries. This is interesting, since the disentanglement of nuclear 
power from military applications by EDF in preferring PWRs to UNGG reactors 
does not extend across the fuel cycle. France has had no fully separate civil and 
military nuclear fuel cycles (Schneider, 2010). 
 Concerning liability, in the past France had the lowest maximum liability 
limits in Europe (Faure & Fiore, 2008). If EDF had to insure itself against a 
worst-case scenario, the cost of electricity production would increase signifi-
cantly (Schneider, 2010). 
2.5.3. Material 
The first eight reactors in the French nuclear energy programme were all of the 
UNGG type and were built by the CEA and EDF. However, they differed in 
subtle ways that allowed the CEA and EDF to materialize their political positions. 
CEA’s first serious UNGG reactors (operational in 1956, 1959 and 1960, respec-
tively) had markedly less energy output in favour of better plutonium 
production.36 EDF, however, controlled the design of the non-nuclear parts of the 
reactors constructed at its site in Chinon (i.e. not the reactor core and fuel rods, 
which were the CEA’s responsibility). As such, its first reactors (operational in 
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34  No legislation specific to nuclear energy was passed in France until 1991 (Schneider, 2010). 
35  The first French PWR started operations in 1967 in Chooz, based on a Westinghouse license. 
In fact, the first French PWR at Chooz was not built by EDF, but was the result of a bid by 
Framatome (a private nuclear engineering firm), showing EDF’s more economically liberal 
stance on nuclear power plant construction. 
36  EDF did participate in CEA’s first reactors, which strengthened its position as a nuclear player, 
but this could not prohibit ‘below optimal’ energy output as favoured by the CEA (Hecht, 
1998). 
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1964, 1965 and 1966, respectively) were far better suited for more efficient 
energy production, which was in line with EDF’s vision of how nuclear energy 
was to contribute to the ‘Radiance of France’ (Hecht, 1998). 
 EDF, with its discursive strategy of ‘depoliticizing’ nuclear energy’s merits by 
strategically making economic efficiency and liberal market competitiveness 
important, managed to legitimate the ‘foreign’ PWR (developed in the USA; see 
section 2.6) as the most economically feasible candidate for French nuclear 
energy production. After the expansion of nuclear energy capacity after the oil 
crisis in 1973, total PWR capacity dwarfed that of other reactor types.37 
 However, the CEA’s ambitions were still alive as the French had a closed fuel 
cycle in which they recycled part of their nuclear waste into MOX, which re-
quires the separation of uranium and plutonium from nuclear waste. Their 
military and civil fuel cycles were not fully separated, discursively, institutionally 
or materially (i.e. they had been processed in the same waste treatment plants in 
Marcoule and La Hague since 1958 and 1976, respectively). In addition, the 
recycling of waste increases fuel efficiency, contributing to French energy 
independence. It also significantly lowers the total volume of long-lived waste to 
be disposed of in geological repositories, and this waste’s radiotoxicity will 
decrease more quickly to non-hazardous levels compared to the waste from an 
open fuel cycle (Taebi & Kloosterman, 2008). Since 1978, France has been 
domestically enriching uranium for running PWRs (World Nuclear Association, 
2012b), which adds to the country’s energy independence. 
 As such, the discursive and institutional elements presented above are 
aligned with the material elements of French NEPT, with a relatively stable 
balance between the CEA’s and EDF’s techno-political aspirations. As such, the 
case of France shows how even slightly different aspirations can give rise to 
different material configurations, and how disalignments between discursive 
and institutional elements wielded by different actors can sometimes still be 
reconciled through material elements. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
37  EDF currently operates 58 nuclear reactors, with a total generation capacity of 63 GWe, good 
for over 75% of the country’s total electricity generation (World Nuclear Association, 2012b). 
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2.6. USA 
The USA’s civil nuclear energy programme has its origins in military research 
during WW2. This research resulted in the development of the atomic bomb, 
which was eventually used in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Parsons, 
1995). After the war, in 1946, the Atomic Energy Act established the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC), which initially focussed almost exclusively on 
military nuclear development. Policy changes in the early 1950s, spurred by 
Soviet nuclear progress, culminated in Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech in 
1953 and the subsequent opening up of the nuclear programme to private parties 
for the construction and exploitation of nuclear power plants under the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 (Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984). By 1957, the first commercial 
reactor at Shippingport was online. The nuclear programme grew exponentially 
in the 1960s and early 1970s, but its expansion had practically ground to a halt 
by 1980 (Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984). Currently, 104 reactors provide about 19% 
of total electricity production in the USA (World Nuclear Association, 2013). The 
institutional elements that supported the programme’s initial success, and its 
paralysis after 1980, are especially interesting. 
2.6.1. Discursive 
Before 1953, the American nuclear energy programme was dominated by 
military nuclear research and application. Confidentiality was so stringent 
concerning technical data that industry had little or no access to it and did not 
initiate nuclear power development in earnest (Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984). This 
changed drastically after Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech in 1953. The 
discursive elements deployed in the speech were meant to help establish the 
USA’s new place in a peaceful nuclear world, and to rhetorically distance itself 
from the other side in the Cold War: the Soviet Union. 
 Firstly, ‘Atoms for Peace’ was meant to contain the destructive force of the 
atom as had been witnessed in Japan only a few years before (Jasanoff & Kim, 
2009), to ‘strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace’.38 As such, the 
speech sought to make a very clear discursive distinction between civil and 
military applications of nuclear technology and indicated that they could indeed 
____________________________________________________________________ 
38  For a full transcript of the speech, see http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html 
(accessed 29 March 2013). 
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be separated (Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984). This distinction marked a break with 
the previous decade, when the AEC considered military and civil nuclear devel-
opment ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Lilienthal, 1947, p. 7). The speech was also 
meant to quell fear of the USA itself, a superpower with enormous destructive 
potential that was now committed to peaceful nuclear development39 and would 
aid others by providing technology and know-how (and thus limit the Soviet 
Union’s nuclear inlfuence in the world) (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009; Parsons, 1995). 
 Secondly, it implicitly and ideologically distanced Eisenhower’s USA – the 
society of ‘freedom, self-determination and life’ (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009, p. 127) – 
from the Soviet Union, with its communist economic model and strong state 
influence in all aspects of life. This strengthened the call for nuclear privatiza-
tion and limited government interference in a nuclear energy market. Similarly, 
the shroud of secrecy was lifted a little in 1954, as industry needed information 
in order to design, develop, construct and exploit nuclear power plants. This 
opened up possibilities for private industry by granting them discursive re-
sources not previously available to them. 
2.6.2. Institutional 
Since nationalized energy provision would not fit the ideological climate of the 
times, the USA’s nuclear energy programme relied on industry and private 
utilities to design, build and operate nuclear power plants. This was reflected in 
the way the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was set up in 1946: it was 
responsible for the regulation, R&D and promotion of both military and civil 
nuclear power (Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984), but was forbidden to build or operate 
full-scale power plants, and had to rely on industry and utilities to do so instead 
(Cowan, 1990). Before 1954, private industry’s access to technical information 
on NEPT was severely restricted and as such, the industry did not develop. 
Meanwhile, the AEC focused its efforts mostly on military nuclear power, 
culminating in the development of nuclear naval propulsion with PWRs. Once 
industry was granted access to technical nuclear information in 1954, the AEC 
could focus on facilitating the development of a civil nuclear industry (Clarfield 
& Wiecek, 1984). Although privatization was important, liability was set by the 
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39  This adherence to peaceful development held true only insofar as the USA’s military and civil 
programmes were materially separated after 1954. The Cold War still saw a serious American 
nuclear weapons build-up. 
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Price-Anderson Act of 1957 at $60 million for the company in question (because 
private insurers would not insure for a larger amount), and $500 million was 
committed by the federal government in the event of an accident. This provided 
a safe investment environment for private industries, but required considerable 
government warrant (Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984). This may seem to go against a 
truly private nuclear energy industry, but there was national interest in its 
development too, as put forward in ‘Atoms for Peace’: exportable NEPT to 
strengthen the USA’s international position in nuclear affairs (Jasanoff & Kim, 
2009). 
 The AEC’s dual role as promoter and regulator put it into a conflict of inter-
est between the interests of the nuclear industry (promotion) and the interests of 
US citizens (safety regulation), and the AEC has indeed at times traded off its 
regulatory responsibilities against industrial success in order to enable the latter. 
For example, over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, the AEC and the industry 
had been rather conservative with funding and publishing research into the risks 
of nuclear power (Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984). For instance, the AEC’s decision to 
not fully disclose the results arising from the 1964 revision of the 1957 WASH-
740 report on the risks of nuclear energy was partly inspired by the detrimental 
effects the increased risk estimates in the revision would have on nuclear indus-
trial development (Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984; J. S. Walker, 1992). On top of this, 
the multitude of reactor designs and operating procedures employed by private 
industry made it especially difficult to overview the specific risks for every 
situation and made licensing procedures slow. However, risks were not the only 
thing that could make or break the industry. Cost prospects in the 1950s and 
1960s were extremely optimistic, assuming that increased experience and 
economies of scale would push nuclear energy prices down to a level ‘too cheap 
to meter’.40 It was thought that the costs of nuclear energy production would end 
up well below those of conventional fuels, like coal. This idea took on a life of its 
own as the industry and the AEC echoed one another’s optimistic cost estimates. 
Despite the unrealistic assumptions on which this optimism was based, it had a 
profound effect, namely it helped start a bandwagon market for nuclear power 
with orders for plants rolling in faster than the AEC could license them 
____________________________________________________________________ 
40  The term was coined by Lewis Strauss, then the chairman of the AEC, in a 1954 speech to the 
National Association of Science Writers (Strauss, 1954). Although not to be taken literally as a 
realistic cost estimate for nuclear fission, it has become iconic of the economic optimism at the 
time concerning nuclear power and its future. 
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(Carlfield & Wiecek, 1984). However, as the 1970s began, nuclear energy faced 
increased contestation from the environmental movement (especially in the 
wake of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970). This led to increased 
safety standards, and the realization that the economics of nuclear energy were 
much worse than previously assumed, and by 1973 the number of orders had 
dropped considerably (Parsons, 1995). It is interesting to note that while the 
courts generally favoured the AEC and its decisions during the 1950s and 1960s, 
the judiciary culture in the USA provided a legitimate realm for contestation 
(Clarfield & Wiecek, 1984). This contestation indirectly helped lead to stringent 
regulation and helped spur the criticism of the AEC, laying bare the conflict of 
interest it operated on. 
 By 1974, the AEC was under such strong attack for unduly favouring the 
industry it was meant to regulate that it was dissolved. Regulation, licensing, 
materials management and the setting of safety standards were brought under 
the wing of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the promotional 
activities were assigned to the Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion (ERDA). As a result, and under increasing societal pressure, regulation 
became even more stringent, risks were more systematically investigated41 and 
costs rose dramatically. The Three Mile Island nuclear accident in 1979 was the 
proverbial nail in the coffin of what twenty years earlier had been an exponen-
tially growing nuclear energy industry (Parsons, 1995). 
2.6.3. Material 
The fact that in its early life the AEC focused on military applications of nuclear 
energy had led to an initial organization of industry around and increased 
experience with PWRs (Cowan, 1990). Despite the AEC’s early experimentation 
in the 1950s with a number of different reactor types (Parsons, 1995), the 
urgency lent to the programme by the ‘Atoms for Peace’ drove the nuclear 
industry towards a solution that was relatively reliable in the short term due to 
this experience: PWRs. 
 The clear distinction in ‘Atoms for Peace’ between military and civil nuclear 
power is also reflected in the abandonment of reactors specifically designed for 
____________________________________________________________________ 
41  For example, despite critique of the uncertainties of the underlying research, the 1975 WASH-
1400 or ‘Rasmussen’ report was much further developed than its 1957 counterpart and 
introduced the methodological basis for modern probabilistic risk assessment. 
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dual use, which were considered in the early years of the AEC (Clarfield & 
Wiecek, 1984). Moreover, ‘Atoms for Peace’ also set the stage for the open fuel 
cycle in two main ways. By urging privatization and making cost a critical aspect 
of nuclear power generation, it assisted the allegedly cheaper open fuel cycle 
(Deutch et al., 2003). Closed fuel cycles also leave more room for military abuse, 
by reprocessing waste and extracting fissionable materials suited for military 
applications (Deutch et al., 2003), a goal not aligned with the distinction between 
civil and military nuclear power so adamantly emphasized by Eisenhower in 
1953. Finally, the institutional arrangement of a privatized nuclear power indus-
try with a plethora of specific plant designs and operations probably helped push 
the USA towards an open fuel cycle, as the management of a closed fuel cycle 
would be significantly more difficult than under a centralized, uniform pro-
gramme such as that in France or India. As alluded to above, however, this open 
fuel cycle produces higher volumes of high-level radioactive wastes42 that also 
remain radiotoxic for significantly longer than their French and Indian counter-
parts (Taebi & Kloosterman, 2008). 
2.7. Irreversibility of NEPT in India, France and the USA 
As the historical narratives above show, these three countries have successfully 
developed a domestic nuclear energy programme, and have put in place a wide 
assortment of discursive, institutional and material elements in the process. In 
this section, both the stable constellations of elements implicated in circuits of 
reproduction as well as important disruptive events will be summarized and 
discussed in terms of the reversibility/irreversibility of NEPT. 
2.7.1. India 
Indian NEPT development is a good example of a circuit of reproduction that, 
owing to sufficient alignment between its elements and adequate protection 
through asymmetries in resources, experienced little disruption in its early 
decades. In the years following independence, a number of discursive, institu-
____________________________________________________________________ 
42  It needs to be noted that while volumes of high-level radioactive wastes are larger for the open 
fuel cycle, total waste volume needs not be. Reprocessing in the closed fuel cycle produces 
additional low- and intermediate-level radioactive wastes (Deutch et al., 2003) 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
40 
tional and material elements were introduced that would eventually come to 
define Indian NEPT. These elements are summarized in table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2 Stable set of elements constituting Indian NEPT 
Discursive Institutional Material 
National pride Technocratic governance 
Indigenous develop-
ment of material 
elements 
Development towards 
independence 
Centralized decision-making 
power and R&D (DAE) 
PHWRs: use of 
natural uranium 
increases independ-
ence from other 
countries 
Development through 
techno-scientific 
advances 
Centralized planning and respon-
sibility for construction according 
to the three-phased plan (DAE and 
subsidiaries) 
PHWRs: produce 
plutonium for the 
second phase 
Nuclear energy as 
symbol of development 
Little democratic control due to 
the DAE directly reporting to the 
Prime Minister 
Closed fuel cycle: 
recycling increases 
resource efficiency 
Faith in government for 
policy decisions 
DAE and BARC executing both 
civil and military research 
Closed fuel cycle: 
reprocessing allows 
for extraction of fuels 
for phases two and 
three 
Bhabha's three-phase 
plan 
Government majority ownership 
Closed fuel cycle: 
reprocessing allows 
for extraction of 
plutonium for 
military purposes 
Non-distinction 
between civil and 
military application 
Unlimited liability: discourages 
foreign input 
Phase two: FBRs 
Secrecy 
Capacity building in Indian 
industry 
Phase three: Thorium-
based reactor fleet 
   
1945-1950s   
1960s-1980s   
Promised   
 
 These were initially limited to discursive and institutional elements, aligned 
with India’s state-driven technology-based development. Bhabha’s three-phase 
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plan formed a strong shared aspiration around which action could be organized. 
According to the conceptualization of technology development presented above, 
alignment between generally shared aspirations and specific other elements, as 
well as amongst these elements themselves, would already provide a strong 
impetus for agents to reproduce these structures through action (giving rise to 
the abovementioned circuits of reproduction). Additionally, possible disalign-
ments between these elements (e.g. issues of safety or environmental 
degradation) would arguably have not given rise to disruptive events. This is due 
to asymmetries in discursive and institutional resource availability for nuclear 
and non-nuclear actors. Secrecy limited the discursive resources available to non-
nuclear actors and prevented disalignments from coming into play. A concentra-
tion of institutional resources with the centralized and technocratic nuclear 
establishment (e.g. decision-making power concerning acceptable risk levels, 
and licensing and construction outside parliamentary control) limited the 
possibility for disruptive action even if disalignment had been recognized. As 
such, the programme was ‘protected’ from disruption and insiders could add 
novel elements (mainly material ones after 1960), aligned with the ones already 
in place. All of this resulted in a relatively stable circuit of reproduction of Indian 
NEPT. Seeing the difficulty of breaking the circuits of NEPT reproduction 
(technology development) in India due to the structural setup of this technology, 
the Indian case offers a good example of largely irreversible NEPT. 
2.7.2. France 
The case of France is interesting because, due to disruptive events, it has under-
gone partial reversal. While the nuclear programme as a whole has not been 
halted (i.e. its circuit of reproduction was not broken), some specific elements 
have significantly changed over the course of NEPT development, the most 
prominent of which is the change from UNGG reactors to PWRs. The period 
between the end of WW2 and the early 1960s marks the pre-disruption phase of 
the French nuclear programme (see table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3 Stable set of elements constituting French NEPT before 1960 
Discursive Institutional Material 
Rebuilding the 'Radiance of 
France' after WW2 through 
NEPT  
Technocratic governance 
Indigenous design 
and production of 
material elements 
Necessity of central planning for 
large new technologies 
Little democratic input 
UNGG reactors, 
mainly aimed at 
plutonium produc-
tion 
Nuclear energy as a modern 
continuation of French tradi-
tional ingenuity and grandeur 
Centralized R&D and 
decision-making power 
(CEA), on both civil and 
military applications 
Closed fuel cycle: 
reprocessing 
increases resource 
independence 
through spent fuel 
recycling 
Nuclear energy technologies 
must be thoroughly 'French' 
CEA responsible for 
reactor design 
Closed fuel cycle: 
reprocessing allows 
the extraction of 
plutonium for 
military purposes 
Technology and nationalistic 
politics interwoven 
CEA responsible for rest of 
fuel cycle 
 
Military and civil applications 
reinforce one another and are 
mutually dependent 
EDF responsible for 
energy production and 
redistribution 
 
Secrecy   
   
1945-1950   
1950-1960   
 
 Similarly to the Indian programme, one can see an initial introduction of 
aligned discursive and institutional elements largely in line with broader societal 
dynamics. Also similar is the protection of the programme through secrecy and 
asymmetrical access to resources between agents inside and outside the nuclear 
establishment. However, change came from inside the establishment. Through 
incremental adjustments to the UNGG reactors, and the successful legitimation 
of the ‘competitive kilowatt-hour’ as the proper operationalization of how nuclear 
energy was to contribute to the ‘Radiance of France’, EDF managed to undo a 
number of previously central elements of French NEPT. This led to a partly 
different stable set of elements (see table 2.4). 
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Table 2.4 Stable set of elements constituting French NEPT after 1960 
Discursive Institutional Material 
Rebuilding the 'Radiance of 
France' after WW2 through 
NEPT 
Technocratic governance 
EDF’s UNGG 
reactors, better 
suited for efficient 
electricity produc-
tion (before 1968) 
Necessity of central planning for 
these large new technologies 
Little democratic input 
PWRs based on 
American Westing-
house design (after 
1968) 
The competitive kilowatt-hour: 
Depoliticization of nuclear 
reactors through appealing to 
economic efficiency 
Centralized decision-
making power 
PWRs optimized for 
energy production 
Energy production and other 
nuclear applications separated 
CEA responsible for rest of 
fuel cycle 
Closed fuel cycle: 
increases resource 
efficiency 
Secrecy 
EDF responsible for 
energy production and 
redistribution 
Closed fuel cycle: 
increases resource 
independence 
through spent fuel 
recycling 
  
EDF responsible for 
nuclear power plant 
construction and operation 
Closed fuel cycle: 
allows extraction of 
plutonium for 
military purposes 
  
Favourable liability 
arrangement for EDF and 
CEA 
Dual use of repro-
cessing 
infrastructure 
   
Elements retained from before 
1960 
  
New elements after disruption 
by EDF 
  
 
 EDF, building on the institutional resources afforded by its position as a 
nuclear player, managed to discursively depoliticize nuclear energy by replacing 
its necessary ‘Frenchness’ with an ‘objective’ measure of economic efficiency. 
This was materialized in EDF’s early UNGG reactors at Chinon. In doing so, it 
managed to sever the formerly intrinsic connection between civil and military 
use of nuclear power plants, and gained institutional resources by now being 
responsible for nuclear power plant construction and operation. Despite this, the 
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resulting configuration is largely aligned with the aspirations of both EDF and 
the CEA, since the closed fuel cycle (under the auspices of the CEA) provided 
opportunities for both military applications and increasing efficiency.  
 The circuit of reproduction of French NEPT was not broken. Rather, certain 
structural elements were undone and replaced, which opened up various possi-
bilities for future development. EDF’s disruptions arguably even helped the 
French nuclear energy programme achieve its success. Still, since significant 
disruptions led to the undoing of specific elements of French NEPT (i.e. dimin-
ished their reproduction in favour of the elements that EDF introduced), French 
NEPT development is an example of the partial reversal of NEPT. 
 
Table 2.5 Stable set of elements constituting the USA’s NEPT roughly between 
1953 and 1970 
Discursive Institutional Material 
Atoms for Peace: putting the 
atom to peaceful use 
Nuclear privatization: 
industry responsible for 
designing, building and 
operating nuclear power 
plants 
Dominance of PWRs 
(most ready for use by 
industry in the 1950s) 
Atoms for Peace: sense of 
urgency in developing 
domestic nuclear energy 
industry 
AEC responsible for both 
regulation and promotion of 
nuclear energy 
Differences between 
specific PWRs 
Atoms for Peace: distancing 
USA from the Soviet Union 
through ‘freedom, self-
determination and life’ 
Regulation loose enough as 
to allow for industry devel-
opment 
Open fuel cycle: 
cheaper for industry 
Very clear distinction 
between civil and military 
applications 
AEC/industry echo chamber 
for optimistic prospects for 
nuclear energy 
Open fuel cycle: less 
risk of dual use of 
nuclear energy 
infrastructure 
Nuclear energy that is safe 
and ‘too cheap to meter’ 
Little possibility for legal 
contestation 
Open fuel cycle: 
facilitates manage-
ment of spent fuel 
from a variety of 
private suppliers 
Limited confidentiality and 
secrecy: open for enabling 
industry, secretive about 
things that inhibit its growth 
Favourable liability arrange-
ment for industry 
Open fuel cycle: 
requires less gov-
ernment intervention  
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2.7.3. USA 
Of the three countries discussed, the USA is the only one in which the expan-
sion of the nuclear energy programme came to a halt. From ‘Atoms for Peace’ in 
1953 until the early 1970s, the USA’s nuclear energy programme rapidly ex-
panded and NEPT largely consisted of the structural elements listed in table 2.5. 
However, as the 1970s set in, a number of these elements were no longer 
applicable. For example, the opening up of the judiciary system as a legitimate 
realm of contestation and the dissolution of the AEC (and the assumption of its 
responsibilities by the NRC and ERDA) significantly altered the distribution of 
institutional resources in favour of more democratic control and outsider influ-
ence (eventually leading to stricter regulation under the NRC). Non-nuclear 
actors could then act upon the disalignments arising in NEPT over the course of 
the 1960s and 1970s:  
 
• Firstly, there was an important disalignment between continuously in-
creasing costs on the one hand, and a competitive and privatized nuclear 
industry with relatively little government intervention on the other.  
• Secondly, guaranteeing that nuclear energy will be both safe (‘Containing 
the Atom’) and cheap (‘Too Cheap to Meter’) proved difficult, despite 
what the AEC had long espoused. Trade-offs were necessary. Indeed, 
when regulations, safety standards and bureaucratic demands became 
more stringent under the NRC, costs rose so dramatically that private in-
dustry lost its domestic interest, evidenced by the fact that the flow of 
applications for new nuclear power plants came to a halt at the end of the 
1970s, after the Three Mile Island accident had vividly confirmed that ab-
solutely safe nuclear power was hardly guaranteed.43 
 
In other words, whereas the institutional setup of the nuclear programme 
(privatized nuclear industry) was important for its rapid growth in the 1950s and 
1960s, that very same setup ceased to work once elements that disaligned with 
its working principles arose. So, these disalignments can be said to have broken 
the USA’s circuit of NEPT reproduction, insofar as further implementation of 
____________________________________________________________________ 
43  Although the health effects of the Three Mile Island accident were minimal, its symbolic 
confirmation of doubts concerning safety held by those critical of nuclear energy provided 
them with the discursive resources to legitimately question the nuclear energy programme. 
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NEPT in society has ceased. As such, the USA’s NEPT has not proven com-
pletely irreversible.  
However, is this sufficient to truly speak of technological reversibility? After 
all, existing nuclear power production continued to generate nuclear energy as 
well as radioactive waste, and specific discursive elements (e.g. the USA as a 
nuclear state) and institutional elements (e.g. nuclear industry and the NRC) are 
still present. To truly speak of reversible NEPT, it seems that an additional 
requirement is required, which is discussed below. 
2.7.4. Conditions for reversible NEPT 
Some preliminary insights concerning reversibility in NEPT development can be 
distilled from the analysis. As alluded to in the previous section, I argue that not 
one but two central conditions need to be met for NEPT to be considered truly 
reversible: 
 
• The ability to stop the further development and deployment of a NEPT in 
a society; namely it has to be possible for the circuit of NEPT reproduction 
to be broken. For this to happen, it seems important to have 
disalignments between structural elements and a relatively symmetrical 
distribution of resources between agents (including the possibility to cre-
ate and act upon disalignment). 
• The ability to undo the undesirable outcomes of the development and de-
ployment of those NEPT. Since the outcomes of NEPT development are 
its structural elements, the ability to undo those whether or not the circuit 
of reproduction has been broken would satisfy this condition. This in-
cludes the risks posed by radioactive wastes, however difficult to ‘undo’ 
these risks may be. 
 
The analysis above has mainly highlighted the first condition (i.e. stopping 
NEPT development). The largely aligned sets of elements, coupled with specific 
asymmetries in resource distribution, were identified as making NEPT devel-
opment more irreversible by reinforcing their reproduction. However, if a circuit 
of NEPT reproduction is actually broken, the ability to undo possibly problematic 
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outcomes44 would surely be desirable and necessary to truly speak of technologi-
cal reversibility. This ability was apparently lacking in the USA after its circuit of 
NEPT reproduction was broken when further implementation of NEPT halted 
after the 1970s. Moreover, even if NEPT reproduction is largely acceptable, the 
second condition would allow for targeted partial reversibility of those elements 
of NEPT that are found to be problematic, like EDF managed to do in France. 
Finally and unsurprisingly, this means that without an adequate solution to the 
problem of nuclear waste, it is impossible to speak of reversible NEPT. However, 
as the analysis above has shown, different NEPT produce radioactive wastes with 
different characteristics. On top of this, solutions are more likely to be imple-
mented if aligned with NEPT’s other discursive, institutional and material 
elements. As such, despite the fact that high-level radioactive waste is very 
persistent no matter what fuel cycle it is a by-product of, it would seem that what 
constitutes an adequate and practical solution to this problem is likely to be 
context-dependent. Of course, all the above leaves unanswered the question how 
exactly these two conditions are to be met, but answering it is the topic of future 
work.  
 Lastly, it needs to be noted that a dilemma seems to haunt a call for reversi-
bility: if, as Orlikowski (1992) argues, the objectification and institutionalization 
of technology is essential for its ability to ‘do work’, then the reversibility and the 
efficacy of a technology are apparently at odds. Despite its potential importance 
if problems with NEPT arise, the complete reversibility of NEPT might make a 
circuit of NEPT reproduction difficult (if not practically impossible), hence 
inhibiting the development of NEPT in the first place. As such, further research 
should elaborate on how efficacy and reversibility are to be balanced across a 
process of technology development. 
2.8. Conclusion 
In order to properly analyse irreversibility of NEPT, this paper conceptualized 
NEPT development as a process of structuration involving human aspirations. 
According to this conceptualization, NEPT consist of a relatively stable set of 
discursive, institutional and material elements, stretching across time and space 
____________________________________________________________________ 
44  For example, a coupling of civil and military nuclear use, specific asymmetrical resource 
distributions between elites and others, or even existing infrastructure or the production of 
radiotoxic artefacts like spent fuel. 
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through recursive implication by social actors. They are delineated from the rest 
of the social system by their identification as belonging to NEPT. Technological 
irreversibility arises when these elements get caught in circuits of NEPT repro-
duction. 
 This conceptualization of technology development was subsequently used to 
structure an analysis of the early decades of NEPT development in India, France 
and the USA. It was observed that the alignment of the structural elements of 
NEPT and a concentration of resources with those agents reproducing these 
elements were both important factors in keeping circuits of reproduction run-
ning. Indian NEPT exhibits both these characteristics, providing a good example 
of largely irreversible NEPT. However, disalignments combined with changes in 
resource availability in favour of dissenting voices provide the conditions for 
disruptive events. In France, EDF managed to create disalignments in French 
NEPT by introducing new structural elements (e.g. the economic kilowatt-hour 
and the foreign PWRs). This eventually led to the partial reversal of French 
NEPT (i.e. some of its structural elements were undone and replaced by others). 
In the USA, the circuit of NEPT reproduction was actually broken when legiti-
mate realms of contestation opened up, which made acting upon disalignments 
possible. Despite this, specific elements of the USA’s NEPT persist to this day. 
The results of the analysis prompted the formulation of two conditions for 
reversible NEPT: 1) the ability to stop the further development and deployment 
of a NEPT in a society, and 2) the ability to undo the undesirable outcomes of the 
development and deployment of those NEPT, which includes the risks posed by 
radioactive wastes and spent fuel. These conditions might help us in developing 
reversible NEPT, although the extent to which this is desirable is unclear given 
the possible tension between complete reversibility and technological efficacy. 
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3 Responsible Innovation In Light of  
Levinas: Rethinking the Relation between 
Responsibility and Innovation 
To date, much of the work on Responsible Innovation (RI) has focused on the 
‘responsible’ part of RI. This has left the ‘innovation’ part in need of conceptual 
innovation of its own. If such conceptual innovation is to contribute to a coher-
ent conception of RI, however, it is crucial to better understand the relation 
between responsibility and innovation first. This paper elucidates this relation by 
locating responsibility and innovation within Emmanuel Levinas’ phenomenol-
ogy. It structures his work into three ‘stages’, each described in terms of their 
leading experience and objectivation regime. This analysis identifies a need for 
constant innovation of political and technological systems, originating from and 
motivated by our responsibility to others. It also shows the relation between 
responsibility and innovation to be threefold: foundational, ethical, and struc-
tural. These insights could help RI to avoid some pitfalls of ‘regular’ innovation, 
and provide moral grounding for important aspects of RI. 
3.1. Introduction 
The past decade has seen a fair amount of theorizing on the concept of Respon-
sible Innovation (RI)45. RI is an approach to research and innovation that aims to 
improve the “(ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the 
innovation process and its marketable products”, and does this by getting a wide 
range of societal actors and innovators to become “mutually responsive to each 
other” (von Schomberg, 2011 p. 9). 
 This new approach is often deemed necessary in view of the “grand chal-
lenges” of our time, such as climate change, the need for sustainable agriculture, 
____________________________________________________________________ 
45  This is sometimes more inclusively formulated as Responsible Research and Innovation 
(RRI). 
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secure and clean energy, etc.46 (von Schomberg, 2013). These grand challenges 
come with large uncertainties (in terms of both problem definitions and possible 
solutions), serious epistemic and moral disagreements among actors, and the 
need for a wide variety of those actors to successfully cooperate. In short, these 
are wicked problems (Horst and Webber, 1973). In the face of such problems, 
current regulation-based systems of innovation governance are said to be inade-
quate because they rely on an outdated responsibility regime based in 
predictability, consequentialist reasoning and top-down decision-making 
(Grinbaum and Groves, 2013; Owen et al., 2013).  
 This critique points to a deficit in the “process” dimension of innovation that 
hinders the achievement of good outcomes (i.e., the “product” dimension)(von 
Schomberg, 2013). This realization is reflected in the fact that most attempts to 
theorize about responsible innovation have focused on the ‘process’ dimension, 
often conceptualizing and/or formalizing more responsible and inclusive 
processes of stakeholder engagement or formulating the characteristics that 
would make an innovation process more responsible (e.g., Blok, 2014; Owen et 
al., 2013; Pellé, 2016; cf. Thorstensen & Forsberg 2016). In other words, re-
search has often focused on formalizing the ‘responsible’ part of RI. 
 For all that, the focus on responsibility has allegedly left the other half of the 
RI dyad (i.e., innovation) problematically undertheorized (Blok & Lemmens, 
2015). This in turn led to a situation where the underlying assumption in RI 
research and practice has often been that “responsible innovation = regular 
innovation + stakeholder involvement”  (ibid p. 20). Given that this ‘regular’ 
notion of innovation is likely to hinder the achievement of responsible outcomes 
(Blok & Lemmens, 2015), replacing it with a notion of innovation more specifi-
cally tailored to RI could provide a promising strategy for bolstering RI. This 
would in turn require a novel, RI-specific (re)conceptualization of innovation. 
 In addition to responsibility and innovation, however, there is another aspect 
to the RI dyad that runs the risk of remaining obscure despite the fact that its 
elucidation could be beneficial for a coherent conception of RI: the relation 
between RI’s constitutive terms. Indeed, it stands to reason that coming to grips 
with the relation between responsibility and innovation is a crucial step towards 
conceptualizing and formalizing both of these terms in such a way that they can 
____________________________________________________________________ 
46  See https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/societal-challenges, 
Accessed 22 September, 2016. 
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be properly integrated. As such, this paper aims to shed some light on the 
relation between responsibility and innovation. It does so through a process of 
partial deformalization47, rather than reflecting on precise processes, outcomes, 
rules or definitions. That is, it reveals the crucial importance of responsibility 
and innovation as well as the nature of the relation between them by providing a 
phenomenological account of social existence in terms of the concrete experi-
ences that form its foundation. 
 The account presented in this paper locates both responsibility and innova-
tion within the broader structure of the ethical phenomenology of Emmanuel 
Levinas. Up to this point, Levinas’ philosophy has only seen limited application 
in RI research, i.e., in considering the implications of his ground-breaking work 
on the nature of responsibility for the ‘responsible’ part of RI48 (Blok, 2014; 
Costello & Donnellan, 2008; Pellé & Reber, 2016). However, I argue that Levi-
nas’ oeuvre also points to a need for the constant innovation of technological and 
political systems, originating from and motivated by our responsibility to others. 
Section 2 first presents Levinas’ existential analytic through the lens of a three 
stage model that locates responsibility vis-à-vis technology and politics and 
shows that the latter are in constant need of change. In section 3, innovation is 
located in the third stage of the model, and its relation to responsibility is further 
specified. Finally, section 4 discusses a number of implications of the relation 
between responsibility and innovation for RI, and our conception of innovation 
therein. Additionally, it shows that conceiving of the relation between responsi-
bility and innovation in this way is compatible with and provides additional 
moral grounding for some already recognized aspects of RI. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
47  ‘Deformalization’ describes Levinas’ efforts to move some concepts (especially that of ‘time’ 
(e.g., Levinas, 1998a p. 175)) away from the schematisms, abstractions or ontological systema-
tizations in terms of which they are usually described, and back to the concrete experiences 
that ground them (the interruption of egological existence by the Other being chief among 
them). 
48  Blok’s use of Levinas’ concept of responsibility as the putting into question of the Ego and its 
totalizing tendencies is probably the most developed Levinasian account of (part of) RI (Blok 
2014). 
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3.2. Responsibility and the Need for Technological and Political Change in 
Levinas 
The task for the following sections is to shed light on the relation between 
responsibility and innovation. This is done by locating them within the frame-
work of the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas49, who provides a 
phenomenological description of human experience, discovering the source of 
ethics in the relationship to the human Other. This is the point of departure for 
the interpretation of the world, for politics and for technology (called Levinasian 
techno-politics in this paper). On this account, politics and technology both have 
their foundation in responsibility and, as I argue in this paper, are in infinite 
need of innovation. To show this, it is necessary to draw out more clearly Levi-
nas’ thinking on technology and its relation to responsibility and politics. To this 
end, this section is structured according to a number of ‘stages’ that are roughly 
recognizable but not explicitly present in Levinas’ existential analytic, which 
describes the structure of subjectivity from its first separation from the outside 
world towards its problematic political existence50.  In this paper, three such 
stages are proposed, each being a precondition for the next one: ‘Origins of the I: 
Egoism’, ‘In Light of the Other: Ethics’, and ‘Comparing Incomparables: Justice’. 
For each stage, two important aspects are discussed below. First, a stage’s leading 
experience describes the experience that is both constitutive of that stage as well 
as motivates, animates and gives direction to it. Secondly, a stage’s distinctive 
objectivation regime is concerned with how its leading experience is objectivated 
in the outer world through action. That is, it describes how a stage takes ‘con-
crete’51 shape.  For example, the second stage describes how its leading 
____________________________________________________________________ 
49  This structure is mainly inspired by Levinas’ Totality and Infinity (Levinas, 1969), amended 
with other works where applicable. I take Totality and Infinity to provide the most helpful 
thematic structure to think about how the experiences most central to Levinas’ work are 
objectivated in the ‘outer world’. 
50  The irony of such a ‘technical’ presentation of Levinas’ thought so as to locate his stance on 
technology and innovation is not entirely lost on me. For reasons of both brevity and clarity, 
however, this simplified account seems appropriate nonetheless. To counterbalance this (over-
)systematization and let some of the sensitivity and atmosphere of Levinas’ initial analysis 
shine through, I liberally cite Levinas’ own writings. 
51  As a phenomenologist, Levinas considers experience to be concrete and not abstract. However, 
throughout this paper, the word ‘concrete’ is used in terms of (experiences that involve) active 
and material engagement with the outer world, similarly to how Levinas does when he writes 
that “[t]he whole of the civilization of labor and possession arises as a concretization of the 
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experience, i.e., responsibility, is objectivated as giving away my possessions to 
those to whom I am responsible. Describing the three stages in this manner 
connects the more commonly considered elements of Levinas’ work (i.e., enjoy-
ment, responsibility and justice) to their all too often overlooked concrete 
correlates concerning the comprehension and handling of the world around us, 
culminating in the aforementioned techno-politics in the third stage (see table 
3.1). 
Table 3.1 Three ‘stages’ in Levinas’ existential analytic 
 
3.2.1. Origins of the I: Egoism 
The first ‘stage’ I glean from Levinas’ phenomenological analysis is that in which 
the ‘I’ first arises as an existence in its own right, separated from the world. This 
fundamental separation comes about in the experience of enjoyment, which gives 
rise to the juxtaposition of the enjoying I on the one hand and the world it takes 
in and enjoys on the other, their relation described as a “living from” (Levinas, 
1969 p. 110)52. Notably, such enjoyment does not belong to the order of knowl-
edge, thought or practical problem-solving, but rather that of sentiment. That is, 
it does not invite a representation of the world but rather operates as sensibility. It 
is “beyond instinct, beneath reason”, the “very narrowness of life” (Levinas, 1969 
p. 138). It is quite simply the savoury enjoyment, in the moment, of “thinking, 
                                                                                                                                          
separated being effectuating its separation. But this civilization refers to […] existence proceed-
ing from the intimacy of a home, the first concretization” (Levinas, 1969 p. 153).	  
52  Levinas emphasizes enjoyment as the foundational experience for the ego: “enjoyment is not a 
psychological state among others […] but the very pulsation of the I” (Levinas, 1969 p. 113). 
 =>          is a precondition for           => 
Stage 
Origins of the I: 
Egoism 
In Light of the Other: 
Ethics 
Comparing  
Incomparables: 
Justice 
Human-orientation I Other Third 
Leading Experience Enjoyment Responsibility Justice 
Objectivation Regime Possession Gift Techno-Politics 
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eating, sleeping, reading, working, warming oneself in the sun”53 (Levinas, 1969 
p. 112) which provides “nourishment, as a means of invigoration” (Levinas, 1969 
p.111). As such, enjoyment describes the I as an ego that takes the world into 
itself, consuming it and making it part of itself. This egoistic54 orientation 
describes “a withdrawal into oneself, an involution” (Levinas, 1969 p. 118). Such 
an ego can be said to exist for itself: not conscious as “a representation of self by 
self [but rather] for itself as in the expression ‘each for himself’” (Levinas, 1969 
p. 118). As such, the leading experience of the ‘Origins of the I: Egoism’ stage is 
self-sufficient, unreflective, pre-conscious enjoyment; a nourishment that 
produces satisfaction (rather than fulfilling articulated needs); a life that lives off 
a love of life itself. 
 However, enjoyment is beset with “concern for the morrow” (Levinas, 1969 
p. 150), with uncertainty about its future since enjoyment does not provide the 
objective conditions necessary for its own continuation. Those conditions are 
made possible only by labor and possession, both of which refer to a dwelling, 
the intimacy of a home, “the first concretization” (Levinas, 1969 p. 153). From 
the interiority of the home, the separated I can recollect itself, look out the 
window upon a world that is now at a distance. This makes possible “a look that 
dominates, […] the look that contemplates”; the outside world is now “at the 
disposal of the I—to take or to leave” (Levinas, 1969 p. 156). This ‘taking’ of the 
elements is the taking-possession through labour. Labour, which is the “destiny of 
the hand” (Levinas, 1969 p. 159)55, draws things from the elements and relates 
them to the I’s own ends. It does so, however, by “separating it from immediate 
enjoyment, depositing it in a dwelling, conferring on it the status of a posses-
____________________________________________________________________ 
53  Enjoyment underlies every experience of the things around us, even of (technological) tools 
used pragmatically, whose existence “is not exhausted by the utilitarian schematism that 
delineates them as having the existence of hammers, needles, or machines” (Levinas, 1969 p. 
110).	  
54  Levinas’ conception of egoism should not be read as a condemnable selfishness in the face of 
others. It is pre-conscious and unreflective, and thus naïve rather than evil. 
55  The labouring hand, Levinas tells us, is “no longer a sense-organ, pure enjoyment, pure 
sensibility, but is mastery, domination, disposition. An organ for taking, for acquisition, it 
gathers the fruit but holds it far from the lips, keeps it, puts it in reserve, possesses it in a 
home” (Levinas, 1969 p. 161). This is a telling illustration of Levinas’ recognition that enjoy-
ment, dwelling, habitation and possession are only possible in an existence that is a body.  
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sion” (Levinas 1969, p. 159)56. This, then, constitutes the objectivation regime of 
this first stage: the I secures its future by taking possession of the elements 
through labour, which transforms them into “raw materials” (Levinas 1969, p. 
159) and relates them to the I’s egoist ends. 
 In sum, the leading experience of the first stage is enjoyment, while its 
objectivation regime consists of possession that ensures enjoyment in the face of 
an uncertain future. However, despite separating the I from the non-I, enjoy-
ment and possession through labour are still a movement towards oneself. That 
is, since the relation with the non-I is exhausted by that which is already enjoyed 
and possessed by the I57, the I cannot by itself become conscious of itself.  For 
that to happen (and thus open up the possibility of responsibility, politics, 
technology and innovation), the I has to be put into question by that which 
transcends it, i.e., that which lies beyond its grasp, that which it cannot contain. 
Levinas locates this transcendence in the idea of infinity, which already over-
flows any thought or conception one could have of it and thus invites 
transcendence. Notably, however, the experience of infinity is not primarily an 
abstract or theoretical affair. Rather, “[t]he idea of infinity is the social relation-
ship” (Levinas, 1987 p. 54), i.e., infinity manifests itself in responsibility to the 
human Other, in ethics. 
3.2.2. In Light of the Other: Ethics 
The second stage, “In Light of the Other: Ethics”, is concerned with the themes 
on which Levinas spent most of his philosophical energy. It presents the transi-
tion from the pre-conscious ‘I’ of the first stage to a subject that is capable of 
both reflection as well as knowledge of the things of the world.  
 This transition, Levinas explains, is made possible by coming face to face 
with infinity. That is, the I that was preoccupied with securing enjoyment 
through possession is now faced with an experience that lies permanently 
beyond its understanding and resists its attempts at mastery; it is faced with an 
Other that is infinitely beyond its grasp. Unlike possessions, this Other does not 
____________________________________________________________________ 
56  By selectively suspending the elemental in the home, possession com-prehends [comprend] or 
grasps the being of the existent. It is through labour and in possession that the thing first arises. 
(Levinas, 1969 p. 158). 
57  I regrettably have to exclude what would undoubtedly be an interesting discussion of Levinas’ 
concept of the il-y-a. 
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arise from labour. Rather, the Other expresses itself (Levinas, 1969 p. 49-52) and 
in doing so, “presents itself as human Other” (Levinas, 1996 p. 12)58.  
 The human Other, irreducible to the I, its thoughts and its possessions 
(Levinas, 1969 p. 43), calls into question the I’s spontaneity. The Other is the 
“judge judging the very freedom” (Levinas, 1969 p. 100) of the thought with 
which the I tries to grasp him (or her59). This resistance that the Other expresses 
against the spontaneity of the I is not a violence. Rather, the putting into ques-
tion of the I is “a welcome to the [Other]” (Levinas, 1996 p. 17) which “has a 
positive structure, ethical” (Levinas 1969, p. 197). Putting the I into question 
owes this positive structure to the fact that it does not entail the destruction of 
the I, but rather summons the enjoying I to respond to the challenge and com-
mand the Other makes “through his nakedness, through his destitution” 
(Levinas, 1996 p. 17) and through his (or her) hunger60 (Levinas, 1998b p. 11). 
The I thus called into question becomes conscious of himself in responsibility, 
absolutely unique since “nobody can respond in its place” (Levinas, 1996 p. 18). 
As such, the conscious I is not responsible to the Other by choice or contract 
(Levinas 1981 p. 88). Rather, the conscious I is, “by its very position, responsibility 
____________________________________________________________________ 
58  I will not delve deeper into the intricacies of the phenomenology of the Other presenting itself, 
i.e., of the face. For a discussion of the face of the Other, see Totality and Infinity, section 3 
(Levinas, 1969). 
59  Levinas uses the generic ‘he’ when discussing the Other, thus technically not excluding those of 
other genders. Nevertheless, this is language that risks being discriminatory and would 
preferably be amended to reflect Levinas’ own inclusionary intentions. However, simply 
including more genders (e.g., ‘his or her’ or ‘his/her’) would not be appropriate here, since 
speaking of the Other in terms of gender already constitutes a grasping of the infinite Other in 
terms of objectifying categories and, as such, fails to do justice to the Other’s alterity. Regretta-
bly, conventional gender-neutral alternatives are equally inappropriate for talking about the 
infinitely Other. That is, using the gender-neutral pronoun ‘it’ would amount to dehumanizing 
the Other, the use of a singular ‘they’ is incompatible with the uniqueness of the Other, and 
less commonly used singular gender-neutral pronouns still conjure up the problem of gender 
categorization. As such, I also revert to generic ‘he’, if only for textual consistency with the 
Levinasian source material.  However, I have added ‘or her’ between brackets to disavow any 
intentional exclusion and to indicate the sometimes awkward struggle to find the best terms in 
which to describe the Other. 
60  Levinas’ focus on hunger stems from a somewhat grim analysis of modern sensitivity to the 
Other: “Of all the appetites […] hunger is strangely sensitive in our secularized and technologi-
cal world to the hunger of the other man. All our values are worn except this one. The hunger 
of the other awakens men from their sated drowsing and sobers them up from their self-
sufficiency” (Levinas, 1998b p. 11). 
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through and through” (Levinas, 1996 p. 17, emphasis in the original). Responsi-
bility, then, is the leading experience of the second stage: the egoistic spontaneity 
of the I is called into question by the infinitely Other, which positively estab-
lishes the conscious I as fundamentally responsible to the Other. 
 Just as this stage’s leading experience involves putting into question the 
enjoyment of the I and its reorientation towards the Other as responsibility, its 
objectivation regime involves a disruption of possession and its reorientation 
towards the Other in the form of the Gift. This concrete articulation of responsi-
bility in the form of the Gift is constituted by two instances of expression: 
dispossession of my possessions in conversation and their actual donation to the 
Other. 
 The first instance concerns the elementary response to the call of the Other, 
which lies in establishing a relationship with the Other in conversation. In 
conversation, I “receive from the Other beyond the capacity of the I”, i.e., the 
Other teaches me by virtue of his (or her) infinite alterity (Levinas, 1969 p. 151). 
In turn, I speak to the Other of the world I possess (Levinas, 1969 p. 173). In so 
doing, the things of which I speak are put in common, receive a universality in 
language (Levinas, 1969 p. 76) that detaches them from the self-centered 
situatedness of possession and enjoyment. As such, the generalization that 
underlies language is an ethical event: it is “a primordial dispossession, a first 
donation” (Levinas, 1969 p. 173) which “permits me to render the things [of 
which I speak] offerable, detach them from my own usage, alienate them, render 
them exterior” (Levinas, 1969 p. 209)61. This allows for the second instance of 
the Gift: the actual donation of my possessions to the Other. As Levinas explains, 
responding to the Other is also a corporeal and substantial realization. It para-
lyzes enjoyment because it actually demands genuine sacrifice of myself and my 
possessions. That is, to respond to the Other’s hunger and destitution involves 
“taking the bread out of my mouth, and making a gift of my own skin” (Levinas, 
1981 p. 138), it is “the openness, not only of one’s pocket book, but of the doors 
of one’s home” (Levinas, 1981 p. 74). Through such sacrifice, the conscious I 
gives concrete form to its existence as responsible-for-the-Other. 
 To summarize, responsibility is this stage’s leading experience, while its 
objectivation regime is formed by the Gift. Both responsibility and the Gift 
____________________________________________________________________ 
61  This explains Levinas’ somewhat more cryptic statement of this relation: “in order that I be 
able to see things in themselves, that is, represent them to myself, refuse both enjoyment and 
possession, I must know how to give what I possess” (Levinas, 1969 p. 171, my emphasis). 
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signify a disruption and reorientation of the previous stage’s leading experience 
and objectivation regime (i.e., enjoyment and possession) towards the Other. 
This positively produces an I that can speak for itself and is unique in its respon-
sibility towards the Other. Responsibility signifies a relationship of radical 
asymmetry, it is a one-for-the-Other.  
 However, this relationship (i.e., ethics) is severely problematized with the 
arrival of a third party, another Other, “other than the neighbour but also an-
other neighbour, and also a neighbour of the other, and not simply their fellow” 
(Levinas, 1996 p. 168). No longer can the I dedicate itself fully to the Other since 
the I is also responsible to the third party. A question now arises: “What am I to 
do?”, and a decision must be made. Doing so is to engage the question of justice, 
which institutes the third stage. 
3.2.3. Comparing Incomparables: Justice 
The third stage, “Comparing Incomparables: Justice,” imposes a dilemma onto 
the responsible ‘I’ since it positions the I in what one could call a properly social 
situation. That is, the I is no longer faced with just an Other, but with the Other 
and the third party: another Other, as unique as the first. What is the I to do 
now? How must it respond to them? This question redirects the I from its 
infinite responsibility for the Other to the primordial problem of justice (Levinas, 
1981 p. 161), which inescapably requires the comparison of Others “in the very 
name of their dignity as unique and incomparable” (Levinas, Bouchetoux, and 
Jones, 2007 p. 206). And to compare them is to ask: “What […] are the other and 
the third party with respect to one another?” (Levinas, 1996 p. 168). In other 
words, the problem posed by the third party cannot be engaged by simply 
respecting the Other’s alterity, but requires determining what Levinas calls 
others’ quiddity (Levinas, 1969 p. 177), i.e., asking what they are on top of re-
specting who they are. Only thus can the “comparison of incomparables” 
(Levinas, 1981 p. 158) required by justice be made. This in turn gives rise to a 
“search for a principle” (Levinas, 1981 p. 161) that includes “comparison, coexis-
tence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of 
faces, […] the intelligibility of a system, and thence also a copresence on an equal 
footing as before a court of justice” (Levinas, 1981 p. 157).  Justice, thus de-
scribed, constitutes the leading experience of the third stage. However, other than 
the leading experience in the previous two stages that had a straight-forward 
orientation (i.e., towards the I and the Other), the structure of justice is dilem-
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matic. It pulls in two directions: the entrance of the third party introduces the 
problem of justice in the name of responsibility, yet any attempt at solving it 
necessarily falls short of the responsibility that motivates it because it cannot 
help but efface the others for which justice is required. 
 Having established justice as the third stage’s leading experience, it is now 
possible to shine some light on its objectivation regime. For this, I take inspira-
tion from the second stage where the objectivation regime underwent a parallel 
transformation to that of the leading experience (i.e., a reorientation from the I 
towards the Other). In the third stage, the transformation of the leading experi-
ence from responsibility to justice stems from the entrance of the third, which 
problematizes the I’s singular and infinite responsibility towards the Other. The 
resulting problem of justice requires the consideration of others in terms of what 
they are, rendering them knowable, measurable, interchangeable, judgeable, 
which allows for the articulation and comparison of others’ interests and needs. 
As such, the transformation of the leading experience in this stage revolves 
around opening up the possibility of representation. Its objectivation regime is 
likewise concerned with representation in two important ways: the representa-
tion of others in politics, and the representation of the world as ‘ready to be 
given’. 
 First off, in responding to the problem of justice, consideration of the third 
party gives rise to “the We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the 
source of universality” (Levinas, 1969 p. 300), i.e., to politics. And it is through 
the institutions of politics that the comparison of others (and the I) is concretely 
established and their interests can be articulated and weighed against one 
another. As an objectivation of dilemmatic justice, however, politics also has a 
much more ominous side. Since politics also understands others in terms of 
‘what’ they are (by their works and through their clothing) they are grasped as 
interchangeable objects (Levinas, 1989 p. 243-244). This constitutes a “great 
‘betrayal’” (Levinas, 1969 p. 44), as the objectivation of others obscures their 
otherness that ushered in the question of justice and politics in the first place. 
Politics, when left to its own devices, “judges them according to universal rules, 
and thus in absentia” (Levinas, 1969 p. 300). As a consequence, “the element of 
violence in the State, in the hierarchy, appears even when the hierarchy func-
tions perfectly. […] There are, if you like, the tears that a civil servant cannot see: 
the tears of the Other” (Levinas, 1996 p. 23). As such, politics unavoidably falls 
short of the responsibility that inspires it because it cannot help but efface the 
Other. This calls for an amendment to politics which “consists in making 
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possible expression” (Levinas, 1969 p. 298) so that the others can call politics 
into question by demonstrating its blind spots and dangerous excesses. In other 
words, in the face of totalizing politics, “justice is a right to speak” (ibid.). In 
politics thus amended, which I call just politics, “the third and all those who, 
alongside the third are numerous humanity [can] remain to me as ‘other’, 
unique in its uniqueness, incomparable, and should concern me” (Levinas, 
Bouchetoux, and Jones, 2007 p. 206)62. Imperfect and incessantly called into 
question by others, politics presents a perpetual puzzle consisting of political 
and institutional systematization, deconstruction and modification. 
 This vision of politics provides a partial response to the problem of justice in 
that it makes possible the actual processes of comparing others and articulating 
and weighing their interests, all while leaving room for the Other to call politics 
into question. However, actually fulfilling the demands of justice also requires a 
parallel transformation of the concrete ‘donation of my possessions’ in the 
objectivation regime of the previous stage (the Gift). That is, the quiddity of the 
Other finds another concrete correlate in a way of knowing and representing the 
world that is no longer caught in the immediacy of my responsibility to a specific 
Other, but rather opens up the possibility of setting up that world as ‘ready to be 
given’, allowing it to be divided among numerous others in need.  
 However, Levinas’ work does not clearly provide a theme that is straight-
forwardly fit for this position. Nonetheless, I would argue that such a way to set 
up the world as ‘giftable’ is probably best understood as technology. One finds 
support for this proposition in Levinas’ (admittedly episodic) reflections on 
technology. In them, Levinas rejects Heidegger’s negativity concerning modern 
technology63 as he is unwilling to let go of the two main promises it holds for 
humanity. First, a wholesale condemnation of technology is, according to 
Levinas, “forgetful of the responsibilities to which a ‘developing’ humanity, more 
and more numerous, calls and which, without the development of technology, 
could not be fed” (Levinas, 1998b p. 9). In other words, through technology, 
____________________________________________________________________ 
62  This quote originally concerns money and its redemptive qualities in preserving alterity amidst 
more totalizing systems. However, Levinas’ positive assessment of this quality in such a 
systematized economic totality prompted me to include it as a goal in this discussion of 
politics. 
63  Levinas’ reflections on technology were mainly made in reply to Heidegger’s analysis in his 
famous essay “The Question Concerning Technology” (Heidegger, 1977), although other 
Heideggerian themes are also caught in the crossfire, notably his focus on Place and enroot-
edness. 
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humanity is supremely able to transform the world into nourishment, into 
matter that can be enjoyed64. These products of technology are separated from 
the responsibility to a specific Other and can thus be gifted to those numerous 
others that need it, thus providing politics with the ‘raw materials’ it needs to 
fulfil its responsibilities. Secondly, technology is secularizing. It teaches us that 
worship of the world, be it in terms of nature, blood or place, only serves to 
obscure the alterity and uniqueness of the Other. Technology shows us that 
these ‘gods’ are “of the world, and therefore are things, and being things they are 
nothing much” (Levinas, 2000 p. 166). Leaving behind such idolatries, an 
opportunity arises by virtue of secularizing technology: “to perceive men outside 
the situation in which they are placed, and let the human face shine in all its 
nudity” (Levinas, 1990 p. 233). In other words, technology is conducive of a just 
politics in which the Other can call both politics and technology into question65. 
 Like politics, however, technology poses a number of dangers, especially 
when left to its own devices. First, technical things can be actually dangerous. 
Not only can they pollute “the air we breathe” (Levinas, 1998b p.9), but they 
even “risk blowing up the planet” (Levinas, 1990 p. 231). Secondly, technology 
“threaten[s] a person’s identity” (Levinas, 1990 p. 231). That is, in a technological 
society, the Other risks becoming little more than a cog in a larger technological 
machinery66. Whether others are considered as simply “desiring machines” 
(Levinas, 1989 p. 240) or mere capital in the workings of capitalism (Levinas, 
2003 p. 50), their technological objectification could lead to their enslavement: 
“in a totally industrialized society [which is the result] of supposedly perfected 
social techniques – the rights of man are compromised by the very practices for 
which they supplied the motivation” (Levinas, 1993 p. 121).  
 Thus arises another parallel between technology and politics: both are 
motivated by our responsibility to others, yet both threaten that very motivation 
by virtue of their essential modi operandi.  For politics, the solution was to open it 
____________________________________________________________________ 
64  While this may sound familiar to Heidegger’s ‘enframing’ the world as ‘standing reserve’ 
(Heidegger, 1977), its ethical implications are vastly different. 
65  Levinas even goes so far as to say that “[s]cience and the possibilities of technology are the first 
conditions for the factual implementation of the respect for the rights of man” (Levinas, 1993 
p. 119).	  
66  This is the most important point that Levinas grants to Heidegger’s analysis of humanity’s fate 
in a modern technological world (Heidegger, 1977), although he does not agree with Heideg-
ger concerning its inevitability. 
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up to the questioning of the Other, thus laying the foundation for a perpetually 
puzzling just politics. Conversely, technology is to be subordinated to such a just 
politics67, since “giving precedence to politics over physics is to work for a better 
world, to believe the world to be transformable and human” (Levinas, 1994 p. 
143, my emphasis)68 for several reasons. First, subordinating technology to a 
politics that is inspired and interrupted by responsibility is to align the specific 
technological set-up of the world with the needs of justice. Secondly, a just 
political process allows the Other to call into question (aspects of) both political 
and technological systems, thus avoiding the totalizing and objectifying excesses 
to which they are prone. This means that, like politics, technology is bound to be 
ever-changing: inspired by just politics, our technological set-up of the world is 
constantly in question and in need of improvement. 
 In sum, the entrance of the third party problematizes both the singular 
responsibility towards the Other and the Gift, evoking politics and technology, 
respectively, in order to tackle the problem of justice. However, both politics and 
technology have a dilemmatic structure vis-à-vis the responsibility that animates 
them. On the one hand, politics allows for the comparison of incomparable 
others and the responsibilities towards them and technology sets up the world as 
giftable and secularized. On the other hand, politics and technology tend towards 
dangerous excesses. The remedy for these excesses lies in 1) welcoming the 
Other calling politics into question, thus forming the just politics that is the first 
way in which justice is ‘objectivated’, and 2) the subordination of the second 
objectivation of justice, i.e., technology, to just politics and the questioning 
Other. This specific constellation of just politics and subordinated technology are 
hereafter referred to as Levinasian techno-politics, a term I introduce here to 
highlight both technology and politics’ importance for justice. In the end, it 
follows from all this that Levinasian techno-politics is never final, always falling 
short of the responsibility that motivates it and thus incessantly in need of the 
improvements called for by others. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
67  This is not always easy. Levinas demonstrates this with the example of the atomic bomb, the 
potential impact of which was so vast that it clouded any politics that was to take place in its 
threatening presence (Levinas, 1994). 
68  My translation from the original French: “Donner le pas à la politique sur la physique est une 
invite à oeuvrer pour un monde meilleur, à croire le monde transformable et humain“.	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3.3. Locating Innovation in Levinas and Relating it to Responsibility 
Having discussed all three stages, it is now clear where responsibility (i.e., as the 
leading experience of the second stage) is located in relation to other themes in 
Levinas’ work, including egoism, possession, justice, politics, and technology. 
However, the analysis has not yet located innovation. If, however, innovation can 
be broadly construed as “the process of bringing something new into the world, 
through a combination of intellectual and practical ingenuity” (Grinbaum and 
Groves, 2013 p. 119), then only one stage stands out as a possible location for 
innovation: the third stage, ‘Comparing Incomparables: Justice’. First, only in 
this stage are the world and the others that live in it represented in such a way 
that they can become part of intellectual or practical projects towards novelty. 
Moreover, a perpetual need for novelty is ingrained into Levinasian techno-
politics if it is to do honour to the responsibility that inspires it. That is, in light 
of techno-politics’ objectification and effacing of others, it is necessary to wel-
come the questioning Other and incessantly deconstruct, improve and reinvent 
current techno-political constellations. This process is where innovation takes 
place within the Levinasian framework presented above. Consequently, innova-
tion is an inescapable part of a Levinasian techno-politics. 
 Having located responsibility in the second stage as its leading experience, 
and innovation in the need for novelty in the third stage, it is now possible to 
flesh out the relation between the two notions more thoroughly. From the 
analysis above, three ways in which responsibility and innovation are related can 
be deduced: one foundational, one ethical, and one structural. 
 The first way in which responsibility is related to innovation is foundational. 
Since responsibility is metaphysically prior to innovation, it is a precondition for 
it. That is, innovation is the means of adjustment and improvement of techno-
politics, and techno-politics only arises after the problematization of the second 
stage’s leading experience (i.e., responsibility) by the entrance of the third party. 
In other words, innovation is always already grounded in responsibility69. The 
second way responsibility relates to innovation is ethical. Initially, our responsi-
____________________________________________________________________ 
69  It is important to note that there is a positive role for enjoyment in innovation too. For example, 
enjoyment underlies the activities of the engineer who (inspired by the needs of others) thinks, 
reads, works and uses tools to innovate (as described in ‘Origins of the I: Egoism’, above; see 
Florman, 2013). So, while the structure of the experience of enjoyment is self-centred, activities 
that are enjoyed may nevertheless lead to outcomes that can nourish the Other and aid the 
cause of justice if they are ultimately motivated by responsibility. 
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bilities towards the Other and the third party (including the dilemmas those 
responsibilities pose) are the ethical driving force behind the development of 
technology and politics. As such, responsibility motivates the development of 
that which can be innovated in the first place. More importantly, however, it is 
the responsibility towards the Other who puts into question techno-politics that 
necessitates innovation and determines its direction. In other words, innovation 
is a response to responsibility. Finally, responsibility and innovation are related 
structurally, i.e., in terms of how the outcomes of innovation form the structures 
through which we can actually work towards justice. Given that the outcomes of 
innovation consist of new political and technological means aimed at overcom-
ing the dangers, omissions and excesses of current techno-political systems, 
innovation actively works towards justice by shaping and reshaping the struc-
tures and resources necessary to fulfil our responsibilities towards others. 
 In sum, responsibility is not only a metaphysical precondition for both 
technology and politics (that which is to be innovated) but, more importantly, it 
demands their creation as well as their innovation, which in turn provides 
(presumably) more and (ideally) better technological and political structures 
through which to fulfil our responsibilities. As such, innovation should first and 
foremost be a response to responsibility; a response that is always provisional 
given the dilemmatic structure of techno-politics. In the next section, thinking of 
innovation in this way is shown to help overcome at least some of the problems 
associated with the ‘regular’ notion of innovation.  
3.4. Levinas, Responsibility and Innovation: Implications and Corroboration 
for RI 
Locating both responsibility and innovation in Levinas’ philosophy established 
their relation as foundational, ethical and structural. While this does not provide 
fully conceptualized and formalized notions of either term, some implications 
for RI can still be induced.  
 One primary implication is that the relation between the ‘responsible’ and 
‘innovation’ parts of RI should not be read, either philosophically or practically, 
in terms of addition. Responsibility is not something to be added onto innova-
tion (cf. Blok and Lemmens 2015). Rather, it is built into the very experiential 
structure of innovation (as its foundation and motivation), and should be built 
into the very process of innovation too (to work towards outcomes that substan-
tially contribute to addressing the problem of justice).  
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 In what follows, other implications are explored by contrasting aspects of 
‘Levinasian’ innovation that is explicitly founded on and motivated by responsi-
bility with some of the possible pitfalls associated with innovation that does not 
explicitly aim to be responsible, understood here as ‘regular’ innovation70(Blok & 
Lemmens, 2015)71. Not only can these pitfalls be avoided by innovation that is 
related to responsibility as described above, but the Levinasian framework and 
its implications for RI are shown to be compatible with and to provide additional 
moral grounding for some features of RI that are already present in the litera-
ture. 
 The first pitfall one risks walking into is a disproportionate amount of 
attention for technological innovation. As the nature of a Levinasian techno-
politics shows, however, responsibility calls for innovation in politics as well as 
in technology. This is compatible with calls by a number of RI scholars for value-
sensitive institutional redesign (Correljé et al., 2015; Taebi et al., 2014) or institu-
tional reflexivity, learning and development (Macnaghten et al., 2014; Owen et 
al., 2013). On top of this, however, Levinasian techno-politics dictates that in RI, 
technological innovation should be subject to just politics if it is to operate in 
service of justice and the responsibility by which it is inspired. 
 The second possible pitfall is that innovation may become seen as inherently 
good. That is, innovations are meant to solve known societal problems and 
supposedly deliver prosperity and employment (von Schomberg, 2013). On the 
one hand, the introduction of innovations simultaneously implies the destruc-
tion of some other established capital, institutions and practices (Blok & 
Lemmens, 2015; Schumpeter, 1942), which would seem to forfeit innovation’s 
status as inherently good. On the other hand, according to the analysis above, 
this destruction can actually be part of what motivates innovation in the first 
place. Arguably, the aspects of techno-politics put into question by the Other 
might actually have to be ‘destroyed’, replaced or improved. Even so, innovations 
are always only provisional responses to the Other’s scrutiny because they 
____________________________________________________________________ 
70  It should be noted that, if the Levinasian analysis is correct, responsibility is also a precondition 
for ‘regular’ innovation, and can be a motivation for it. Still, it can be said that there is a 
considerably less developed role for responsibility in the techno-politics of ‘regular’ innovation. 
71  Blok and Lemmens (2015) do not present their analysis in terms of possible pitfalls, but 
describe a concept of innovation that is purportedly “self-evidently presupposed” in the RI 
literature (p. 28). As this section shows, however, the RI literature already describes character-
istics of innovation that are at odds with their notion of ‘regular’ innovation. 
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necessarily fall short of the responsibility that inspires them (see section 2.3). It 
is in light of its metaphysical foundations, then, that innovation simply cannot 
be inherently good. This openness to the Other’s questioning has three further 
implications for RI. First, it should welcome critical others and allow them 
influence concerning the focus and direction of innovation. This provides 
support for some features of RI that have long been recognized: that it should be 
deliberative (Owen et al., 2013) and that those potentially influenced by the 
innovations should be informed about them and be able to “influence the setting 
up, carrying out, monitoring, evaluating, adapting, and stopping” of their 
implementation (van de Poel, 2016 p. 680). Secondly, RI should be self-critical 
and reflective (Owen et al., 2013) and produce institutional and technological 
innovations that are responsive to the need for future change or adaptation 
(ibid.) and flexible so that their further implementation could be stopped and 
their negative impacts reversed or compensated (Bergen, 2016b; van de Poel, 
2016). However, since systematization is still necessary for techno-politics to be 
effective (i.e., to be able to work towards justice), such flexibility will inevitably be 
limited (Bergen, 2016a). Thirdly, all this means that the outcomes of RI are 
never final, and that RI is a perpetual process towards an inclusive techno-
politics. 
 The third pitfall associated with ‘regular’ innovation is that economic feasibil-
ity could be seen as a necessary condition for its success. The analysis presented 
in this paper does not necessarily eschew economic considerations. After all, a 
focus on economic success can be understood from the point of view of techno-
political necessity. The aggregation and weighing of needs and interests fits in 
the modus operandi of techno-politics without which “humanity […] could not be 
fed” (Levinas 1998b, p. 9). Notwithstanding this potential, the very economic 
calculations that enable justice also risk effacing those others in service of which 
they work. Economic parameters must not obscure the real responsibilities to 
which RI is a response. This is in line with similar reservations already present 
in the RI literature. For one, innovation should primarily serve those others who 
need it most (Soete, 2013). Along similar lines, innovating responsibly requires 
attention for the just distribution of potential hazards and benefits as well as 
protection of those that are most vulnerable (van de Poel, 2016). 
 Lastly, ‘regular’ innovation risks being blind to the asymmetries in knowl-
edge and power between actors involved in or affected by innovation(s) (Blok & 
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Lemmens, 2015; Stirling, 2008; van Oudheusden, 2014)72. However, the relation 
between responsibility and innovation provides a counterweight to such asym-
metries, which can be said to arise in the third stage where both knowledge as 
well as power over others becomes possible through techno-politics. As in 
techno-politics generally, the counterweight to power asymmetries in RI lies in 
the asymmetry inherent in the responsibility of the I towards the Other. That is, 
the Other calling the I to responsibility defies and resists the I’s ability for power 
to achieve its egoistic goals. It does so without needing power itself, because the 
way the Other presents itself is “not a force. It is an authority. Authority is often 
without force”(Levinas, 1988 p. 169)73. The authority of the Other’s ethical 
demand is a counterweight to power not because it is more powerful but because 
it puts into question the very right to that power and that which is to be achieved 
by it. However, this ‘ethical’ asymmetry is at odds with aspirations towards 
symmetrical ‘mutual responsiveness’ between stakeholders that currently 
underlies a lot of work on RI. Blok (2014) has nonetheless taken up the task of 
harnessing the potential of ethical asymmetry through the concept of dialogical 
responsiveness between RI stakeholders. Such dialogical responsiveness focuses 
on the very act of dialogue between stakeholders in which they would become 
critical towards themselves and where their identity is dialogically constituted 
and deconstructed. Such a model of stakeholder dialogue could help in living up 
to the ethical and structural relation between responsibility and innovation. 
3.5. Conclusion 
In order to contribute to a better understanding of RI, this paper shed light on 
the relation between responsibility and innovation and sketched some of its 
implications for RI. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
72  Blok and Lemmens (2015) argue that RI presupposes symmetry between actors in the way it 
attempts to include ethics in the innovation process, judging this specific assumption to be 
naïve. To me, this presupposes more conceptual content than their ‘regular’ notion of innova-
tion contains, which I would rather attribute to the specific participatory interpretation of the 
‘responsible’ part of RI. The regular notion of innovation has little to nothing to say about actor 
symmetry, hence my formulation of the fourth pitfall in terms of a blindness of asymmetries 
rather than the presupposition of symmetry. 
73  See footnote 59. 
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 To this end, both responsibility and innovation were located within the 
ethical phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas, which was structured into three 
stages for the purposes of this paper. Each stage was discussed in terms of its 
‘leading experience’ and ‘objectivation regime’. Whereas the first stage is driven 
by enjoyment that becomes objectivated in the form of possession, the second 
stage disrupts this enjoyment and reorients the ego towards responsibility 
towards the Other. This responsibility becomes objectivated as the Gift, the 
dispossession of my possessions and their donation to the Other. With the 
entrance of the third party to which the I is also responsible, the third stage 
ushers in the problem of justice. Tackling this problem calls for the establish-
ment of a Levinasian techno-politics. However, given the totalizing tendencies of 
such a techno-politics, it is vital to welcome the Other who questions techno-
politics and identifies its blind spots and dangerous excesses. In so doing, the 
Other calls us to responsibility to change techno-politics for the better, i.e., to 
innovate. 
 It was concluded that innovation and responsibility are intrinsically related in 
at least three important ways. First, they are related foundationally because 
responsibility is metaphysically prior to innovation and as such, a precondition 
for it. Secondly, they are related ethically since innovation is driven by responsi-
bility, i.e., by the Other calling on us to innovate for the better. Lastly, they are 
related structurally in the sense that the outcomes of innovation form the 
structures through which we can actually attempt to fulfil our responsibilities to 
others. Conceptualizing the relation between responsibility and innovation in 
this fashion establishes innovation as a response to responsibility, albeit one that 
should be seen as provisional and open to future innovation. 
 Rethinking the relation between responsibility and innovation in this way has 
a number of implications for RI. First and foremost, it means that responsibility 
cannot simply be added to innovation. It is already built into the experience of 
innovation and should also be an integral part of the process of innovation. 
Secondly, the Levinasian analysis confirms the need for both technological as 
well as political/institutional innovation in RI. Thirdly, the framework presented 
in this paper enriches our conception of the normative status of innovation in 
RI. That is, while innovation is motivated by and necessary in light of responsi-
bility, it is also inevitably provisional, and falls short of the responsibility that 
inspired it. On top of this, innovation’s roots in responsibility and justice make it 
cautious of measuring RI’s success in purely economic terms. Lastly, the author-
ity of the Other calling innovators to responsibility can provide a counterweight 
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to power asymmetries in RI processes. These implications resonate rather well 
with a number of more specific proposals in recent scholarship on innovating 
responsibly. These include calls for protection and prioritization of those most 
vulnerable, flexibility or responsiveness of the innovation process as well as its 
outcomes, and the need for deliberative and critical engagement of stakeholders 
so as to improve and provide direction to innovation. As such, the relation 
between responsibility and innovation provides moral grounding for such 
proposals for RI. 
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4 Path Dependence, Agency and the  
Phenomenology of Technology Adoption 
The theory of path dependence remains a popular explanation for why markets 
or societies become locked into specific technological trajectories that become 
increasingly inflexible over time. However, a number of scholars have become 
skeptical of the value of historical case studies for studying path dependence (the 
dominant method up to this point) and instead recommend other approaches 
like lab experiments and simulations. Nonetheless, the ‘thick’ description of 
actual cases may still have significant value for the study of technological path 
dependence. First, thick socio-technical descriptions of the environment in 
which technology adoption occurs reveals normatively problematic aspects of 
path dependence beyond inefficiency. Secondly, a thicker, structurational notion 
of agency in path dependent processes could help to alleviate concerns about 
path dependence’ allegedly excessive determinism and its reliance on contin-
gency for path creation. This paper aims to contribute to such a structurational 
notion of agency by developing conceptual resources for agent-centred descrip-
tions of technological path dependence. It does so by reinterpreting the basic 
evolutionary building blocks of path dependence (i.e., technology adoption, 
technology and the social selection environment) through the lens of Alfred 
Schutz’ social phenomenology. The resulting perspectives provide a number of 
conceptual resources that should allow for better describing why and how agents 
make the technology adoption decisions that they do, and the way in which 
technology and the social selection environment mediate those choices and their 
consequences. 
4.1. Introduction 
Some technologies that were introduced in the past no longer seem as attractive 
as they once did. Usually, a switch to alternative solutions does not present 
practically insurmountable difficulties. This is, however, not always the case. For 
some technologies -whether relatively simple ones like the QWERTY keyboard 
or large technological infrastructures like fossil-fuel based transport systems or 
those related to nuclear energy- it may prove incredibly difficult to reverse their 
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dominance even when there are good reasons to do so (Bergen, 2016b; Cowan, 
1990; David, 1985; Foxon & Pearson, 2008). In such a situation, the technology 
in question can be called locked-in. If we are to avoid becoming locked into such 
a potentially less-than-ideal technological trajectory, it is of course important to 
understand how such a situation comes about. One approach explaining the 
lock-in phenomenon can be found in the concept of path dependence, in which 
self-reinforcing sequences of technology adoption lead to inflexible market 
outcomes.  
 The concept of path dependence has seen widespread application across the 
social sciences in the past few decades, examining a wide range of topics such as 
the lock-in of technologies (Bergen, 2016b; Cowan, 1990; W. Walker, 2000), 
regional economic development (Martin & Sunley, 2010) and institutions both 
inside the firm (David, 1994; Vergne & Durand, 2011) and beyond (North, 
1990). This application has, however, also seen great variation in the extent to 
which path dependence was formalized as a specific theory of technological or 
institutional persistence. Indeed, it has at times been used as a “trendy, catch-all 
phrase to describe virtually every sequence of events where history seems to 
matter on the surface” (Vergne, 2013 p. 1194). Such broad application has made 
path dependence subject to the risk of concept stretching and proliferation, thus 
limiting its specificity and explanatory potential (Rixen & Viola, 2014). To avoid 
this, a lot of work theoretical work on path dependence has involved specifying 
the basic structure of path dependent processes (e.g., Arthur, 1989, 1994; 
Martin & Sunley, 2010; Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009), identifying specific 
mechanisms that drive path dependent processes (Arthur, 1994; David, 1985, 
1994; Dobusch & Schüßler, 2013; Mahoney, 2000; Page, 2006; W. Walker, 
2000), delineating path dependence from other types of explanations for techno-
logical or institutional persistence (e.g., Rixen & Viola, 2014; Sydow et al., 2009; 
Vergne & Durand, 2010), prescribing more rigorous methods for path depend-
ence studies (e.g., Vergne & Durand, 2010, 2011), and qualifying the normatively 
problematic aspects of path dependence (e.g., Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995). 
 This paper aims to contribute to path dependence’ further theoretical devel-
opment by elaborating on an arguably underdeveloped but promising strand of 
the path dependence literature. Specifically, it is concerned with the further 
development of a ‘thick’ notion of agency that could help to alleviate some of 
path dependence’ problematic aspects without losing the theoretical specificity 
developed in the abovementioned efforts. Section 4.2 provides a succinct over-
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view of the basic tenets of path dependence, criticisms levelled against it, and the 
potential advantages that a thick notion of agency could bring to the table. 
4.2. Path Dependence: Basics, Criticisms, and the Importance of Thick  
Descriptions 
To start, I take the following to generally describe the basic structure of a path 
dependent process by which a technology becomes locked-in74 (Arthur, 1989, 
1994; Sydow et al., 2009): 
 
1. The Preformation Phase. This phase is characterized by a broad scope of 
action for agents since multiple technological alternatives are available to 
them. However, significant uncertainty usually exists concerning the 
technologies’ performance, payoffs, the future rate of adoption by others 
and/or eventual market outcomes. Indeed, in this stage it is impossible to 
predict ex-ante which technology will gain the upper hand or which will 
end up being the “best” option available (e.g., because that may depend on 
the number of other adopters). However, once a specific technology gains 
a small but significant lead over competing technologies, this may consti-
tute a ‘small historical event’ that sets history off on a specific new path75 
if these events set off a self-reinforcing process. This also constitutes the 
end of the preformation phase. 
2. The Formation Phase. The formation phase is characterized by processes 
of self-reinforcement that tend to amplify a technology’s initial lead. That 
is, adoption of the leading technology increases the chance that that tech-
nology will be adopted in the future76, while alternatives become 
increasingly unattractive in comparison. As such, while different outcome 
____________________________________________________________________ 
74  There is still significant variation among path dependence studies when it comes to this 
description, if not in structure then in emphasis on the relative importance of specific phases. 
75  Such small historical events have also been called ‘random’ because they are situated beneath 
the resolution of the analyst’s lens (Arthur, 1990), because these decisions were not made with 
the optimality of the system which would result from these decisions in mind (David, 2007), 
or simply because they were not clearly predictable by the theoretical models usually employed 
to understand the system at hand (Mahoney, 2000). 
76  That is, padoption(Techx)t+1 > padoption(Techx)1 due to self-reinforcement. Note that this implies 
endogeneity of path reinforcement (Rixen & Viola, 2014). 
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distributions are still possible, the range of options narrows over time as 
self-reinforcement continues. 
 Different mechanisms have been identified as contributing to self-
reinforcement in the formation phase. Historically, the literature has re-
served most of its attention for positive feedback mechanisms based on 
increasing returns to technology adoption. Such mechanisms include large 
set-up costs and economies of scale (Arthur, 1990; David, 1985), positive 
network externalities (Katz & Shapiro, 1985), adaptive (possibly self-
fulfilling) expectations (Arthur, 1994; Dobusch & Schüßler, 2013), tech-
nology-specific learning effects, including learning-by-doing and learning-
about-payoffs (Cowan, 1990), interrelatedness and compatibility with 
other technologies (David, 1985; Dobusch & Schüßler, 2013), and the cu-
mulative nature of quasi-irreversible investments in terms of capital, 
infrastructure, contracts, etc. (David, 1985, 2007; W. Walker, 2000). 
However, in addition to positive mechanisms reinforcing the dominant 
path, some authors have also highlighted the importance of negative 
mechanisms that decrease the likelihood of other paths being selected 
(Vergne & Durand, 2011), with negative externalities being considered 
necessary for path dependence to occur (Page, 2006). 
 As these mechanisms help to further reinforce the dominant path, the 
outcome distribution further narrows to such an extent that “the domi-
nant decision pattern becomes fixed and gains a deterministic character” 
(Sydow et al., 2009 p. 692). At this point, the process enters the third 
phase. 
3. The Lock-in Phase. In this, the dominance of the selected technology is 
said to be irreversible. However, it is important to note that lock-in im-
plies a relatively weak notion of irreversibility (Perrings & Brock, 2009). 
Not only is this dominance in principle reversible (although practically 
highly unlikely), but it usually also temporary. That is, the locked-in sys-
tem is susceptible to exogenous shock, opening up possibilities for 
technological alternatives. As such, lock-in is probably better understood 
in terms of ‘inflexibility’ (Arthur, 1994) or ‘contingent irreversibility’ 
(Desjardins, 2013). 
 Still, this situation is seen as potentially problematic since there is no 
guarantee that the best or most efficient technology comes to dominate 
Path Dependence, Agency and the Phenomenology of Technology Adoption 
75 
the market under conditions of self-reinforcement (Arthur, 1989)77. As 
such, the emergence of lock-in bears a risk of potential inefficiency. 
 
It is important to note, however, that while lock-in is a system property, it is an 
emergent one. That is, through mechanisms of self-reinforcement, individual 
technology adoption decisions give rise to system-level inflexibility (Cantner & 
Vannuccini, 2016)78. In this, one recognizes the basic (quasi-)evolutionary model 
underlying path dependence (Cecere, Corrocher, Gossart, & Ozman, 2014; 
Desjardins, 2013; Dobusch & Schüßler, 2013; Perrings & Brock, 2009)79: indi-
vidual technology adoption decisions by agents (selection) among different 
technological alternatives (variation) within a specific socio-technical selection 
environment increase the likelihood of reinforcing the dominance of the technol-
ogy that gained a lead in the preformation phase. As such, technology, its 
adoption and the environment in which that occurs are taken to be the basic 
evolutionary building blocks of path dependence. 
 This, then, I take to be a general description of the basic structure of techno-
logical path dependence and lock-in, which, at least to some extent, has been at 
the core of path dependence studies. Despite path dependence’ popularity, 
however, a number of important criticisms concerning it has been formulated 
over the years, three of which are discussed here: the focus on inefficiency, 
excessive determinism, and the necessity of contingency. 
 
First, some of lock-in’s normative implications have often been overstated (Kay, 
2005). More specifically, while Arthur (1994) originally surmised that ineffi-
ciency is only a potential attribute of lock-in, fear of market failure has 
____________________________________________________________________ 
77  Of course, what exactly makes a technology the ‘best’ or ‘most efficient’ one is not set in stone 
and consensus concerning these valuations may well be absent. For the basic structure of path 
dependent processes, however, this is of lesser importance. 
78  In other words, to be compelling, path dependence must be able “identify and elucidate the 
role of critical human actions (or failures to act) that are shaped by transient and incidental 
circumstances – conditions which were not obviously pertinent to the principal issues of 
interest in the drama, yet from whose influence a succession of unanticipated and ultimately 
unwanted results unfolded” (David, 2007 p. 95). 
79  As some of the ‘founding fathers’ of path dependence theory note, the dynamics of path 
dependence have an “evolutionary flavor, with a ‘founder effect’ mechanism akin to that in 
genetics” (Arthur, 1994 p. 28), causing institutions and technologies to “ ‘evolve’ in a manner 
that shares important attributes with biological processes of evolution” (David, 1994 p. 217). 
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nevertheless animated much of the literature on technological path dependence 
(Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995; Vergne & Durand, 2011). However, in most cases 
of path dependence and lock-in, inefficiency is not an issue and when it is, it 
usually does not imply market failure (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995)80. Even so, 
path dependence deserves our attention. For one, it can still be analytically 
valuable in understanding historical processes of social evolution and persis-
tence (Pierson, 2000). Moreover, from a “strategic, future-oriented point of 
view,” retaining flexibility by avoiding lock-in may have significant strategic 
value (Sydow et al., 2009 p. 695). For example, uncertainty about the future is 
not limited to payoffs or market outcomes. Other morally relevant aspects of a 
technology only become clear when the technology is already implemented on a 
sufficiently large scale, including risks (van de Poel, 2016) and specific institu-
tional structures connected to the technology (Bergen, 2016a). 
 A second line of criticism focuses on path dependence’ allegedly excessive 
determinism (Kay, 2005). Indeed, the basic structure leaves very little room for 
endogenous change once a system is locked-in because as long as self-
reinforcement holds, maximizing agents81 endogenous to the system would 
simply continue to reinforce the dominant technology. This conception of path 
dependent processes leaves little to no room for the possibility of endogenous 
innovation and creativity as ways of weakening a dominant path (Martin & 
Sunley, 2010). 
 A third criticism of path dependence involves the preformation phase. While 
some authors do not see this phase as essential for path dependence (e.g., 
Dobusch & Schüßler, 2013), others contend that the condition of contingency 
can be analytically problematic. That is, if contingency is essential for path 
dependence, it implies that things could have been otherwise. Using historical 
case studies (the historically dominant method in path dependence research), 
such a counterfactual is difficult if not impossible to retroactively prove. As such, 
____________________________________________________________________ 
80  That is, most cases involve first- and/or second-degree path dependence. According to 
Liebowitz and Margolis (1995), only third-degree path dependence (where inefficiency is 
present and was remediable) is problematic. Additionally, revisiting important case studies 
such as QWERTY’s lock-in (David, 1985) has shown that inefficiency has at times too easily 
been assumed to be both present and problematic (Kay, 2013; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1990). 
81  Such models often assume rational or boundedly-rational models of agency (e.g., Arthur, 
1989, 1994). While this is in accord with a normative focus on pareto (in)efficiency, novel 
decision-theoretical models could very well be needed for modelling path dependence (Page, 
2006). 
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some scholars call for different research methods that would allow for dealing 
with this problem, such as lab experiments, simulations and counterfactual 
analysis (Vergne & Durand, 2010, 2011)82. However, to then also eliminate 
historical case studies from our repertoire of research methods for path depend-
ent processes would arguably amount to throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater.  
 
Indeed, ‘thick’83 socio-technical description of cases can still provide a number of 
distinct advantages for path dependence studies that aim at policy relevance 
(Cantner & Vannuccini, 2016), even if such methods do not provide great 
predictive capabilities (Kay, 2005; Page, 2006). Moreover, they can actually help 
to alleviate some of the concerns raised in the three criticisms mentioned above. 
For one, thick descriptions of the environment in which agents make their 
technology adoption decisions are compatible with normatively problematic 
aspects of path dependence other than inefficiency because they often point 
beyond only utilitarian or market considerations. Indeed, policy, political, 
normative and symbolic factors also have a profound influence on (and are 
influenced by) technology selection (Cecere et al., 2014; Sydow et al., 2009). For 
path dependence, this means that self-reinforcement may be driven by mecha-
nisms that are not based mainly on economic or utilitarian considerations (as in 
many archetypal cases), but rather on considerations of functionality in larger 
systems, a technology’s legitimacy or power discrepancies between social groups. 
As such, there are utilitarian as well as functional, legitimacy and power explana-
tions for path reinforcement (Mahoney, 2000)84. Such additional explanations 
____________________________________________________________________ 
82  Research applying these methods remains relatively scarce for now (e.g., Hossain & Morgan, 
2009). 
83  The notion of ‘thick description’ in this chapter does not refer to the anthropological 
methodology of the same name popularized by Geertz (1973). Rather, the notion of ‘thick’ 
descriptions simply denotes their aim to provide a more nuanced understanding of both the 
context and the underlying structures of the phenomena described (i.e. of agency in a socio-
technical environment) without interpreting them in an overly reductionist or mechanistic 
fashion (as one would in some economic models). 
84  While Mahoney discusses the different explanations for path dependence in terms of 
institutional reproduction, it nevertheless makes sense that similar types of mechanisms are 
capable of driving technological path dependence. Also, Mahoney talks about ‘legitimation 
explanations’ rather than ‘legitimacy explanations’. However, in light of the discussion in 
section 4.7, ‘legitimation’ seems to imply active processes of legitimation, which would fall 
under power explanations according to the theory developed in this paper. 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
78 
are undoubtedly relevant for at least some technology policy, e.g., for technolo-
gies of significant symbolic and political significance such as nuclear energy 
(e.g., Lawrence, Sovacool, & Stirling, 2016) or for technologies with normatively 
regrettable downsides not appropriately reflected in the market, such as those 
standing in the way of eco-innovations (Cecere et al., 2014). In so doing, thick 
descriptions of the technology selection environment point beyond inefficiency 
as the most important normatively problematic implication of path dependence. 
I.e., functional, legitimacy and power explanations bring with them their own 
potential problematic aspects,  such as specific political power structures85 or 
widespread legitimation and normalization of technology-related behaviours that 
are regrettable for reasons other than inefficiency. 
 Similarly, it stands to reason that thick descriptions of agency in path depend-
ent processes could be equally fruitful. For example, thick descriptions of 
agency, including how agents navigate and act upon their world and the choices 
with which they are faced, could partially mitigate the second and third criticism. 
 More specifically, some have highlighted the need for more pro-active, 
strategic, and creative notions of agency for path dependence studies (Araujo & 
Harrison, 2002; Garud, Kumaraswamy & Karnøe, 2010) that would allow for 
“understanding path dependence not simply from a retrospective perspective but 
also from an actor-centred standpoint, focusing on how actors react to an uncer-
tain future in real time” (Araujo & Harrison, 2002 p. 5). This opens up 
possibilities for endogenous change by allowing for a) the possibility that a path 
gets created by strategic action by actors, thus alleviating worries about the 
necessity of ‘contingent’ events, and b) the possibility of endogenously innovat-
ing out of lock-in instead of having to rely on exogenous shock for weakening a 
dominant path, thus relaxing the problem of excessive determinism (Martin & 
Sunley, 2010). As such, they soften some of path dependence’ problematic 
aspects, and broaden both the scope and outcome possibilities for path depend-
ence studies without thereby necessarily losing much of path dependence’ 
theoretical specificity or definitional clarity. 
 Some steps have already been taken towards such notions of agency, most of 
which take an appropriate account of agency to be ‘structurational’ in nature 
(e.g., Araujo & Harrison, 2002; Garud, Kumaraswamy & Karnøe, 2010; Sydow 
____________________________________________________________________ 
85  The political implications of nuclear power are a case in point (Winner, 1980). 
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et al., 2009)86. That is, agency and individual choices and actions cannot be 
understood outside of the socio-technical context in which they occur (i.e., the 
environment), and neither is it possible to make sense of (the evolution of) that 
context without agency. On such an account, agents are iterational (referring to 
the recurring use of routine ways of dealing with situations), projective (referring 
to an imaginative future-orientedness in terms of scenario’s for action with 
regard to one’s interests, desires, etc.) and practical- evaluative (referring to the 
capacity to make normative and practical judgements)(Araujo & Harrison, 2002 
p. 8). 
 
In this paper, I continue along this path towards thick, structurational descrip-
tions of agency in studies of technological path dependence by further 
developing some of the conceptual resources needed for such descriptions. Such 
resources must at least a) incorporate the three above-mentioned characteristics 
of structurational agency, b) centre around on what drives path self-
reinforcement, i.e., they must have something to say on how technology can be 
adopted, c) highlight the interconnectedness of agency with the structures in 
which it is exercised, and d) should be at least nominally compatible with utilitar-
ian, functional, legitimacy and power explanations of path reinforcement. 
 This is achieved by reinterpreting the basic evolutionary building blocks of 
technological path dependence presented above (technology, technology adop-
tion, and the environment in which it occurs) in terms of Alfred Schutz’ social 
phenomenology. Such a phenomenological foundation anchors these reinterpre-
tations in agents’ experience of the world in which they live and which they 
navigate. Additionally, since Schutz focused on the development of an explicitly 
social phenomenology, it facilitates the connection between agent-centred 
phenomenological insights with their social (and technological) implications 
(Dreher, 2011). 
 Section 4.4 provides a Schutzian exploration of the subjective process of 
choosing and acting. This results in a broad perspective on technology adoption 
that incorporates the characteristics of structurational agency. Subsequently, 
sections 4.5 and 4.6 describe technology and the social selection environment in 
a way that highlights the interconnectedness of agency to structure and provides 
____________________________________________________________________ 
86  ‘Structurational’ means that this notion of agency is in accordance with Giddens’ conception of 
the duality of structure and agency (Giddens, 1984). 
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further resources for the analysis in Section 4.7, where insights from the previ-
ous sections are mapped onto the different kinds of explanations of path self-
reinforcement that reflect a thick understanding of the context in which technol-
ogy adoption occurs. Before all this, however, Section 4.3 provides a short 
introduction to some of the relevant tenets of Schutz’ work and thus presents 
some essential theoretical background for sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. 
4.3. Some Basic Insights into the Structure of Everyday Experience 
Schutz set out to provide a comprehensive phenomenological analysis of some-
thing rather mundane: our experience of the everyday life-world. This life-world 
is the “province of reality which the wide-awake and normal adult simply takes 
for granted in the attitude of common sense” (Schutz & Luckmann 1973 pp. 3-4), 
its objects self-evidently real and unproblematic. These include my consociates87 
with whom this pre-given social and cultural life-world is essentially shared88. 
Three important elements that shape the subjective experience of the life-world 
are briefly discussed below: the subjective stock of knowledge, its systems of 
relevance, and its objectivations in the outer world. 
 
The way in which I experience the life-world is first of all dependent on what I 
know of that world or what I expect from my actions upon it, i.e., on the form 
and content of my subjective stock of knowledge. This subjective stock of knowledge 
broadly consists of three ‘types’ of elements: fundamental, habitual, and specific 
(Schutz & Luckmann 1973).  
 The fundamental elements of the subjective stock of knowledge concern the 
basic boundaries of the situation in which I find myself, and are more or less 
automatically given in the horizon of each experience. For example, my situation 
usually includes (a) socially objectified system(s) of basic typifications, such as 
those found in common language. The habitual elements of the subjective stock 
of knowledge concern routine mastery of familiar problems I encounter. These 
routine elements include skills (e.g. walking), useful knowledge (e.g., how to 
____________________________________________________________________ 
87  Although it was not used as frequently by Schutz, I prefer the term ‘consociates’ (or simply 
‘others’) to ‘fellow-men’ given the risk of exclusion inherent in the latter. 
88  The fact that the life-world is shared allows for intersubjective communication, coordination 
and cooperation, which in turn can influence the life-world. Unsurprisingly, then, the current 
structure of the life-world is the product of innumerable interactions between ancestors. 
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write), and knowledge of recipes (e.g., how to get coffee from the faculty coffee 
machine). The specific elements of the stock of knowledge are explicit elements 
that I have learned through personal experience or was taught by others. They 
are only useful in certain situations and as such, lay dormant most of the time 
until a ‘relevant’ situation arises when they can enter the conscious experience in 
order to master a situation that is ‘problematic’89. However, which situation 
turns problematic in the first place and what is relevant for its mastery depends 
on what Schutz calls the systems of relevance. 
 
While any situation in which I find myself is in principle open to a wide array of 
experiential possibilities, some specific elements of the situation are usually 
singled out, enter into consciousness, and are open to further determination and 
acting upon. To understand this process, Schutz described three systems of 
relevance: thematic, interpretational, and motivational90, which form the driving 
force of the subjective stock of knowledge and “govern its dynamics and use” 
(Campo 2015 p.142). For each of these, he further distinguishes between imposed 
and intrinsic relevance. 
 Thematic relevance is concerned with which objects enter into conscious 
experience. This can happen in two different ways. On one hand, imposed 
thematic relevance refers to situations that cannot be met “by applying the 
traditional and habitual pattern of behaviour or interpretation” (Schutz 1976 p. 
231) and something thus “becomes constituted as problematic” (Schutz 2011 p. 
107), imposing a change in my thematic field. On the other hand, intrinsic 
thematic relevance involves those occasions in which I voluntarily change the 
theme of experience.  
 Interpretational relevance comes into play when something has entered my 
thematic field and is in need of interpretation. When this object is “routinely 
coincident with elements of the stock of knowledge that are sufficiently familiar 
and certain”, interpretation is automatic and no further explication is necessary 
(Schutz & Luckmann 1973 p. 198). This, Schutz calls imposed interpretational 
____________________________________________________________________ 
89  Schutz’ problematic situation in need of mastery (Schutz & Luckmann 1973 p. 116) is 
somewhat similar to Dewey’s ‘indeterminate situation’  that is in need of determination 
(Dewey 1998).  
90  The distinction between systems of relevance is purely analytic. In everyday experience, they 
are unified, interdependent, and practically indistinguishable (Schutz & Luckmann 1973 p. 
233). 
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relevance. If, however, further explication is needed for interpretation, Schutz 
speaks of intrinsic interpretational relevance.  
 Lastly, motivational relevance gives content to every mention of ‘problematic’, 
‘interest’, ‘sufficient’, or ‘relevant’ above, because thematic and interpretative 
decisions are “motivationally important” for my conduct, my action, my manner 
of living (Schutz & Luckmann 1973 p. 210). My interests, or “the set of motiva-
tional relevances which guide the selective activity of my mind” (Schutz 2011 p. 
129) put my experience of the current situation “into a meaningful relation with 
life-plans and daily plans” (Schutz & Luckmann 1973 p.210) in two ways. On the 
one hand, I act in and understand the world in a specific way because I have a 
certain biographically determined background. My social environment, educa-
tion, prior decisions and commitments, etc. determine the attitude with which I 
encounter a situation, which consists of “expectations, hypothetical relevances, 
plans for acts, skills, and other elements of habitual knowledge, as well as of 
‘frames of mind’ ” (Schutz & Luckmann 1973 p. 217). Schutz classifies these 
because-motives as imposed motivational relevances. On the other hand, intrin-
sic motivational relevances involve my voluntary orientation towards the 
situation in terms of in-order-to motives: the conscious goal of my action in-
spires a series of steps that I need to do first things first in order to reach said goal.  
Some such steps of action can play out completely inside my own mind (e.g., 
doing simple addition or subtraction). Nevertheless, for most actions to be 
effective I also need objectivations in the outer world. For example, I might need 
them to communicate with others (e.g., by waving, pointing, speaking, etc.) or to 
change the outer world to suit my needs.  
 
Some elements of the subjective stock of knowledge are thus objectivated in the 
outer world in the context of (inter)subjective processes of mastering problem-
atic situations. There are, however, different types of such objectivations. Two of 
these types are discussed here: products (with a focus on tools) and signs91. 
 While most if not all actions that are geared towards the outer world change 
the life-world and “leave behind traces in lifeworldly objects” (Schutz & 
Luckmann 1973 p. 272) some of these traces are “motivated changes” to the life-
world, or products (Schutz & Luckmann 1973 p. 273). Products include tools, 
____________________________________________________________________ 
91  This leaves ‘indications’ undiscussed since they are less relevant for the reinterpretation of 
path dependence’ basic evolutionary building blocks. For more information see (Schutz & 
Luckmann 1973 pp. 267-271). 
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works of art and marks, with tools being especially relevant for a Schutzian 
understanding of technology. Technological objects92 can be understood as tools, 
i.e., they allow for the purposeful alteration of the structure of the life-world93. 
They are experienced “not just as things in the external world (which of course 
they also are), but rather in a subjective reference schema of interests and 
contexts of plans” (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973 p. 17). That is, their interpretation 
mainly relies on understanding their function in the mastery of everyday prob-
lems94, which may include transforming the outer world into objects ready for 
use95, lowering the necessary effort to achieve certain goals (e.g., by simplifying 
the sequence of steps or lowering the investment in or dependence on certain 
knowledge, like skills), or creating or crossing spatial, temporal, and social 
boundaries of the situation.  
 Still, by themselves, tools have a serious limitation: without a way to make 
clear to others their full meaning or function, it is difficult for them to travel 
beyond the boundaries of their subjective origin without losing (part of) said 
meaning or function. To overcome this difficulty, one uses signs.  
 Signs are objectivations that, through processes of abstraction and idealiza-
tion, have their meaning detached from their situation of origin and can thus be 
employed to transmit knowledge to others across society. Such signs are orga-
nized in larger systems of signs, especially those of (more or less specialized) 
language or other symbolic systems. With signs, it becomes possible to commu-
nicate elements of knowledge (like the inner workings of tools, the recipes for 
working with them or the goals towards which they are useful) through other 
objectivations like markings on the tools, manuals, and educational materials. 
 
Having now summarized some of Schutz’ basic insights into the structure of 
everyday experience, the following sections develop conceptual resources that 
____________________________________________________________________ 
92  Schutz does not discuss technological objects as such. Their identification as tools as well as 
the functions ascribed to them are my own. 
93  A motivated change in the form of a product may inadvertently leave traces that were 
unplanned and might go unnoticed due to them not coinciding with strong interpretational 
and motivational relevances. In other words, since we are focused on products’ intended 
functions, unintended side-effects can be difficult to recognize.  
94  Post-phenomenology more thoroughly reflects on how technology influences our experience 
of and action in the world than I can here (e.g., Verbeek 2011). 
95  This is reminiscent of Heidegger’s analysis of the essence of modern technology which sets up 
the world as ‘standing reserve’ (Heidegger 1977). 
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should be conducive to actor-centred accounts of path dependence. They do so 
by providing a Schutzian perspective on path dependence’s building blocks (i.e., 
adoption, technology and the social selection environment) starting with ‘adop-
tion’. 
4.4. A Schutzian Perspective on Adoption 
From an agent-centred standpoint, technology adoption always presupposes that 
an agent makes choices and undertakes actions. For example, acquisition of a 
technology implies a choice of the technology as a worthwhile goal, and action 
being undertaken towards actually acquiring it. As such, a better understanding 
of choosing and acting as the subjective substratum of adoption seems an 
appropriate strategy for developing conceptual resources for a thicker notion of 
agency. To that end, this section delves into Schutz’ understanding of the 
subjective process of choosing and acting (Schutz & Luckmann 1989). Schutz 
describes this process as consisting of roughly the following more or less con-
scious episodes (see figure 4.1): 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Structure of the process of choosing and acting, based on (Schutz & 
Luckmann, 1989) 
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The process is first initiated by the experience of a situation as problematic. Based 
on thematic relevances, certain objects enter into experience as problematic. 
When the open elements of the situation cannot be habitually settled (e.g., it is 
not automatically clear what the object is or what needs to be done), the would-be 
actor will have to choose. 
 
The second episode indeed consists of choosing. Given the ‘openness’ of the 
problematic elements of the situation, one must choose the specific project that 
one is to act out from an in principle infinite amount of possibilities. According 
to Schutz, choosing includes several important aspects. 
 One aspect consists of grasping the situation based on the subjective stock of 
knowledge. The experience of the problematic situation is determined by one’s 
subjective stock of knowledge and imposed and intrinsic interpretational rele-
vances. This not only includes the fundamental elements of the stock of 
knowledge (e.g., the basic categories of common language), but also the habitual 
and specific elements of knowledge that are relevant and can be brought to bear 
on the situation. The adequacy of these elements of knowledge for grasping the 
situation determine which parts of the situation get taken for granted (imposed 
interpretational relevance) and which are ‘open’ for explication and manipula-
tion (intrinsic interpretational relevances).  
 Additionally, the problematic situation (as grasped based on the subjective 
stock of knowledge) is connected to the would-be actor’s interests and plans, since 
its active mastery depends on how its further explication or manipulation could 
contribute to these interests and plans96. The would-be actor usually has a diverse 
range of such interests and plans (often connected to social roles and responsi-
bilities, e.g., engineer, citizen, parent, etc.). As such, different and even 
conflicting interests may be taken as the starting point for the next aspect of the 
process of choosing:  envisioning ways of acting upon these interests.  
 Any purposive action is indeed preceded by the envisioning of projects, which 
“consists in an anticipation of future conduct by way of phantasying” (Schutz 
1973 p. 68). In such phantasying, one first has to envision the state of affairs that 
one would want to bring about with future action. It is then possible to recon-
struct the sequence of single steps that would bring one there, or what I call an 
____________________________________________________________________ 
96  These interests and plans act as imposed motivational relevances, some of which are part of 
the attitude with which the situation is encountered. 
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in-order-to sequence97. When multiple projects have been envisioned as possibili-
ties for mastering the problematic situation, they need to be weighed before a 
choice between them can be made. 
 Weighting the different projects against one another is the last aspect of choos-
ing, the outcome of which is determined by a number of factors98. First is the 
extent to which interests are expected to be fulfilled. As mentioned, envisioned 
projects are fuelled by the interests appealed to by the problematic situation. The 
better a project is expected to fulfil these interests (if successful), the more 
appealing it is for guiding future conduct. Secondly, Schutz’ claim that 
“[i]nterests have from the outset the character of being interrelated into a system. 
[…] also actions, motives, ends and means, and, therefore, projects and purposes 
are only elements […] projected within a system of higher order” (Schutz 1973 p. 
93), indicates that compatibility with other interests and overarching plan-
hierarchies is also an important characteristic of appealing projects. The third 
factor is that of urgency. On the one hand, a project may be a necessary step 
towards the fulfilment of other interests and plans, thus gaining urgency under 
the ‘first things first’ idealization. On the other, the problematic situation may 
urgently require action, for example, because it poses an immediate threat or 
because it is one’s responsibility to act. Finally, one has to consider the factor of 
practicability, which involves 1) an “estimation on the part of the would-be actor 
that the objective conditions for reaching his goal […] are given”, and 2) “the 
conviction that his own ‘capacities’ are sufficient to make the performance of the 
steps of the act practicable” (Schutz & Luckmann 1989 p. 25). Practicability thus 
also involves an estimation on the part of the would-be actor of the plausibility of 
plans. 
 After all this, one project is usually chosen as the most appropriate for 
mastering the problematic situation. 
 
The third episode that Schutz discusses is that of deciding. Since the process of 
choosing happens in the inner durée of consciousness, and precedes any moti-
vated action in the outer world, the project that ends up being chosen is not yet 
____________________________________________________________________ 
97  This can then act as intrinsic motivational relevance. 
98  Simply listing these does not do justice to Schutz’ more nuanced description of weighting 
projects. However, it allows for his insights to be clearly connected to explanations for path 
reinforcement in section 4.7. 
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translated into action. The would-be actor first needs to decide for that to happen. 
Such a decision, which is an act of will, links the chosen project to action. 
 
Finally, the fourth episode consists of acting out the chosen project by going through 
the related in-order-to sequence. For those projects that require “action that in its 
design necessarily engages in the surrounding world” (Schutz & Luckmann 
1989 p. 10) and where these changes to the world are “not a purely accidental 
effect of action [but] must rather be intended and inserted in the plan of action” 
(Schutz & Luckmann 1989 p. 12), action is called work.  
 In doing work, the actor acts upon the capacities that she presumes to have 
and which were important in determining the practicability of the project. In 
other words, work involves the capacities necessary to achieve projected out-
comes. Finding resonance with Giddens’ rather straight-forward suggestion that 
“the capacity to achieve outcomes” defines power (Giddens 1984 p. 257), it might 
be useful to consider Giddens’ other suggestion that power is determined99 by 
two types of resources: allocative and authoritative. Allocative resources refer to 
“capabilities […] generating command over objects, goods or material phenom-
ena”. Authoritative resources, on the other hand, refer to “types of 
transformative capacity generating command over persons or actors” (Giddens 
1984 p. 33). Along similar lines, an actor doing work might be said to have two 
types of capacities. First, she has the capacity to create new or mobilize existing 
objectivations so as to change the structure of the outer world in accordance with 
her goals. These objectivations include material features of the environment, 
means of material (re)production and other produced goods (Giddens 1984 p. 
258). However, since the life-world is essentially shared with others, most of 
these objectivations intentionally or unintentionally impact others’ experiences 
and actions, which leads us to the second type of capacity. That is, the actor has 
the capacity to get others to act in accordance with her goals, which involves the 
creation of imposed relevances for others, be it thematic, interpretational or 
motivational (Dreher & López 2015; Dreher 2013; Goettlich 2011). As mentioned 
above, this might include the creation or mobilization of certain objectivations 
(e.g., walls, fences and alarm systems aim to keep people out of a power plant). 
More importantly, however, specific ways of understanding and valuating the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
99  Put more accurately, power is generated “in and through structures of domination. The 
resources which constitute structures of domination are of two sorts – allocative and authorita-
tive” (Giddens 1984 p. 258). 
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life-world (in the form of symbolic systems) are put forward that are able to 
shape every part of others’ process of choosing as described above. 
 
With this, Schutz’ phenomenological analysis of the process of choosing and 
acting has been adequately summarized. The following section shows how it is 
compatible with the abovementioned characteristics of structurational agency 
and with different ways of adopting technology. 
4.4.1. Linking Schutz’ description of choosing and acting with technology 
adoption and structurational agency 
In the previous section, the subjective process of choosing and acting has been 
laid bare. This description provides a number of conceptual categories and 
resources that a) are iterational, projective and practical-evaluative, and b) link up 
to different ways of understanding technology adoption (and thus to possible 
self-reinforcing mechanisms in path dependence). 
 
Starting with the latter, different ways in which technology can be adopted are 
reflected in the specific ways in which technological objects can play an impor-
tant role in the process of choosing and acting100. 
 First, technological objects can be part of the actor’s allocative or authoritative 
capacities in acting out a project. That is, they can function as tools towards the 
goal of the project. This corresponds to a notion of adoption as choosing to use 
the technological object. This can lead to learning effects as the technological 
object is used in mastering problematic situations.  
 The second notion manifests itself when the technological object is the goal 
of the current project (i.e., it is part of my interests and plans towards which a 
project was envisioned). This corresponds to another but related notion of 
adoption: acquisition, which, even without learning effects, could contribute to 
path self-reinforcement through economies of scale. The fact that use and 
acquisition are recognizable is hardly surprising, since they are probably the 
most straightforward ways in which technology can be adopted (e.g., Hall & 
Kahn, 2003)  
____________________________________________________________________ 
100  Some other models for technology adoption are based on similar subjective processes, albeit 
less phenomenologically grounded. See, for example, the five stages of the adoption process in 
the ‘diffusion of innovations’ approach (Rogers, 1995). 
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 The third way of adopting technology refers to the possibility of the techno-
logical object being adopted only as a future prospect whereby, in accordance with 
the ‘first-things-first’ idealization, an actor must wait or complete other projects 
before acquisition and/or use become possible. This means that for the current 
project, according to the two types of capacities, certain objectivations need to be 
created or mobilized or other people need to (be made to) adapt their behaviour 
towards this future technological prospect. This is especially important where 
the planning, regulation, production, acquisition, or operation of a technological 
object transcends the capacities of any single person or even most organisa-
tions101. 
 The last way in which technological objects feature in choosing and acting is 
not usually seen as a form of adoption, despite the fact that it involves techno-
logical objects playing an important role in choosing and acting. It refers to 
when technological objects (or the consequences of using them) enter into 
experience as problematic, prompting choices and actions to rectify the problem. 
For the purposes of this paper, I call this ‘negative’ adoption as opposed to the 
more ‘positive’ notions of adoption above102. This is important for path rein-
forcement because negative adoption of non-dominant technologies can 
reinforce a dominant path (which could be reinforced by negative externalities to 
adoption of the dominant technology). Moreover, actors can go to great lengths 
to avoid others experiencing the dominant technology as problematic. In so 
doing, they avoid weakening the technological path103. Notwithstanding, includ-
ing the possibility of negative adoption also opens up possibilities for 
endogenous change in path dependent processes. 
 In sum, adoption of a technology occurs when the technology is recognized 
and occupies an important place in an agent’s subjective processes of choosing 
and acting. It includes acquisition (as the goal of a project) and use (as tools), but 
____________________________________________________________________ 
101  This is more elaborately discussed in section 4.5. 
102  Negative adoption does not coincide with the notion of ‘negative externalities’. The latter do not 
necessarily involve a technology being experienced as problematic. Rather, negative external-
ities to positive adoption of a specific technology simply lower the chance of positive adoption 
of other technologies.?
103  For example, during the early decades of nuclear energy in the USA, far-reaching secrecy 
withheld information that may otherwise have caused many more people to experience 
nuclear energy as problematic (Bergen 2016a). 
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also incorporates the technology featuring as a future prospect and it being 
experienced as problematic. 
 
As said, the process of choosing and acting as described above is also compatible 
with a structurational notion of agency, since it describes a process that is 
iterational, projective and practical-evaluative. 
 We can see the iterational aspects of choosing and acting first and foremost 
in the possibility of habitual settlement of problematic situations, indicating that 
some solutions to well-known problems are thoroughly routinized. However, 
even if the agent has to choose, she still does so based on her subjective stock of 
knowledge. This includes iterational aspects because of the importance of 
habitual knowledge for grasping the situation, but also the role of skills, useful 
knowledge and knowledge of recipes in envisioning projects for fulfilling the 
interests at stake. Lastly, routinized ways of dealing with a problematic situation 
also add to the practicability of a situation. 
 The projective aspects of choosing and acting are most clearly connected to 
the envisioning of projects, in which a desirable future state of affairs and a 
sequence of steps towards it are envisioned. However, the initial connection of a 
problematic situation with interests and plans as well as the different aspects of 
weighting the different envisioned projects (the interests at stake, compatibility 
with other interests, urgency and practicability) indicate a “future-orientedness 
in terms of scenario’s for action with regards to one’s interests, desires, etc.” 
(Araujo & Harrison, 2002 p. 8). 
 Lastly, it would be difficult for a process of choosing and acting not to be 
practical-evaluative. However, Schutz’ phenomenological description of choos-
ing indicates that it is a complex process that is heavily reliant on one’s interests 
and plans, and the centrality of problematic situations, whereas the envisioning 
of projects and their evaluation shows a focus on practical judgement. 
 
Thus, next to being compatible with different ways of adopting technology, 
Schutz’ phenomenology of choosing and acting is in line with a structurational 
notion of agency since it contains the conceptual resources for describing agents’ 
processes of choosing and acting in a way that is iterational, projective and 
practical-evaluative. However, as indicated in section 4.2, these conceptual 
resources for a structurational notion of agency also need to be interconnected 
with the structures in which this agency is exercised and be compatible with the 
different explanations for path self-reinforcement. To this end, sections 4.5 and 
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4.6 provide a Schutzian perspective on the two other evolutionary building 
blocks of path dependence, i.e., technology and the social selection environment 
respectively. These descriptions find their basis in a phenomenology of everyday 
life and as such, are meant to describe the interrelatedness of subjective agency 
with the structures discussed rather than provide exhaustive new descriptions of 
already well-studied socio-technical phenomena. 
4.5. A Schutzian Perspective on Technology 
In section 4.3, it was established that technological objects basically function as 
tools. However, this straight-forward characterization does not fully appreciate 
Schutz’ insistence on technology’s impact on the life-world104. More importantly, 
it is also insufficient to show the interrelatedness of these objects with agents 
and the social structures in which they find themselves. The following sections 
present additional considerations concerning the interrelatedness between 
technological objects and society that are inspired by and structured around 
some of Schutz’ relevant insights. 
4.5.1. Making technologies work: recipes, roles, and dependence on others 
My ability to do work involving tools, i.e., to act purposefully using technology 
depends on whether I possess the necessary knowledge to do so. Not only do I 
need to recognize an object as a tool of a certain type, but I need sufficient 
knowledge in terms of skills and recipes for action of how to handle it, at least to 
the extent that allows me to experiment or ‘muddle through’ the situation. As 
Schutz indicates: as long as I can do work with technological objects, even “the 
most complicated gadgets prepared by a very advanced technology”, I do not 
need to know “the Why and the How of their working” (Schutz 1946 p. 463). If, 
however, the technological object does not function properly and/or my knowl-
____________________________________________________________________ 
104  As Schutz indicates, “[t]he power of making tools expands the range and multiplies the 
instruments of the psyche, but the tool-maker or commodity-maker obtains power over society 
when society has begun to think these wares indispensable.” (Schutz 1952 p. 233). In a 
globalized and technologized world, “our social surrounding is within the reach of everyone, 
everywhere; an anonymous other, whose goals are unknown to us because of his anonymity, 
may bring us together with our system of interests and relevances within his control” (Schutz 
1946 p. 473). 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
92 
edge of it turns out to be insufficient, I am often dependent on others that I 
know to have capacities that I do not. These capacities might include tools for 
repairing it, more intricate knowledge about its inner workings, or simply 
knowing the right manual or people to refer me to. That is, when technological 
objects become problematic, I often depend on others whose capacities tran-
scend my own. 
 This dependence on others when it comes to the creation and trouble-
shooting of technological objects (especially very complex ones) indicates a 
division of labour that, while experienced differently by all involved, is also to 
some extent known or knowable to them. For example, when I buy a car, I 
realize that there are ‘car mechanics’ that I could visit in case it breaks down, and 
that the car was created by ‘engineers’ and ‘workers’ as part of ‘car companies’ 
(just as they might know me as a ‘user’ or ‘customer’). As such, they are not 
subjectively understood in terms of specific “personal types”, but rather in terms 
of relatively anonymous “functionary types”, (Schutz & Luckmann 1973 p. 82), 
often as part of collectives like companies or administrative bodies that I also 
know to have clear functions or goals. Such relatively anonymous functionary 
types allow for the inclusion of others in larger plans and plan-hierarchies, since 
understanding them in terms of expected conduct (analogous to functions for 
tools) makes them more predictable and thus makes plans more plausible and 
practicable. 
4.5.2. Technological Hierarchies – Social Hierarchies – Plan Hierarchies 
The making of technological objects also involves the creation of three kinds of 
interconnected hierarchies105.  
 Most obviously, technological objects are usually created out of other techno-
logical objects (parts), and will be combined with other tools when used by actors 
____________________________________________________________________ 
105  Callon (1991) points out that the more structured and interrelated techno-economic networks 
are, the more inflexible they become. Something similar might be true of the different 
hierarchies presented in this section. Also, the power of planning in which time, space, tools 
and functionary types (and as such, others) are connected and arranged (as they are in the 
three types of interconnected hierarchies) bears resemblance to the power ascribed to so-called 
‘centres of calculation’ (Latour 1990). 
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doing work106. They are part of technological hierarchies. In order to create these 
parts and bring them together I need to have an idea what parts are available to 
me and which ones I still need to create or have created, whether their acquisi-
tion is feasible, how to put them together, etc.  
 For most technologies, this also means that I depend on others because they 
make the parts I need (other manufacturers), they have the expertise for figuring 
out which ones I need or how to put them together (engineers), they have the 
know-how to imagine new parts (R&D), are able to get my products to users 
(distributors), they have the financial resources I need (investors and consum-
ers), etc. As such, the creation of technological objects relies on getting others to 
act in such a way as to support my plans for the creation of these technological 
objects, i.e., it involves the creation of social hierarchies.  
 For some technologies, like complex infrastructural systems, actually doing 
work with the technology requires further meticulous planning and enrolling 
others (whether individually or in group) into precisely defined roles with 
specific responsibilities (which act as imposed thematic and motivational rele-
vances). Successful coordination of both tools and others requires the creation of 
objectivated and systematic plan hierarchies107, including a more or less detailed 
overview of projects with their proper in-order-to sequences for myself and 
others to act out. This is possible because I know ‘of’ others in terms of func-
tionary types. For example, I may know that I need a software engineer, but I do 
not need to have a specific one in mind for drafting my plans108. 
 For many actors, getting them to act ‘according to plan’ can be reasonably 
guaranteed by the exchange of highly generalized resources like money for more 
____________________________________________________________________ 
106  What is experienced as the technological object is determined by its fit into the pragmatic 
mastery of the situation. For example, many people might treat a nuclear power plant as one 
object most of the time: an interpretation that is sufficient to their ends (although that suffi-
ciency may deteriorate in case the experience of the power plants turns problematic, e.g., in 
case of a nuclear disaster). Engineers operating the power plant, on the other hand, would 
consider the plant’s ‘parts’ as technological objects in their own right since they feature 
prominently in their work. 
107  Seeing technological objects as composites connected to forms of organisation and 
objectivated plan hierarchies might well be compatible with a ‘richer’ conception of path 
dependence (Martin 2010 p. 19-20). 
108  This is reminiscent of David’s discussion of role typing and institutionalization (David, 1994), 
also based on functionary types (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). 
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specialized ones like research, specialized labour or specific tools109 (although 
others may require a different approach, e.g., through contracts providing future 
certainties, propaganda, rules and regulations set by ‘proper’ authorities, etc.). Of 
course, the chance of actually getting others to act according to plan increases 
the more that doing so is experienced by them as relevant. For example, custom-
ers are more likely to buy the technological object I create when they think that 
these tools I make are particularly suited for solving their problems or fulfilling 
their interests, i.e., “when society has begun to think these wares indispensable” 
(Schutz 1952 p. 233). This highlights the potential of providing others with 
specific ways of experiencing the world so as to influence their choices and 
actions (e.g., through advertising). Note that this implies exceptional power for a 
tool maker that is simultaneously a recognized authority for knowledge-making 
about the problem the tool is supposed to address110. 
 
With the Schutzian perspective on technology laid out, we can now turn to the 
‘social selection environment’. 
4.6. A Schutzian Perspective on the Social Selection Environment 
As shown in Section 4.4, actions (e.g., those involving technology adoption) 
presuppose a subjective stock of knowledge, including interests and plans, habits 
and recipes for action. However, action does not occur in a vacuum: it occurs in 
society and involves others111, with whom I can quite effectively and efficiently 
interact, compete, coordinate, and cooperate. This is only possible because we 
have a lot of knowledge in common. This is so because much of the subjective 
stock of knowledge is not all being derived from subjective explications of 
problematic situations. Rather, much of it was taught to me by others from a 
____________________________________________________________________ 
109  The relative specificity of these resources for a limited number of plans might explain why 
such investments are seen as sunk costs or ‘micro-level irreversibilities’ (David 2007). Since 
the resulting resources are only useful towards my plan, they may not be useful to many others 
or to plans I might want to act out in the future. Hence, I am ‘stuck’ with the results of my 
transaction. 
110  This has sometimes been the case with the agencies responsible for nuclear energy production 
(Bergen 2016a). 
111  That is, “[h]umans are the ones who can do or not do something. And humans are humans – 
and first become humans at all – only among their kind. In other words: the person who acts 
is in society” (Schutz & Luckmann, 1989 p.66). 
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wider social stock of knowledge. For the Schutzian process of choice, four 
elements derived from this social stock of knowledge are especially relevant:  
 
• the unquestioned every-day social life-world within which any inquiry 
starts, 
• the socially approved elements of knowledge that can be taken for granted 
(including a number of interests and plans that are considered ‘normal’ to 
have), 
• the procedures that are considered appropriate for mastering the situa-
tion, whether they be “practical, magical, political, religious, poetical, 
scientific, etc.”, and 
• the typical conditions under which a problem can be considered as solved. 
 (Schutz 1973 p. 351) 
 
These elements influence every step of choosing. The grasping of the problem-
atic situation occurs in terms of the unquestioned matrix for inquiry and the 
elements of the subjective stock of knowledge. It is then connected to plans and 
plan hierarchies, some derived from one’s socially recognised identity or role. 
Envisioning projects is helped if the necessary knowledge (including recipes for 
action and knowledge of tools) for mastering the problematic situation are 
available in the social stock of knowledge, and the procedures for weighting 
these projects can be similarly socially derived. For example, an engineer might 
come up with different ways of dealing with a risky situation than others, and 
she may resort to procedures for weighting these projects that seem authoritative 
to her. For example, she might apply quantitative risk assessment, cost-benefit 
analysis, next to more generally authoritative procedures like price comparisons, 
or following legal prescriptions. 
 However, as this example indicates, there is not one homogenous social stock 
of knowledge. Rather, it is divided into generally relevant knowledge on the one 
hand, and relatively specialized knowledge that corresponds to specific roles on 
the other112. Since no single person can specialize in everything nor can she 
single-handedly carry out everything, an important part of the social stock of 
____________________________________________________________________ 
112  For example, the specific operations of the engineer are not equivalent to the experience of 
everyday life in that they involve highly formalized systems of calculability and justification. 
Nevertheless, the general stock of knowledge provides the substratum on which this formal-
ized action is built, and the pragmatic motive still undergirds the world of the engineer. 
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knowledge is knowledge of the structure of specializations and the tasks and 
authority113 that go with these. Knowing such a “typology of experts” (Berger & 
Luckmann 1966 p. 95) allows one to navigate a complex social world, plan 
projects, enrol others in them and coordinate their actions, e.g., as described in 
section 4.5114. 
 Finally, it is important to note that even if the social stock of knowledge is an 
impressive collection of imposed relevances, choosing and action are still 
properly subjective processes because in everyday life, “the social stock of 
knowledge is divested of its social character […] It appears in the form a taken-
for-granted subjective possession” (Schutz & Luckmann 1973 p. 319). Because of 
this, the capacity to determine the contents of the social stock of knowledge is a 
way to impose relevances on others (and thus influence their choices) without 
necessarily eliciting the impression of oppression115. 
 
Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 provided a Schutzian perspective on the basic building 
blocks of path dependence: ‘adoption’, ‘technology’ and the ‘social selection 
environment’. Section 4.4.1 already presented how the Schutzian perspective on 
adoption, i.e., as founded in the phenomenology of choosing and acting, is 
compatible with different ways in which technology can be adopted by agents 
(i.e., through use, acquisition, as a future prospect, or as problematic) as well as 
with agency that is iterational, projective and practical-evaluative. Now that the 
Schutzian perspective on technology and the social selection environment have 
also been presented, it is possible to show how the Schutzian process of choos-
ing and acting relates to the different explanations for path reinforcement. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
113  This authority is important in determining the credibility of claims made by the supposedly 
authoritative party. As such, authority is important in changing or maintaining the social stock 
of knowledge which both implies and (re)produces structures of power. 
114  The compatibility of the relevant elements of the social stock of knowledge shared by persons 
responsible for sub-tasks of a project is another prerequisite for effective coordination. While 
some such elements are only useful in select communities (e.g., radiotoxicity decay rates), 
others are extremely widespread (e.g., general Standards for Weights and Measures  (Latour 
1999)). 
115  For nuclear energy technologies, such influence has often been exercised through so-called 
socio-technical imaginaries, i.e., “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order 
reflected in the design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological 
projects” (Jasanoff & Kim 2009 p. 120). 
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4.7. Linking Schutz’ Description of Choosing and Acting with Explanations for 
Path Reinforcement 
This section aims to show how the concepts from the Schutzian analysis of 
choosing and acting fit with the utilitarian, functional, legitimacy, and power 
explanations for technological path reinforcement briefly introduced in section 
4.2. Of course, since technology adoption is what drives the mechanisms on 
which these explanations rely, the process of choosing and acting underlies all of 
them. However, as the rest of this section shows, the different explanations 
emphasize different aspects of choosing and acting for their explanatory work. 
In exploring these connections, the insights from the Schutzian perspective on 
technology and the social selection environment are employed to mediate this 
relation when necessary. 
4.7.1. Utilitarian Explanations 
In utilitarian explanations for path reinforcement, agents adopt a technology if it 
provides most benefits in comparison to the costs involved, and is better in that 
regard than competing technologies. A path could thus get reinforced if the 
efficiency of the leading technology increases (or is perceived to increase) more 
than that of competitors as more agents adopt the technology (Mahoney 
2000)116. The mechanisms involved include positive ones that directly reinforce 
the dominant technology, such as those based on increasing returns (e.g., 
economies of scale, learning effects, network externalities, etc.). However, 
mechanisms that indirectly support the path by making competing technologies 
less attractive (e.g., negative externalities) can also drive utilitarian explanations 
for path reinforcement. 
 This focus on efficiency increase finds it phenomenological correlates in two 
specific aspects of the process of choosing that are involved in the weighting of 
projects. On the one hand, learning effects from using a technology may allow 
for its improvement, in turn increasing the extent to which interests are fulfilled by 
using said technology. On the other hand, utilitarian explanations for path 
reinforcement are at work when adoption of a technology increases the practica-
bility of future projects in which the same technology finds ‘positive’ adoption 
____________________________________________________________________ 
116  This is still highly dependent on the specific returns regimes of the different technologies 
available (see, e.g., Arthur, 1989; Page, 2006) 
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(i.e., as a tool, as the goal of the project, or as a future prospect) or decreases the 
practicability of projects in which other technological objects with the same 
function (i.e., competing technologies) would find positive adoption. Given that 
practicability of a project involves a) an estimation by the would-be actor that the 
conditions for reaching her goal are given and b) that she believes her capacities 
to be sufficient (Schutz & Luckmann 1989 p. 25), it can also be explicitly coupled 
with a number of well-known mechanisms for path self-reinforcement such as 
increasing returns, some examples of which are presented below. 
 First, increased adoption can convince possible future adopters that the 
objective conditions for the success of the current project and future plans are 
given. That is, as acquisition and use of a technology continues, uncertainty 
about its reliability, quality, etc., decreases, which in turn increases the plausibil-
ity of projects in which the technology finds positive adoption, especially those 
involving the technology for acquisition and as a future prospect. This corre-
sponds to mechanisms based on adaptive expectations (Arthur, 1994). 
 Secondly, people adopting the technology can lower the necessary capacities for 
the execution of the project. For example, in cases where the technological object 
is the goal of the project, acquisition may be facilitated when increased adoption 
lowers prices due to scale economies117. Where the technological object is a tool 
in the execution of the project, the results of learning by previous users de-
creases my need for investment in the necessary knowledge and skills, 
facilitating the decision towards acquisition and subsequent use.  
 Finally, increased adoption may increase practicability by increasing an agent’s 
capacities. For example, learning effects due to adoption as ‘use’ can increase 
practicability by giving tool producers the capacities for tool improvement or by 
having users develop better skills, routines or recipes for action. Such invest-
ments in habitual elements of knowledge can also be understood as a sunk cost 
because they tend to be technology-specific, in which case other technologies 
become less attractive in comparison because of the investment in new skills 
involved118. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
117  Note that this mechanism describes a process in which consumers’ buying behaviour 
increases the producer’s authoritative capacities, including the possibility of lowering prices.  
118  This phenomenon is also known as ‘technical interrelatedness’ (David, 1985) 
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4.7.2. Functional Explanations 
As shown above, the choice between technological alternatives is partly deter-
mined by the practicability of projects in which technologies find positive 
adoption. This includes the consideration of how well the technologies, as tools, 
fulfil the function according to which they are recognized and understood.  For 
functional explanations of path reinforcement, however, adoption of a technology 
is driven by its ‘functionality’ in or for a larger system. As such, the specific 
efficiency of a technology is less important here than are the consequences of the 
adoption of that technology for the system of which it is part (e.g., adaptation or 
survival of the system)(Mahoney, 2000). Self-reinforcement in functional 
explanations can occur when the positive effects of the technology on the system 
become clear, which causes additional adoption of the technology, which en-
hances the technology’s capacity to fulfil the function, etc.  
 This of course means that there can be reasons for agents to prefer one 
technology over another based on the larger ‘systems’ of which the technology is 
a part. In terms of the Schutzian perspective on technology: functional explana-
tions revolve around the consequences of the adoption of a technology for the 
distinctive technological, plan, and social hierarchies associated with the tech-
nology, since these hierarchies inform which other interests are pursued, other 
projects are envisioned and carried out, other technologies may be adopted, etc. 
As such, even if technologies are functionally119 equivalent, they can be compati-
ble with other interests, plans and projects because of the differences between 
the hierarchies involved in making them work.  
 As such, functional explanations of path reinforcement refer to cases in 
which the choice between technological alternatives is determined by a different 
aspect of the weighting of projects during choosing: the compatibility between 
the technology (including the hierarchies that make it work) and other interests 
and projects, even if those have little to do with the technology’s function as a 
tool120. Given that this compatibility is partly determined by the hierarchies 
featuring as resources in envisioning and acting out other projects, functional 
____________________________________________________________________ 
119  ‘Functionally equivalent’ is used in the sense that they perform the same function as tools and 
are similarly practicable in projects in which the technology is positively adopted. 
120  That is, a technology’s explicit function as a tool may or may not have much to do with the 
‘function’ it serves in larger systems. For example, one ‘function’ of nuclear energy technology 
in India was to increase indigenous industrial and engineering capacities (Ramana 2007; 
Tomar 1980), which scarcely depends on how well the reactors produced energy. 
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explanations can also be said to depend on the increased fulfilment of interests 
by and practicability of other projects rather than those in which the technology 
finds positive adoption. 
4.7.3. Legitimacy Explanations 
According to legitimacy explanations, agents adopt a technology when they 
perceive it to be right or proper. Self-reinforcement occurs when the initial 
adoptions set a precedent for what is considered appropriate or legitimate. 
Additional adoptions occur because they are the appropriate thing to do, which 
further reinforces the legitimacy of the technology.  
 According to the Schutzian perspective on adoption, for someone to perceive 
a technology as ‘right or proper’, it is necessary for her to have knowledge of, and 
commitment to, interests, plans, etc. that are to be prioritized over others. As indi-
cated in the Schutzian perspective on the social selection environment, these 
interests and plans are often derived and subjectivated from the social stock of 
knowledge through upbringing, education, etc. They act as imposed motivational 
relevances and are part of the attitude with which a technology is experienced. 
 In this regard, two parts of this social stock of knowledge are especially 
relevant. First, there are the socially approved elements of knowledge that can 
generally be taken for granted and form the background of many situations121. 
This includes the elements of knowledge in terms of which the situation (includ-
ing technology) is to be interpreted, but also general interests such as increasing 
safety or security, or general plans such as restoring lost national prowess122. 
Also included is knowledge of the ‘typology of experts’ which (in terms of 
functionary types) allows an agent to know what her own and others’ roles are in 
solving societal problems, e.g., politicians should take political decisions and 
engineers should design technologies123. Secondly, the social stock of knowledge 
____________________________________________________________________ 
121  The less homogenous the population of possible technology adopters is in this regard, the 
lower the chances of lock-in (Cantner & Vannuccini, 2016), since this increases the chance that 
other technologies will be positively adopted or that the dominant technology gets negatively 
adopted. 
122  For example, post-World War 2 France saw the general plan to restore the Radiance of France 
by developing nuclear energy technologies (Hecht 1998). 
123  This does not mean that politicians do not influence technological design or that engineers do 
not engage in politics (Hecht 1998). However, these activities are not explicitly dictated by their 
functionary types. 
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includes knowledge of the proper procedures for handling specific problematic 
situations. In line with knowledge of the typology of experts, this includes 
procedures of delegation by which an actor is to leave certain decisions to those 
with the proper expertise or authority. On top of this, it includes some general 
knowledge about how these experts are supposed to make these decisions. 
 This differentiation of roles points towards a distinction between ‘those 
involved’ in technology adoption based on legitimacy considerations. On the one 
hand, there are those who positively adopt a technology because they a) consider 
this adoption as right or proper, i.e., as fulfilling those socially derived interests 
that are prioritized over others and/or b) the adoption is the outcome of what the 
actor, based on the social stock of knowledge, believes to be the proper procedure 
for deciding what technology to adopt (including who is involved in that deci-
sion, often in terms of functionary types). On the other hand, for those that do 
not positively adopt the technology themselves, legitimacy can help to avoid its 
negative adoption which could weaken the technological path (e.g., by giving rise 
to public opposition to the technology). This is possible if the ‘properness’ of the 
technology is taken for granted based on the social stock of knowledge124, or in 
cases where the technology does become problematic but explication of that 
situation quickly settles it in favour of the technology’s adoption due to the social 
stock of knowledge containing the elements showing its properness (or lacking 
the opposite), e.g., research results sufficiently establishing safety, or the fact 
that all legal and professional prescriptions were followed in deciding on its 
adoption.  
 Of course, all this does not explain how this legitimacy comes about, i.e., 
through active processes of legitimation. However, since such legitimation 
processes involve the exertion of power through the mobilization of allocative 
and authoritative resources, they belong to the power explanations for techno-
logical path reinforcement.  
____________________________________________________________________ 
124  When the technology is not problematic to me and does not feature in the resolution of other 
problematic situations, one could say that I am ‘indifferent’ towards it. In such a case, I do not 
technically adopt it. However, such indifference could still affect path dependence and lock-in if 
my actions provide others with resources. For example, even if I do not care whether my 
electricity was produced using nuclear or solar energy technologies, my paying for it provides 
resources to those selling that electricity to me and those resources enable them to increasingly 
adopt their technology of choice. 
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4.7.4. Power Explanations 
Power explanations maintain that technological path reinforcement occurs due 
to the support the technology receives from an elite group of actors. Self-
reinforcement can occur when the adoption of the elite-supported technology 
acts to further increase the power that the elite group has to ensure (or increase 
the chance of) future adoptions125. 
 Such actors’ status as elite is defined by the disproportionate power they have 
to provide such support successfully in comparison to others. As explained in 
the Schutzian perspective on adoption, the power an actor holds refers to the 
allocative and authoritative capacities she has to achieve her goals. In other 
words, power refers to those capacities that allow for 1) changing the structure of 
the outer world in accordance to her goals, and more importantly 2) to get others 
to act in accordance with her goals through creating imposed relevances for 
others (Dreher & López 2015; Dreher 2013; Goettlich 2011) which could influ-
ence their processes of choosing and acting. If such influence on others by an 
elite group of actors is to lead to power-based path reinforcement, however, it 
will have to be applied on a sufficiently large scale. Based on the above, this can 
happen in at least two ways. 
 First, creating (and enrolling others into) the social and plan hierarchies 
necessary for making a technology work is a clear example of exercising power to 
get others to work towards the technology’s success. However, this does not 
mean that these others actually positively adopt the technology, since they only 
execute small projects in the corresponding plan hierarchy. However, to the 
extent that they depend on the technology’s presence and functioning (e.g., 
because they get paid for working on it), being part of the technology’s social 
hierarchy helps to avoid them negatively adopting it. When the social hierarchy 
is very encompassing (e.g., because it involves all citizens in a technological 
project of national importance), this can have particularly profound effects. 
 Secondly, an elite group might have the power to determine the contents of 
the social stock of knowledge (or its relatively specialized subdivisions), includ-
ing its systems of relevance. Such deliberate determination of the social stock of 
____________________________________________________________________ 
125  As such, power explanations might be particularly useful in analysing situations where 
competition is not very fair nor effective, interests are concentrated, the chance of bankruptcy 
is low or non-existent, etc. (e.g., government). Some have argued that such situations have a 
higher chance of path dependent processes leading to lock-in (Liebowitz & Margolis, 2013). 
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knowledge can steer the utilitarian, functional and legitimacy considerations of 
others. For example, the capacity to determine prices provides an obvious way of 
increasing the practicability of a technology’s positive adoption by others, and 
the authority to make projections on the technology’s future can also increase 
such practicability by strengthening the plausibility of successful adoption126. As 
such, power clearly has a role to play in utilitarian explanations. For functional 
considerations, the capacity to connect the technology to commonly supported 
projects and plans is paramount127. For legitimacy considerations, a select group 
might have the power to set the standards for what is to be considered acceptable 
(e.g., to define maximum acceptable risk levels) or to define the procedures by 
which a technology is to be adopted (e.g., through expert opinion instead of 
democratic means). In all of these cases, power is exercised to either increase the 
probability of others positively adopting the technology or to avoid them nega-
tively adopting it128. As such, power considerations (and the elements of 
choosing and acting that drive them) are inextricably woven into the other 
explanations for path reinforcement. 
 
These sections have demonstrated how the explanations for path self-
reinforcement emphasize different aspects of the process of technology adoption 
that underlies them. More generally, they also show that the conceptual re-
sources developed in the Schutzian perspective on technology adoption, 
technology, and the social selection environment are at least nominally compati-
ble with specific explanations for path reinforcement. 
4.8. Conclusion 
This paper set out to develop conceptual resources for a ‘thick’, structurational 
notion of agency in path dependent processes. Such resources would aid the 
____________________________________________________________________ 
126  For example, part of what fueled nuclear energy expansion in the USA in the 1950s and 1960s 
were overly optimistic price projections for nuclear energy production issued by the industry 
and the US AEC, i.e., the experts on the issue (Clarfield & Wiecek 1984; Cowan 1990). 
127  For example, the power to determine the connection and compatibility between nuclear power 
and regaining the Radiance of France in the early decades of the French nuclear energy 
program was centralized in the governmental Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique (Hecht 1998). 
128  This includes imposing thematic and interpretational relevances by selectively exposing others 
to the elements of knowledge in terms of which the technology is to be understood but also by 
determining what is not part of the social stock of knowledge (e.g., through secrecy). 
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study of path dependent processes from an actor-centred point of view, and 
could alleviate some of the concerns concerning path dependence’ reliance on 
contingency and its allegedly excessive determinism. Such resources would have 
to a) incorporate the three characteristics of structurational agency, b) centre 
around on what drives path self-reinforcement, i.e., they must have something to 
say on how technology can be adopted, c) highlight the interconnectedness of 
agency with the structures in which it is exercised, and d) should be at least 
nominally compatible with different explanations for path reinforcement. 
 To this end, the basic theoretical building blocks of technological path 
dependence’ quasi-evolutionary underpinnings (adoption, technology, and the 
social selection environment) were reinterpreted through the lens of Alfred 
Schutz’ social phenomenology, which provided agent-centred theoretical founda-
tions for the resulting perspectives. 
 The Schutzian perspective on adoption provided a description of the process 
of choosing and acting that was both compatible with agency that is iterative, 
projective and practical-evaluative and with different ways of adopting technol-
ogy, three ‘positive’ and one ‘negative’. Three forms of positive adoption of 
technology were recognized in choosing and acting: the technology being the 
goal of a current project (which could lead to its acquisition), its use as a tool in a 
current project, and holding it as a future prospect to work towards. On the other 
hand, there is also the possibility of negative adoption, whereby the technology 
enters into experience as problematic. In principle, the latter creates room for 
endogenous change in locked-in technological trajectories129, although the way it 
would do so concretely would need further study. 
 The Schutzian perspective on technology and the social selection environ-
ment (which are inevitably actor-centred due their phenomenological 
underpinnings) show that the notion of agency implied in the process of choos-
ing and acting is interconnected with the structures in which it is exercised. 
They were also useful in the next step, which consisted in showing how the 
explanations for path reinforcement (utilitarian, functional, legitimacy, and 
power) rely in different ways on the process of choosing and acting, technology, 
the hierarchies involved in making technology work, and the social stock of 
knowledge. Utilitarian explanations rely on increasing the extent to which 
interests are fulfilled by and the practicability of projects in which the technology 
____________________________________________________________________ 
129  Of course, this does not diminish the possibility of lock-in being disrupted by exogenous change. 
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finds positive adoption. Functional explanations rely on the compatibility of 
positive adoption of the technology (including its technological, social, and plan 
hierarchies) with other interests and plans, even if those plans have little to do 
with the technology’s explicit function. For legitimacy explanations, positive 
adoption depends mainly on the subjectivation of important motivational 
relevances from the social stock of knowledge, including the typology of experts 
that describes who has proper authority to decide certain matters and how this is 
to be done. Lastly, power explanations rely on the exercise of allocative and 
authoritative capacities by disproportionally powerful actors to explain both 
increased positive adoption as well as avoiding negative adoption. The most 
prominent ways of exercising authoritative capacities include enrolling others 
into a technology’s social hierarchy, as well as determining the contents of the 
social stock of knowledge. In doing so, it is possible to influence utilitarian, 
functional, or legitimacy-based considerations in others. 
 As such, The Schutzian perspectives on adoption, technology and the social 
selection environment provide a number of conceptual resources which could be 
helpful for describing path-dependent processes in an actor-centred way. That is, 
they could help to understand why and how agents make the technology adop-
tion decisions that they do, and the way in which technology and the social 
selection environment mediate those choices and their consequences. 
 
However, some critical notes are also in order. First of all, they should not be 
seen as a wholesale alternative to other ways of describing or investigating these 
processes, whether from a historical perspective, modelling, lab experiments, 
etc. Nevertheless, they might provide inspiration for them, e.g., for modelling 
agents’ decision processes. Also, the perspectives may be more explicitly con-
nectable to other theoretical developments in path dependence studies, even if 
they are not currently incorporated. For example, combining the perspectives 
developed in this paper with insights from the exploration of important implica-
tions of path dependence’ quasi-evolutionary structure by Vergne and Durand 
(2011) could be quite informative for further connecting actor-centred and 
structural investigations into technological path dependence. 
 Lastly, some of the conceptual resources developed in this paper might not be 
all that specific to technological path dependence. That is, they may also be 
partially applicable in other theories on technological or institutional persistence, 
such as escalating commitment, sunk costs, structural inertia, etc. (Sydow et al., 
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2009). However, this should probably not be a problem for the application of the 
perspectives to the study of technological path dependence. 
 107 
5 Reversible Experiments:  
Putting Geological Disposal to the Test 
Conceiving of nuclear energy as a social experiment gives rise to the question of 
what to do when the experiment is no longer responsible or desirable. To be able 
to appropriately respond to such a situation, the nuclear energy technology in 
question should be reversible, i.e. it must be possible to stop its further develop-
ment and implementation in society, and it must be possible to undo its 
undesirable consequences. This paper explores these two conditions by applying 
them to geological disposal of high-level radioactive waste (GD). Despite the fact 
that considerations of reversibility and retrievability have received increased 
attention in GD, the analysis in this paper concludes that GD cannot be con-
sidered reversible. Firstly, it would be difficult to stop its further development 
and implementation, since its historical development has led to a point where 
GD is significantly locked-in. Secondly, the strategy it employs for undoing 
undesirable consequences is less-than-ideal: it relies on containment of severely 
radiotoxic waste rather than attempting to eliminate this waste or its radioac-
tivity. And while it may currently be technologically impossible to turn high-level 
waste into benign substances, GD’s containment strategy makes it difficult to 
eliminate this waste’s radioactivity when the possibility would arise. In all, GD 
should be critically reconsidered if the inclusion of reversibility considerations in 
radioactive waste management has indeed become as important as is sometimes 
claimed. 
5.1. Introduction 
Ever since nuclear energy technologies were developed after the Second World 
War (WW2), we have been learning about the risks of nuclear energy production 
and how to deal with them130. However, more than 50 years after nuclear power 
____________________________________________________________________ 
130  The development of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is especially noteworthy here, 
pioneered in the famous WASH-1400 or Rasmussen Report (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission 1975). 
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plants first supplied electricity to the grid131, the Fukushima nuclear disaster 
made it excruciatingly clear that we are nowhere near done learning. Not only 
are there residual uncertainties about the risks of already widely deployed 
nuclear energy technologies, but new technologies are being developed (e.g., 
Generation IV reactors), while older ones have not seen widespread introduction 
even after decades of effort (e.g., geological disposal of radioactive waste).  
 However, how is this learning to be organized? The uncertainties and risks 
connected to nuclear power plant operation and radioactive waste management 
(RWM) have led van de Poel (2011) to propose that we should consider nuclear 
energy as a social experiment. This would mean that specific decisions on the 
acceptability of a technology, which now often occur before its actual introduc-
tion into society, would be replaced by an ongoing and conscious process of 
learning about its risks and benefits, as well as what is to be considered accept-
able. So, understanding a nuclear energy technology as a social experiment 
would allow us to learn more about that technology’s risks and benefits as the 
experiment unfolds. Nonetheless, it also means that we might at one point learn 
what we, in a sense, would rather not, i.e., that continuing the experiment is no 
longer responsible or even that it is simply no longer desirable. What is an 
experimenter to do then? At the very least, she should be able to stop the ex-
periment, and hazards should be contained as far as possible (van de Poel 
2011)132. In earlier work (Bergen, 2016a) I contended that these two conditions, 
the ability to stop further development and implementation of a technology (the 
experiment) and undoing its undesirable consequences (e.g., hazards), are 
constitutive of technological reversibility. In other words, the technology experi-
mented with should be reversible if the experimenter wants to be prepared for 
the experiment taking a turn for the worst. 
 This paper further explores what it means for a technology to be reversible by 
applying the abovementioned conditions for technological reversibility to a 
technology in which reversibility is already a salient consideration: the geological 
____________________________________________________________________ 
131  In 1953, Obninsk, Russia was home to the very first reactor providing power to the national 
grid. As this was mainly a research reactor, however, its power output was rather limited. By 
1956, Calder Hall, United Kingdom housed the first large-scale nuclear power plant, although 
it also produced plutonium for the British military program. In 1957, the Shippingport Atomic 
Power Station in Pennsylvania became the first large-scale nuclear power plant that was fully 
devoted to civil nuclear energy production. 
132  These are the two conditions that are most relevant to considerations of reversibility out of a 
longer list by van de Poel (p. 289). 
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disposal of radioactive waste (GD). In doing so, the paper also provides an 
answer to whether or not GD can be considered reversible in the way required 
for responsible social experimentation. 
5.2. Reversibility as an Issue in Radioactive Waste Management 
A quick exploration of publications by major nuclear organisations133 revealed 
five broad uses of the concepts of reversibility and irreversibility in the field of 
nuclear energy. The first three uses describe basic processes and consequences 
that are implicated in the production of nuclear energy: 
 
• (Ir)reversible mechanical/chemical/thermodynamic processes during the 
production of nuclear energy or radioactive waste management (e.g., 
spent fuel reprocessing, drilling damage to repository host rock, and nu-
clear fission) 
• A specific but important sub-category of the above: (ir)reversibility of 
flows and migrations, mostly of radioactive isotopes (e.g., in technical, en-
vironmental or geological systems). This aspect is often connected to 
standards for radioactive waste management facilities. 
• (Ir)reversibility of consequences, e.g.: 
o Mutations and cell damage in living tissue due to irradiation 
o Damage to the environment and its ecosystems 
 
While these uses are useful for describing (ir)reversible aspects connected to 
nuclear energy, they are not actually oriented towards making a nuclear energy 
technology more reversible. However, the last two uses are oriented as such, 
since they provide specific design goals or strategies for reversible radioactive 
waste management (RWM) technology and its implementation: 
 
• Retrievability of radioactive waste from a waste storage or geological dis-
posal facility. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
133  That is, the websites of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), the French National 
Radioactive Waste Management Agency (ANDRA), the Swedish National Council for Nuclear 
Waste (KASAM), and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) were 
searched for the terms ‘reversibility’, ‘reversible’, ‘irreversibility’, and ‘irreversible’. 
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• Reversibility of (consequences of) decisions during the implementation 
process of a waste storage or geological disposal facility 
 (e.g., Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management 1978; 
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 2011; U.S. Department of Energy 1991) 
 
Different RWM technologies differ in their plans for reversibility or retrievability 
of radioactive wastes, broadly determined by two factors. First, the type of 
radioactive waste is relevant. Generally, three categories of radioactive waste are 
distinguished based on their lifetime and radioactivity: low, intermediate, and 
high-level waste (IAEA 2009)134. High-level waste from nuclear energy produc-
tion can be further divided based on the nuclear fuel cycle from which it results: 
it usually consists of either unprocessed spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or the still 
highly radioactive rest products of SNF reprocessing (HLW)135. The second 
relevant factor is the specific stage of RWM. For example, an interim storage 
facility has different ambitions for retrieving SNF or radioactive wastes than a 
final disposal site136. 
 For many low and intermediate-level waste, disposal and monitored storage 
(on- or near-surface) are considered realistic solutions until radioactive decay has 
rendered the wastes sufficiently unhazardous. Interim storage (on-surface, near 
surface or otherwise) for high-level waste137 is employed for a) letting it decay and 
cool down to a point at which they become eligible for emplacement in a dis-
____________________________________________________________________ 
134  This portrayal of the distinction does not include exempt waste, very short-lived waste, and very 
low-level waste, since they require relatively little or short duration shielding or regulatory 
control (IAEA 2009). 
135  In a fuel cycle without reprocessing of SNF (the ‘open’ fuel cycle, e.g., in Canada, Sweden, and 
the USA), SNF is considered high-level waste when it is accepted for disposal. In a fuel cycle 
with reprocessing of SNF to extract uranium and plutonium for recycling (the ‘closed’ fuel 
cycle, e.g., in France, India, and Japan), high-level waste from nuclear energy production 
consists mainly of the fission products left over from this reprocessing (IAEA 2006), which 
are normally solidified before disposal. This distinction between HLW from reprocessing and 
SNF without reprocessing is highly significant: while unprocessed SNF has a waste lifetime of 
about 200,000 years, reprocessing can reduce high-level waste lifetime to about 5,000 years 
(Taebi & Kloosterman 2008). 
136  Per definition, in the case of storage, retrieval of the waste is envisioned for some point in the 
future, whereas disposal implies emplacement of waste without the intent of eventual retrieval. 
137  In line with the distinction given above, I use the formulation ‘high-level waste’ to mean the 
category as defined by the IAEA (2009), which in the case of nuclear energy production 
includes both SNF and HLW as presented in footnote 164. 
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posal facility, and/or b) storing it until disposal facilities are available (Bonin 
2010). In both cases, retrievability is an essential design feature. After such 
storage, however, a more permanent solution is generally deemed necessary for 
the further management of SNF and HLW, given the immense span of time that 
these materials remain potentially radiotoxic: geological disposal. A geological 
disposal facility, or repository, combines the protection offered by stable geologi-
cal layers deep below the earth’s surface with multiple engineered barriers (e.g., 
overpack, clay, bentonite) around waste packages that contain either solid SNF or 
liquid HLW from reprocessing that has been stabilized in a confinement matrix 
(e.g., glass or concrete). All this is supposed to prevent radionuclides from 
reaching the human living environment until they have reached a safe level of 
decay (Bonin 2010). Given the time it takes for this level of decay to be reached, 
emplacement of SNF or HLW in a repository is, for all intents and purposes, 
meant to be indefinite138.  This solution supposedly allows the current generation 
to take responsibility for the radioactive wastes it produces, while not burdening 
future generations with it, nor counting on the longevity of institutions to 
maintain waste management practices for thousands of years. 
 Despite its ultimate goal of indefinite disposal of SNF and HLW for the 
reasons specified above, reversibility is increasingly recognized  as a possibly 
important aspect of GD (e.g., Aparicio 2010; ICRP 2013; OECD Nuclear Energy 
Agency 2011; Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste 2010). Arguably, the 
most systematic proposal that describes how reversibility is supposed to feature 
in geological disposal has been put forward by the OECD Nuclear Energy 
Agency (NEA) as a result of their Reversibility & Retrievability project, in which 
it explored the role of reversibility considerations in GD. According to the NEA 
(2011):  
 
• Reversibility “describes the ability in principle to change or reverse deci-
sions taken during the progressive implementation of a disposal system 
[...] The implementation of a reversible decision-making approach implies 
the willingness to question previous decisions in the light of new infor-
mation, possibly leading to reversing or modifying them, and a decision-
____________________________________________________________________ 
138  Note that this does not mean that actual confinement of radionuclides is guaranteed 
indefinitely (which is technically impossible), just that the timescales involved prescribe 
extremely long-term emplacement. 
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making culture that encourages such a questioning attitude” (p. 23; em-
phasis in the original). 
• Retrievability, on the other hand, is “the ability in principle to recover waste 
or entire waste packages once they have been emplaced in a repository. 
Retrievability is the final element of a fully-applied reversibility strategy” 
(p. 24; emphasis in the original). Note that this does not mean that all 
high-level waste will also be practically accessible: past actions such as 
HLW vitrification might still exclude this possibility. 
 
Both reversibility and retrievability apply here to the period before final closure 
of the repository, possibly up to 100 years after initial emplacement. Reversibility 
refers to a step-wise decision-making process, in which previous decisions can 
be undone. However, reversibility diminishes over time, as actions based on 
these decisions are partly cumulative and increase the costs and effort involved 
in undoing past decisions. Retrievability also gets more and more difficult as 
waste packages get sealed in place and the repository gets backfilled over time 
(OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 2011). Thus, final closure of the repository also 
means the end to a realistic possibility of reversibility and retrievability. Indeed, 
reversibility and retrievability are not considered to be “design goals” for GD. 
Rather, they are seen by the NEA as “attributes of the decision-making and 
design processes that can facilitate the journey towards the final destination of 
safe, socially accepted geological disposal” (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 2012 
p. 22). In other words, they are only instrumental in achieving the ultimate 
(design) goal of GD that has been set forward since its origins in the 1950’s (e.g., 
National Research Council 1957)139: passive safety, or safety without human 
intervention. Still, a number of reasons are put forward as justifying the import-
ance of reversibility and retrievability for GD: 
 
• Reversibility would allow future generations to use the emplaced materi-
als as a resource, especially since SNF contains plutonium and uranium 
which might have value as a future source of energy. 
• Further technical advances might make it possible to render radioactive 
wastes (more) harmless. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
139  For a brief discussion of the evolution of reversibility provisions in GD in the USA, please see 
section 5.3.4. 
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• If a repository performs worse than expected, remedial action would be 
facilitated by reversibility provisions. 
• Finally, reversibility can help foster public acceptance of waste disposal 
facilities, or help adapt waste management if public or policy attitudes 
change over time. 
 (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 2011) 
 
However, as Barthe (2010) points out: the goal of final disposal of wastes a 
century after initial emplacement as well as the regressive nature of reversibility 
and retrievability seem contradictory to these reasons for adopting reversibility in 
the first place. First of all, it will probably take a significant amount of time to 
develop technology for using a repository’s contents as resources or for making 
high-level waste less harmful. If this is the case, why would one want to have 
reversibility and retrievability diminish and possibly disappear before such 
technology can be developed and implemented on a sufficient scale? Secondly, 
repository performance becomes significantly more difficult to assure with 
increasing extrapolation into the long-term future. As such, reversibility and 
retrievability as a response to worse-than-expected repository performance has a 
higher change of becoming useful as time goes by. These considerations cast 
doubt on the extent to which GD could live up to the NEA’s own reasons for 
reversibility given above. On top of all this, it is clear that the choice of technol-
ogy is a foregone conclusion in the NEA’s framework. It is concerned with how 
to implement a specific technology: GD. Yet, the recognition that changing 
public and/or policy attitudes towards RWM should be able to influence RWM 
strategies, as is shown in the fourth reason for reversibility, is of importance 
here. What if, for whatever reason, GD does not turn out to be the apt solution 
the technical community takes it to be (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 1995)140, 
and/or democratic considerations would point us towards other technologies? 
Should our past decision for GD not also be reversible?  
 If GD reversibility provisions were, analytically speaking, fully in line with 
the reasons given for these provisions, these discrepancies should not exist. And 
yet, these discrepancies are here and warrant our attention.  In this paper I 
would like to propose an outlook on technological reversibility that could a) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
140  Not only could this happen due to technical difficulties, but also through learning about what 
we should or should not consider ‘apt’. 
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provide some insights in how technologies like GD become irreversible, b) could 
help explain why the discrepancies above exist as they do, and c) provide input 
concerning the way technologies like GD could be made more reversible. In so 
doing, I explore whether GD can actually be considered a reversible technology. If 
it can, then the above criticisms might be moot. However, it might also turn out 
that despite the efforts visible in the NEA’s Reversibility & Retrievability project, 
GD cannot be considered properly reversible. If so, we might need to reconsider 
either GD as the dominant high-level waste management technology or whether, 
why and to what extent we want reversibility in the first place. 
 To answer the question whether GD can be considered properly reversible, it 
is necessary to have an idea of what constitutes a reversible RWM technology. 
Elsewhere, I have argued that for a nuclear energy technology to be considered 
reversible, two conditions need to be both met: 
 
• The ability to stop the further development and deployment of said tech-
nology in a society 
• The ability to undo the undesirable outcomes of the development and de-
ployment of the technology when so desired. 
 (Bergen, 2016a) 
 
While arguably adequate as abstract descriptions of what constitutes ‘ideal’ 
reversibility, these conditions are not yet sufficiently operationalized to be useful 
in considering practical cases such as the one presented here. For one, their 
form does not yet invite either questioning or qualified answers. Secondly, they 
are not yet case-specific. As such, I would like to rephrase the conditions as two 
GD-specific questions that, if both answered affirmatively, would show that GD 
is reversible. These questions are: 
 
1) Would an authorized body be reasonably able to switch from GD to an alterna-
tive solution if problems with GD were to arise? If not, the first of the 
conditions for reversible technology would not be met, and GD cannot be 
considered fully reversible141. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
141  If it is currently impossible to switch to an alternative, then the technology is not currently 
reversible. Whether or not some future developments might change this situation has little 
bearing on the technology’s current reversibility status. 
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2) Does GD exhaust the possibilities of undoing the consequences connected to 
high-level waste, and the hazards that could come about due to the use of GD 
for managing this waste? Again, a negative answer to this question would 
disqualify GD as a reversible technology. 
 
In what follows, I deal with these two questions in turn. In section 5.3, the first 
question is examined by taking a closer look at the historical development of GD 
through the lens of path dependence and lock-in. I answer the second question 
in section 5.4, where I propose that the ability to undo undesirable consequences 
of GD is connected to the choice between different design strategies, and that 
GD’s chosen strategy is less-than-ideal. 
5.3. On the Ability to Stop Further Development and Deployment of  
Geological Disposal 
In this section, the following question is considered: would an authorized body 
be reasonably able to switch from GD to an alternative solution if problems with 
GD were to arise? To answer this question, it is important to understand why 
switching to an alternative could become difficult or impossible in the first place. 
According to the theory of path dependence and lock-in, such difficulties can 
arise as a result of a historical process of technological development that leads to 
a situation in which switching to another solution becomes increasingly difficult: 
the technology becomes locked-in. As such, investigating the development of GD 
through the lens of path dependence and lock-in could help answer the question 
at hand. Before discussing GD’s historical development and whether it is locked-
in or not, the theory behind path dependence and lock-in is briefly introduced 
below. 
5.3.1. Path Dependence and Lock-in 
We call the development and implementation process of a specific technology 
path dependent if that process is determined by its own history (David 2007). 
That is, due to its specific characteristics, such a process can become inflexible in 
terms of the practical possibility of changing their course due to them being 
unable to “shake free from their histories” (David 2001 p. 19). Such path de-
pendent processes, contain two main elements (Arthur 1989): 
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• A contingent starting period. This period is contingent in the sense that it 
does not originate in a smooth and predictable historical sequence of 
events but rather that a new element (e.g., the introduction of a new tech-
nology) sets history off on a novel path.  
• A period exhibiting ‘increasing returns’. Arthur  identified four major types 
of increasing returns: scale economies, learning effects, adaptive expecta-
tions and network economies (Arthur 1994). While increasing returns 
can be conceived of quite narrowly as increasing efficiency, David (2007) 
considers it more appropriate to conceive of them as “self-reinforcing, 
positive feedback mechanisms governing decisions such as the choice 
among alternative production techniques, or consumer goods, or geo-
graphical locations for production activities” (David 2007). This self-
reinforcement consists of both “positive and negative mechanisms that 
decrease the likelihood that alternative paths will be selected” (Vergne and 
Durand 2011). Positive mechanisms directly support the path (e.g. ec-
onomies of scale or learning effects), while negative mechanisms operate 
by rendering alternative paths less interesting. As such, these mecha-
nisms sustain the path that was contingently selected.  
 
In some cases, this self-reinforcement can be so efficacious that it leads to an 
irreversible outcome, i.e., lock-in (Mahoney 2000; Vergne & Durand 2011). 
While initially options are open and multiple outcomes are possible, path 
dependence and self-reinforcement lead to (more and more) irreversibility that, 
without exogenous shock, could be incredibly persistent. If so, the potential for 
endogenous change becomes rather low (Mahoney 2000).  
 According to David (2007), one fundamental aspect of these self-reinforcing 
dynamics or increasing returns is the presence of micro-level irreversibilities, 
which occur when “a finite and possibly substantial cost must be incurred to 
undo the effects of the resource allocation decision in question” (David 2007 p. 
101). So, these micro-irreversibilities make agents favour certain options for 
action, while disfavouring others due to the relative opportunities and costs 
involved in pursuing them. This effect is further strengthened if these micro-
irreversibilities are interdependent, since it becomes less favourable to undo 
specific micro-irreversibilities if this requires undoing others as well. As such, 
they are constitutive of the self-reinforcement of dominant structures by guiding 
agents’ behaviour towards adherence to the most dominant (technological) 
solution, eventually strengthening its lock-in and increasing its irreversibility. 
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Two notes about these micro-irreversibilities are in order. First, different types of 
lock-in seem to correspond to different sorts of micro-irreversibilities driving 
path-dependent processes. Indeed, different types of drivers of a technology’s 
lock-in can be found in the literature. For example, there is political (e.g., W. 
Walker 1999, 2000), institutional (e.g., Foxon & Pearson 2008; W. Walker, 
1999, 2000), economical (e.g. Arthur 1989; Liebowitz & Margolis 1995), and 
infrastructural (e.g., Frantzeskaki & Loorbach 2010; Scrase & Smith 2009) lock-
in of a specific technology or technological project or system. While these have a 
different emphasis on what is most determinative of the lock-in in question, they 
all refer to sets of symbolic, institutional and/or material micro-irreversibilities 
that underlie the reinforcing dynamics. For high-level waste management, such 
micro-irreversibilities cover a spectrum of elements, from stabilization and 
packaging of HLW, test sites for GD and nuclear reactors producing SNF 
(material) to preferred methods of risk evaluation, nuclear regulations and policy 
prescriptions and practices, and institutional commitment (institutional), as well 
as underlying narratives, themes and values (symbolic). Secondly, it is interest-
ing that non-material micro-irreversibilities could drive path-dependent 
processes. As such, even if a process of technology development results mainly 
in institutional or symbolic elements, a technology could (in theory at least) 
become locked-in without significant deployment of said technology in the real 
world as long as increasing returns are sufficient to keep actors committed to 
that technology. Finally, micro-irreversibilities lie at the basis of the positive and 
negative mechanisms that can lead to lock-in, i.e., make a technology practically 
irreversible. As such, this framework seems to combine both (ir)reversibilities 
within GD  as micro-irreversibilities (which include the matters the NEA’s 
concepts of retrievability and reversibility is meant to address), as well as the 
(ir)reversibility of GD itself as a technology for radioactive waste management. 
 In what follows I will use the history of civil nuclear energy and high-level 
waste management in the USA between 1944 and 1987 as an example to show 
how GD’s development can exhibit the characteristics of a path-dependent 
process. While certainly not an exhaustive example (GD is held to be the appro-
priate solution in most nuclear energy-producing countries (U.K. Nuclear 
Decommissioning Authority 2008, 2013)), I hope it is sufficiently powerful for 
showcasing the type of historical process that lies at the basis of GD’s domi-
nance. First, I present a sketch of GD’s contingent genesis in the years after the 
WW2, after which I elaborate on its history from the late 1950’s onwards. 
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5.3.2. Geological Disposal’s Contingent Starting Period: Nuclear Development 
between 1944 and 1957 
The contingent starting period that set the stage for our current situation in 
which GD is the dominant solution for civil high-level waste management in the 
USA can be situated in the period between 1944 and 1957. 
 During WW2, nuclear development was dominated by military applications, 
both in weapons technology (developing the atomic bomb in the Manhattan 
project) as well as reactor design (producing plutonium for the weapons pro-
gram). This dominance continued in the years after the war, one result of which 
was the development of the pressurized water reactor [PWR] for use in subma-
rines142 (Cowan 1990). Given the circumstances of WW2, this initial focus on 
developing nuclear applications was rather straight-forward. For all that, these 
developments were prioritized over the careful and necessary management of 
the wastes they produced. While in 1944, the first HLW facility was constructed 
at the Hanford site in the State of Washington to store liquid HLW from the 
military nuclear program143, many low- and intermediate level wastes were dealt 
with through ‘dilute and disperse’ strategies (Mckinley, Alexander & Blaser 
2007; Miller, Fahnoe & Peterson 1954). This early focus on applications rather 
than proper waste management was further exacerbated by how the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) was set up in 1946, being responsible for both the 
promotion as well as regulation of nuclear development. Its focus was much 
more on promoting the development of nuclear applications than on strict 
regulation, and secrecy ensured its control over nuclear matters (Clarfield & 
Wiecek 1984). In combination with relatively small waste volumes and the 
isolated location of the facilities at which this waste was produced, this led to 
RWM being basic (if not haphazard) until the early 1950’s. In at least one sense, 
this was surprising: WW2 had graphically shown both the potency as well as the 
destructive capabilities of splitting the atom. In 1953, however, nuclear safety 
____________________________________________________________________ 
142  Initiated in the late 1940’s, the nuclear naval propulsion program launched its first PWR-
powered submarine -the USS Nautilus- in 1954. 
143  This HLW was apparently stored without concrete plans of its further management, an 
example of the prioritization of the application end of the fuel cycle. A tremendously complex 
and expensive clean-up operation is currently ongoing at the Hanford site to properly deal with 
40 years’ worth of Hanford’s HLW in deteriorating storage facilities (Oregon Department of 
Energy, 2014). 
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found strong political expression in Eisenhower’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech144, 
which was to set the stage for the development of a peaceful civil nuclear energy 
program, separate from the military one. As Jasanoff and Kim (2009) argue, the 
speech was aimed at symbolically containing the atom’s destructive potential so 
graphically illustrated in Japan only a few years before. It was also aimed at 
containing international fear of the USA as a nuclear superpower, and was to 
open the way towards the exploitation of the atom’s peaceful applications. With 
‘Atoms for Peace’, then, a strong theme of containment of the dangers connected 
to the atom lay at the basis of the nuclear energy industry. The speech also called 
for a private nuclear energy industry145. This meant limited government influ-
ence in the new industry, and making investment in it interesting for private 
investors. With the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, the patenting of nuclear energy 
technologies was opened up, and secrecy was partly lifted so that private parties 
could use previously confidential technical knowledge to develop nuclear energy 
applications. 
 After ‘Atoms for Peace’, the nuclear energy industry indeed started to de-
velop. Since the nuclear energy program was pressured by Eisenhower’s 
intentions into a mode of urgency, a reactor type was chosen with which signifi-
cant experience had already been accumulated in the military program: the PWR 
(Cowan 1990). However, a final solution for the disposal of HLW had not yet 
been settled upon. An important step towards that goal was taken when, at the 
request of the AEC, the Committee on Waste Disposal of the National Research 
Council produced a report (National Research Council 1957) that would prove to 
be foundational for the development of GD and the values or aspirations it 
embodies. It argued that (after additional research), deep geological disposal 
could be both a safe and feasible option for HLW disposal, and called for more 
research into the solidification of HLW which mostly took a liquid form at the 
time146. On top of this, in the case of deep GD, the HLW was to “disposed of 
____________________________________________________________________ 
144  For a transcript of the speech, see http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html (accessed 
March 29, 2013). 
145  What was also contained was the nuclear influence of the USSR. The USA’s nuclear industry 
development had to be privatized in order to be ideologically in line with the American liberal 
ideal so different from the USSR’s statist communism. 
146  The report mentions that the Commission was “convinced that radioactive waste can be 
disposed of safely in a variety of ways and at a large number of sites in the United States” (p.3), 
adding that the “most promising method of disposal of high level waste […] seems to be in salt 
deposits” (p. 4). Moreover, it promotes the “stabilization of the waste in a slag or ceramic 
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without concern for its recovery” (p. 86). As such, confidence that HLW could be 
safely contained and disposed of in the near future was established by the 
Committee’s research. 
5.3.3. 1957-present: the path to lock-in 
This promise of GD as a passively safe future solution for HLW disposal pro-
vided the nascent nuclear energy industry with the reasonable assumption of 
manageable long-term safety, which was important given the risks involved. On 
top of this, the dominant assumption from the late 1950’s until the mid-1970’s 
was that SNF from the civil nuclear energy program would be reprocessed to 
extract fissionable uranium and plutonium, which would be reused for further 
energy production147 (J. S. Walker 2009). As such, the future development of 
both a civil reprocessing industry as well as GD facilities was considered a 
sufficient and realistic HLW management strategy. Nuclear authorities stood by 
the idea that the problem of radioactive waste was technically soluble (U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission 1962 p. 55). Also, based on a series of hearings by 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1959, the authorities were convinced 
that the radioactive waste problem should not slow down the development of the 
nuclear energy industry and that it would be possible to protect the public during 
this development (Metlay 1985 p. 236).  This confirmed the AEC’s confidence in 
the possibility of safe radioactive waste management and its prioritisation of 
industrial promotion over HLW management. This attitude endured for over a 
decade despite a number of incidents at early above-ground HLW storage sites 
between 1959 and the mid-1970’s (Metlay 1985), which nonetheless spurred the 
adoption of additional safety features in the 1960’s and 1970’s such as multi-
layered storage casks for HLW and the solidification of HLW where it had been 
                                                                                                                                          
material” (p. 6) as another promising method, away from the predominantly liquid HLW at 
the time. 
147  There was already significant experience with reprocessing technology in the military program. 
Moreover, the AEC promoted reprocessing out of concern for uranium supply shortages for 
the nuclear energy industry. Together with the breeder reactors the AEC was looking into, 
reprocessing would substantially increase the sustainability of uranium resources (Stewart & 
Stewart 2011). 
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liquid before148 (Metlay 1985). As such, additional steps were taken towards the 
greater capacity to contain HLW and its risks.  
 While the 1960’s saw an exponential increase in orders for nuclear power 
plants, serious practical research into GD was also being undertaken by the AEC, 
and in 1966 a follow-up committee reaffirmed the conclusions of the 1957 report 
that GD was the most promising solution for the disposal of HLW (National 
Research Council 1966). Moreover, the civil reprocessing industry saw its 
humble beginnings (heavily promoted by the AEC) with the start-up of the 
reprocessing facility at West Valley, New York in 1966. With a second plant at 
Morris, Illinois and a third at Barnwell, South Carolina receiving construction 
permits in 1967 and 1970 respectively, the development of the civil reprocessing 
industry had apparently been kick-started (Metlay 1985).   
 In 1970, Lyons, Kansas was proposed as the site for the very first full-scale 
GD demonstration project149. This decision was supported by further research by 
the National Research Council that confirmed Lyons’ adequacy as a pilot facility 
site and again stressed GD’s appropriateness for HLW disposal (National 
Research Council 1970). However, not everyone shared the AEC’s optimism 
about the safety and appropriateness of the site (there were numerous boreholes 
present due to earlier explorations for oil and gas and  some water migration 
could not be properly accounted for (Metlay 1985)), and the proposal was 
dropped two years later for technical and political reasons. Despite this setback, 
the AEC still pushed for an expansion of the geological disposal program, 
extending the search for other possible sites for GD. Nonetheless, in the wake of 
the difficulties with the Lyons site, and as public opposition to nuclear energy 
was picking up in the early 1970’s, other possibilities for HLW management 
were considered (Vandenbosch & Vandenbosch, 2007). Firstly, an attempt was 
made by the AEC to implement Retrievable Surface Storage Facilities as a 
possible medium-term solution for HLW. This proposal was rejected by oppo-
nents, including the public, politicians and the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA, set up in 1970), partly out of fear that these facilities would 
become low-budget permanent solutions (U.S. Congress Office of Technology 
____________________________________________________________________ 
148  The 1957 National Research Council report had prompted further research into waste 
solidification which continued through the 1960’s and beyond. In 1970, the AEC proposed 
new regulations to have liquid HLW solidified five years after its generation (Metlay 1985). 
149  An abandoned salt mine near Lyons already served as a test site for HLW disposal between 
1965 and 1968. 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
122 
Assessment, 1985). It was subsequently dropped in 1975. Secondly, several 
options for the final disposal of HLW were further investigated and compared, 
like extra-terrestrial disposal, disposing of waste in the seabed, in or under ice 
sheets in the Arctic, transmutation of certain waste types and indeed, geological 
disposal (e.g., U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 1974)150. On top of these difficul-
ties for the GD program, the reprocessing industry was not at all thriving in the 
way the AEC had hoped. The West Valley plant stopped operation in 1972, when 
modifications to solve operational and environmental regulatory issues were 
deemed uneconomical. The Morris plant, finished in 1974, never came into full 
operation due to technical problems and equipment failures and was abandoned 
in the same year. Finally, the Barnwell facility was meant to start operation in 
1974, but construction delays and licensing issues prevented that deadline from 
being met (Stewart & Stewart 2011). In short, the AEC’s plans for HLW man-
agement were not running smoothly. 
 Not only HLW management was in some trouble around this time: the 
nuclear energy industry had to learn the hard way that the optimism about 
atomic energy “too cheap to meter”151 was sorely misplaced, especially as the 
AEC was obliged to enforce stricter regulations on the industry under growing 
pressure from environmental groups and the EPA. As such, orders for power 
plants dropped significantly. This same pressure laid bare the conflict of interest 
the AEC operated upon (promoting as well as regulating the nuclear energy 
industry), which led to the AEC being disbanded by the Energy Reorganization 
Act in 1974, its responsibilities split between the Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration (ERDA; promotion) and the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC; regulation, licensing, materials management and setting of 
safety standards)(Stewart & Stewart 2011). This led to even stricter regulation, 
which increased costs and made it even more difficult to get licenses for nuclear 
power plants (Clarfield & Wiecek 1984). As the expansion of nuclear energy 
production capacity was slowly grinding to a halt in the latter half of the 1970s, 
the societal pressure that previously led to the disbanding of the AEC rekindled 
____________________________________________________________________ 
150  Although some of these options had at times been considered, this was the first time they were 
as officially and systematically compared. 
151  This phrase was coined by the chairman of the AEC, Lewis Strauss, in a 1954 speech to the 
National Association of Science Writers (Strauss 1954). While it has become iconic of the 
economic optimism at the time concerning nuclear power, it is not to be taken as what was 
actually considered a realistic cost estimate. 
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critical attention as well as urgency for HLW management. So despite other 
options at least being investigated, ERDA continued the AEC’s quest for the 
expansion of GD with the National Waste Terminal Storage (NWTS) Program in 
the latter half of the 1970’s, wanting to build six repositories by 2000. In light of 
these developments, however, that period also saw increased critical input from 
geologists and physicists on GD’s feasibility. The optimism that generally 
governed the AEC’s attitude towards GD now met with more critical inquiry, 
which was reflected in the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Man-
agement’s (1978) report  to the US president. The report acknowledged that 
knowledge, experience and predictive capability on repository operation was 
lacking. And while it still strongly recommended proceeding with GD, it also 
advised using a “technically conservative” approach (e.g., p.46), which includes 
reversibility of waste emplacement decisions (p.18) and temporary retrievability of 
emplaced high-level waste during an initial period of repository operation (e.g., 
p. 46)152. Other developments helped increase the USA’s dependence on GD, as 
the closed fuel cycle that the AEC had pushed for two decades was plagued with 
even more difficulties. While the newly-founded NRC was investigating the 
proliferation concerns connected to plutonium recycling and the safeguards 
necessary to make it work in 1975-’76 (which worried a nuclear energy industry 
that still favoured reprocessing), reprocessing received increased public attention 
(J. S. Walker 2009). This escalated when reprocessing became a prominent 
theme in the presidential race between President Ford and Jimmy Carter, in 
which both eventually expressed reservations with regards to the appropriateness 
of reprocessing SNF. After Carter became president, he issued a statement 
(Carter 1977) that the USA would “defer indefinitely the commercial reprocess-
ing and recycling of the plutonium produced in the U.S. nuclear power 
programs”, and that “a viable and economic nuclear power program can be 
sustained without such reprocessing and recycling”. Official policy turned 
against reprocessing and the Barnwell reprocessing facility was mothballed and 
never came online, which effectively meant the end of the civil reprocessing 
industry153. So not only was GD the only technology of the AEC’s old program 
____________________________________________________________________ 
152  Note that the NEA’s R-scale (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency 2011) provides a specific timeline 
and a more gradual decline of retrievability than does the IRG, and is more operationalized.  
153  Although the Reagan administration withdrew the ban on reprocessing in 1981 (U.S. 
Congress Office of Technology Assessment 1985), it never became part of official U.S. 
radioactive waste policy again. 
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that had any promise of becoming a reality, but without reprocessing of SNF the 
U.S. nuclear fuel cycle would generate larger quantities of high-level waste that 
remain radioactive for significantly longer than in a fuel cycle with such repro-
cessing (Taebi and Kloosterman 2008), since it would have to dispose of 
unprocessed SNF. As such, it became even more critical to look for high-level 
waste management technologies that were focused on maximal long-term safety, 
something GD was already known for. From this point on, there was little 
question as to which technology would be best for the management of high-level 
waste (as it was in the mid-1970’s (e.g., U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 1974)), 
despite the fact that not reprocessing SNF put more severe demands on reposi-
tory design and siting. 
 Implementation of GD still proved difficult though, as the search for possible 
sites in light of the NWTS met with many negative reactions from state exec-
utives and lacked permissions for exploration. Combined with federal budget 
cuts, this forced the geological disposal program to forego the desired expansion. 
Nevertheless, efforts to operationalize GD continued. Shortly after the publica-
tion of the abovementioned IRG report, the DOE (formerly ERDA) published its 
Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Commercial Radioactive Waste 
Management in 1980, which was intended to support a programmatic decision 
to focus efforts on mined GD (Metlay 1985). Around the same time, the NRC 
was working on its proposal for the technical criteria that should govern reposi-
tory licensing154, also focussing on GD as the standard solution (J. S. Walker 
2009). This coalescence of institutional efforts towards the implementation of 
GD was subsequently expressed in the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA), 
which followed the DOE’s and the NRC’s commitment to mined geological 
disposal. Moreover, the act added even more urgency into the equation by 
aiming for repositories to be operational by 1998 (and capable of taking unpro-
cessed SNF), and shifting some focus away from Monitored Retrievable 
Storage155 (MRS, similar to the AEC’s Retrievable Surface Storage Facilities), 
____________________________________________________________________ 
154  These criteria included many concepts still visible in the NEA’s proposal today, like multiple 
barriers, the validation of models, geological uncertainties, and the problem of human 
intrusion (Metlay 1985). 
155  While industry favoured MRS as a temporary solution, environmental groups again protested 
it out of fear of MRS facilities becoming de facto permanent disposal sites. The NWPA only 
foresaw inquiry into the need for and feasibility of MRS, but did not order any concrete 
construction (Vandenbosch & Vandenbosch 2007). 
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saying it was not a complete alternative to GD (Vandenbosch & Vandenbosch 
2007). On top of all this, the government would provide only limited support for 
temporary storage as it could be perceived as a reason to delay final disposal 
efforts. Following the establishment of the 1982 NWPA, nine sites were selected 
as possible candidates for repository construction. In the following years, a 
complex process of negotiations narrowed this list down to three: Hanford, 
Washington; Deaf Smith County, Texas; and Yucca Mountain, Nevada. How-
ever, partly driven by political and cost considerations, the search was even 
further narrowed down in the 1987 Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act, 
limiting site characterization efforts to Yucca Mountain, Nevada only.  
 Yucca Mountain’s history is interesting in its own right156, as it has been 
central to decades of struggle to construct a working GD facility. However, I 
think it unnecessary to elaborate on it here, for two reasons. Firstly, the analysis 
as presented above contains the necessary elements for explaining GD’s rise to 
dominance and why it could be difficult to do otherwise (see section 5.3.4). 
Further describing the case of Yucca Mountain and the policy-making around it 
would not take the analysis in a significantly different direction. Secondly, the 
case of Yucca Mountain and the adherence to GD even after Yucca’s failure 
arguably serves better as evidence for GD’s tenacity rather than as an explanation 
for it (aside from increased commitment and added urgency factors which were 
certainly not absent before). Indeed, due to significant technical as well as social 
and political hurdles, Yucca Mountain never became the USA’s first non-
military GD site. In 2011, the Obama administration even gave up further efforts 
to make it into a working disposal site for SNF, as such eliminating hope of 
having an operational repository in the near future. However, in spite of a 
history riddled with difficulties (of which three decades revolved around Yucca 
Mountain), GD remains the go-to option for high-level waste management in the 
USA (e.g., Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future 2012). 
5.3.4. Is Geological Disposal Locked-in? 
After all this, is GD locked-in in the USA? Let me start by discussing two objec-
tions to the idea that this is even possible, or that we can know that it is so. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
156  For a comprehensive overview of the policy and technical difficulties in SNF management in 
this period, see Vandenbosch & Vandenbosch (2007) and Macfarlane & Ewing (2006). 
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First, one could question how it could be possible for GD to be locked-in if it 
seems incapable of actual implementation, even after decades of effort. How-
ever, as argued in section 5.3.1, if symbolic and institutional micro-
irreversibilities are sufficient to drive actors to continuously commit to a specific 
technology, this could be all that is necessary for that technology to be locked-in. 
At least, it could be enough to make the process of technology development and 
implementation inflexible in terms of the practical possibility of changing its 
course, i.e., path-dependent. In other words, having many material manifesta-
tions does not make a technology irreversible; having the relevant actors 
repeatedly orienting their actions towards making that technology (even more of) 
a reality does157. The way this worked out in the case of GD is summarized 
below. 
 Second, can we know if GD is locked-in if no ‘realistic’ alternatives are 
currently available to which one could switch? After all, in many famous (albeit 
not uncontroversial) cases of path dependence and lock-in, equally good or even 
better alternatives were available but not being selected, for example with VHS 
tapes (Arthur 1990), the QWERTY keyboard (David 1985), or PWR reactors 
(Cowan 1990). Would most actors still commit to GD if a better solution was 
available? Unfortunately, this is a counterfactual that is impossible to prove. As 
such, it would seem at first glance that any claim that GD is irreversible can only 
be trivially true, i.e., it is impossible to switch to an alternative as long as there 
are none. This, however, neglects three factors. One, what counts as an equally 
good or better alternative is not set in stone. That safety and containment have 
long been leading in the judgment that GD is the only realistic path to follow is 
to some extent historically and politically contingent. Two, it is possible to add 
plausibility to the claim that GD is locked-in by showing that its history exhibits 
characteristics of a path-dependent process, i.e., micro-irreversibilities driving 
increasing returns in favour of GD, leading up to a point at which it is difficult to 
do something other than GD. Three, the fact that no realistic alternatives are 
available at this point in time partially follows from the very historical develop-
____________________________________________________________________ 
157  First, note that having many material manifestations can indirectly increase lock-in, since it 
allows for learning effects, economies of scale, sunk costs, etc., all of which can push actors to 
commit to the technology, i.e., constitute increasing returns. Secondly, this means that one 
should not ask whether it is either high-level waste policy practice or the technology of GD that 
is irreversible, since policy maker’s continuous commitment could theoretically be sufficient to 
make GD locked-in.  
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ments that lead to GD’s dominance. All three factors are discussed in this 
section.  
 Already gaining salience during GD’s genesis before 1957 and inspired by the 
post-WW2 period, the themes of safety and containment have since guided the 
management of HLW and SNF. As such, these themes have been increasingly 
embodied materially (e.g., solidification of liquid HLW, multi-layered storage 
containers, and of course, the technology that is GD) and institutionally (e.g., the 
separation of the military and civil nuclear energy program, Carter’s decision to 
refrain from reprocessing to contain the atom’s proliferations risks, the urgency 
in the NWTS and NWPA for curtailing above-ground SNF build-up and con-
tinuous institutional commitment to GD as a way of doing so). In turn, these 
embodiments have helped reinforce and operationalize safety and containment 
as leading values. As such, the adoption and continuous reaffirmation of these 
values functioned as symbolic micro-irreversibilities that supported the path of 
GD as an appropriate solution for HLW and later, SNF158. 
 As GD’s story unfolded after its contingent starting period (1944-1957), an 
accumulation of micro-irreversibilities occurred favouring GD. These, combined 
with broader societal developments, have repeatedly helped drive actors to 
adhere to GD as the final solution for HLW and SNF. Indeed, after the themes of 
safety and containment gained prominence and the 1957 Committee on Waste 
Disposal report proposed GD as the most promising method for making them a 
technological reality, GD received the institutional commitment of both the AEC 
and the industry (albeit in combination with reprocessing of SNF). GD was now 
embedded as an essential part of policy for future HLW management. During 
the 1960’s, serious research into GD (including small-scale test sites) acknow-
ledged its feasibility as well as increased its lead compared to alternatives, which 
were not systematically looked into since optimism concerning GD’s appropri-
ateness and feasibility was wide-spread. However, as GD came closer to real 
implementation it ran into difficulties (exemplified by the failure at Lyons, 
Kansas), as did the organisation responsible for it: the AEC. The AEC was 
____________________________________________________________________ 
158  This is in no way supposed to be a polemic against considerations of safety. However, in light 
of a demand for reversibility, even these value judgements should be open for reconsideration, 
since other values might prescribe other solutions. For example, an assessment based on 
maximizing future generation’s opportunities for making use of SNF (something the NEA 
mentions as one of its reasons for reversibility in GD), would likely select a different solution 
than GD.  
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
128 
disbanded out of worry about the conflict of interest it operated upon, and 
alternatives for GD were more systematically investigated. However, several 
factors kept GD on its dominant course. Firstly, while actors were more critical 
of GD during this time, the value system behind its selection was not under 
similar scrutiny. Secondly, the pressure on the nuclear energy program to 
urgently provide solutions was significantly increased by a number of factors: 
the end of reprocessing and the fact that now SNF needed to be disposed of, 
Carter’s strong political stance on the dangers of proliferation combined with 
increasing SNF build-up, increased societal displeasure with the nuclear energy 
industry, and the failure to implement a temporary arrangement in the form of 
the Retrievable Surface Storage Facility. It is unsurprising, then, that the re-
sponse to critical inquiry into GD in the late 1970’s actually was greater 
commitment to GD under an increased sense of urgency. Like when PWRs were 
selected for power generation (Cowan 1990), urgency can be an important driver 
for conservatism in technology selection. What was needed was a technology 
with which there was considerable experience, even if there may have been 
alternative technologies for the job eligible for (further) development. Thirdly, 
ERDA continued the AEC’s quest for expansion of the GD program, assuring 
continuity of institutional commitment. As a result of all this, GD survived its 
minor 1970’s crisis. After this point, GD’s practicability (with increased know-
ledge, experience, and increasingly structured institutional frameworks) and 
political legitimacy (with the explicit commitment to GD in the 1982 NWPA) 
further increased, as such making it even more into the ‘realistic’ solution it is 
still taken to be.  
 In addition to these mechanisms supporting GD, there were also reasons 
why alternative paths were specifically not selected. For example, in a situation of 
limited resources available for organizing high-level waste management (espe-
cially at a time when the focus was on developing the energy industry rather 
than on ways to manage its wastes properly), it is clear that commitment to GD 
would mean even more limited resources available for development of possible 
alternatives, especially when it is assumed that there is little reason to do so. 
Indeed, until the mid-1970’s, the AEC and the industry saw little need to sys-
tematically look into and develop alternatives to reprocessing and GD. Some 
possible alternatives, like disposal in the seabed or under Arctic ice sheets, would 
have also been unpopular both with an increasingly environmentally aware 
public in the 1970’s as well as other countries across the world. Also, further 
development of more advanced fuel cycles that would reduce waste lifetime (and 
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as such, lessen demands on disposal technologies) were incompatible with the 
ban on reprocessing in 1977 as they were judged to give rise to unacceptable 
proliferation concerns.  
 After all this, the case of Yucca Mountain, its failure, and the subsequent 
retention of GD as the most favourable solution for high-level waste disposal 
attests to the fact that a point has been reached at which switching to an alterna-
tive solution for high-level waste management has become difficult (not least 
because possible alternatives, other than temporary storage, are underdevel-
oped). Still, this is quite peculiar given the lack of working civil GD sites in the 
USA159. Apparently, it can become extremely difficult to change course on the 
choice for a specific technological solution despite extremely few actual working 
instances of the technology itself. 
 Finally, allow me to briefly elaborate on the evolution of reversibility con-
siderations in GD over the course of its history. It is interesting that while the 
National Research Council’s 1957 report contends that HLW should be emplaced 
in geological repositories without concern for its retrieval, the 1979 IRG report 
features provisions for limited retrievability on the basis of epistemic and 
prudential considerations. This was both politically salient as well as in line with 
the critical appraisal of GD in the late 1970’s. And while the NEA’s reasons for 
retrievability presented in section 5.2 have significantly expanded in scope to 
considerations of justice when compared to the IRG’s, the practical side of 
reversibility and retrievability does not seem to have followed suit. Indeed, while 
the reasons for reversibility considerations have significantly evolved, our choice 
and design of the technology meant to fulfil these has not sufficiently done so, as 
evidenced by the discrepancies noted in section 5.2. On the one hand, if GD is 
locked-in, this could possibly help to explain why these discrepancies exist 
between the NEA’s reasons for reversibility and retrievability and the extent to 
which GD seems to be an appropriate means of achieving them, since it would 
be extremely difficult to change to a solution more in line with new reasons for 
wanting reversibility. On the other hand, the inclusion of reversibility and 
retrievability considerations in GD does not seem to have lessened its domi-
nance. Au contraire, making GD compatible with increased demands on high-
level waste management (be it epistemic demands (IRG) and/or demands for 
____________________________________________________________________ 
159  For HLW from the military nuclear program, there is the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) 
in New Mexico which has been receiving waste since 1999, although its history since 1973 has 
also not been without both technical and socio-political difficulties. 
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justice (NEA)) would make it less pressing to work towards alternatives. So the 
inclusion of reversibility considerations, while lowering the probability of 
problems with GD arising, has not alleviated GD’s lock-in. 
 The history of GD sketched above contains ample micro-irreversibilities that 
would lead GD to become locked-in by making it more likely that agents favour 
GD. By the same token, and partly due to the same developments that led to 
GD’s dominance, alternatives have not been extensively pursued. So, in addition 
to GD being locked-in in a trivial sense (no ‘realistic’ alternatives are currently 
available), these factors provide plausibility to the idea that GD is locked-in due 
to being unable to shake free from its own history. As such, considering the first 
question put forward in section 5.2: 
 
• Would an authorized body be reasonably able to switch from GD to an 
alternative solution if problems with GD were to arise? 
 
, it seems  that, at least for the USA, one would have to conclude that it would be 
at least difficult and at worst impossible for an authorized agency to step down 
from GD as the dominant high-level waste management technology, at least 
within a reasonable timeframe. Given that GD is the preferred solution to the 
high-level waste problem in most nuclear energy-producing countries160, and that 
other countries do not have access to more alternatives to GD than the USA 
does, I think it not unreasonable to expect that in some of these countries, GD 
might be similarly locked-in161. 
 If all the above holds true, GD at least partly fails to meet one of the condi-
tions and can thus not be considered a truly reversible technology (in those 
specific cases). However, one could ask whether GD’s lock-in is really problem-
atic, given that a) scientific confidence in the capacity of engineered barriers and 
geology to contain high-level waste is significant, and b) that no technology is 
readily available on a satisfactory scale to turn high-level waste into benign 
substances? That is, is it not a good strategy for ‘undoing’ the morally undesir-
____________________________________________________________________ 
160  One should not forget the impact of international organisation and cooperation. For example, 
given that the IAEA was set up in 1957 (pushed by the Eisenhower administration after the 
1953 ‘Atoms for Peace’ speech), one can imagine the subsequent international spread of the 
themes of containment and safety (e.g., IAEA, 1956).  
161  However, even if this expectation is reasonable, any claim to a specific country having GD as a 
locked-in technology would have to be backed up by the necessary socio-historical analysis. 
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able consequences of nuclear energy technologies? This question relates directly 
to the second question put forward in section 5.2: 
 
• Does GD exhaust the possibilities of undoing the consequences con-
nected to high-level waste, and the hazards that could come about due to 
the use of GD for managing this waste? 
 
In the following section, I contend that there are different general strategies for 
undoing such consequences that one can follow in developing a technology, and 
that some are preferable over others, at least qua reversibility. GD is principally 
focused on one of these strategies, albeit not the most preferable one. 
5.4. On Geological Disposal’s Capacity for Undoing Consequences 
What does it mean to ‘undo the consequences connected to high-level waste’? 
What would constitute an ‘ideal’ undoing of consequences is, practically speak-
ing, impossible: one simply cannot go back in time and start over. Nevertheless, 
what sorts of action could one still undertake towards the undoing of conse-
quences, limited as they may be? In what follows, I present four practical 
strategies for ‘undoing consequences’ in order of decreasing similarity to ‘ideal’ 
undoing: 
 
1) Remediation: bringing (parts of) the system under consideration back to a 
previous state by eliminating the problem source and using (part of) the 
system’s internal dynamics to undo the unwanted effects of the technol-
ogy’s development and implementation. This seems to require the least 
invasive effort, and leaves a solid basis for other developments. 
2) (Re)construction: bringing (parts of) the system under consideration back 
to the state by eliminating the problem source and actively reconfiguring 
system parts to reconstruct the previous state so as to undo the unwanted 
effects of the technology’s development and implementation. 
 
Note that the previous two imply elimination of the problem source. In the case 
of RWM in general and of GD in particular, high-level waste would have to be 
considered the most important ‘problem source’, and this is what the rest of this 
section will focus on. Other possible problem sources might be specific institu-
tional arrangements or possibly outdated value systems (i.e. institutional or 
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symbolic elements mentioned as micro-irreversibilities above). Given this 
possibility, undoing certain consequences may be as ‘simple’ as reverting to a 
state in which multiple possible paths were open, i.e. getting rid of lock-in. 
However, there are two more strategies for undoing consequences, ones in 
which the problem source is not eliminated: 
 
3) Containment: Containment of the problem source without eliminating it, 
shielding potential victims from its harmful effects. 
4) Compensation: Compensate victims for the undesirable consequences of 
the technology development project when even containment not possible. 
 
One important point to make about these strategies is that if one wants to 
reasonably ensure that these options are available when the need arises, the 
technology in question needs to be designed according to these strategies. An-
other point is that these strategies are not mutually exclusive, and will most 
likely have to be used in conjunction. Also, there is a preferable order to these 
approaches: what cannot be solved by remediation should be tackled by recon-
struction, etc. In this way, the potential for undoing unwanted consequences is 
exhausted to the greatest possible extent. These insights do have their implica-
tions though, the most important of which is probably the following: already 
during the development of a technology, one should aim for remediable and 
reconstructible solutions rather than ones dependent on containment or com-
pensation. From the point of view of reversibility, the latter are little more than 
‘end-of-pipe’ solutions necessitated by our incapability to construct more rever-
sible technologies by eliminating problem sources. The question is: which of 
these strategies does GD exemplify?  
 One could argue that GD is a technology based on remediation. After all, the 
internal dynamics of the system (radioactive decay) will eventually undo the 
unwanted effects connected to high-level waste. When, after thousands of years, 
the waste reaches the radiation level of natural uranium ore, would the situation 
not be remediated? Well, at least not in the way that remediation is meant here 
as a strategy for undoing consequences: remediation would have to include the 
elimination of the problem source, no active steps towards which are actually 
undertaken in GD. Charitably to GD, however, one could argue that our actions 
implementing GD now do eliminate high-level wastes eventually. However, can 
we then really say that our actions eliminate these wastes? High-level waste and 
the risks connected to it (while diminished through multiple engineered and 
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natural barriers) exist as possibly problematic for an extended amount of time, 
one that far surpasses any example of institutionalized practice or organized 
action. As such, even on this charitable reading GD fails to eliminate the prob-
lem source within a timeframe that is relevant for a practical conception of 
remediation as a strategy for undoing consequences. As such, we cannot claim 
that GD is a remediation-based technology.  
 Despite appearances (it requires very specialized and scientifically advanced 
construction after all) GD is also not reconstruction-based for the same reason 
mentioned above: the high-level waste is just not eliminated quickly (or actively) 
enough. At most, it could be said that retrievability considerations in GD’s 
design do allow for some reconstructive action in case unwanted effects do 
occur, whether these effects are connected to the dangers of radiotoxicity or 
intergenerational injustice. However, the limited timespan for which retrieva-
bility is envisioned, combined with its diminishing nature and the fact that while 
retrieval would remove the problem source from its location but not entirely 
eliminate it, leaves GD’s potential for reconstruction rather limited.  
 In the end, GD corresponds largely to the containment strategy: despite 
limited retrievability provisions, containment is indeed the design goal of GD. 
Rather than actively eliminating the problem source, it is contained behind 
multiple barriers, e.g., the vitrification matrix, multi-layer canisters, the reposi-
tory with its multiple engineered barriers and even stable geological layers. But 
this is not all. The ‘containment’ strategy is so pervasive in GD that even its 
institutional and symbolic orders were oriented towards containment, at least for 
a large part of GD’s history. For example, technocratic elites have generally left 
little room for public participation in how high-level waste was to be handled162, 
especially during the early decades of nuclear energy development. Additionally, 
by viewing this waste in terms of difficult-to-control and largely irreversible risks, 
legitimation of technical and passively safe solutions was assured (especially 
when combined with a general distrust of social solutions). In short: GD works 
towards containment all the way down, from the top echelons of nuclear policy 
making to hundreds of meters below the earth’s surface. 
 In GD’s defence, however, one might rightly bring up the point that eliminat-
ing high-level waste is currently practically impossible. No technology is actually 
____________________________________________________________________ 
162  Given the difficulties to find public acceptance for waste storage sites or geological repositories, 
these processes have gradually opened up to some extent (Bergmans 2008; Richardson, 
Michie, Minhans, Kallenbach-Herbert, & Andersson 2011). 
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available to turn such waste into benign substances. Given this fact, is GD not 
the best technology available for taking our responsibility towards future genera-
tions? Two points need to be made in response to this. First, while it is true that 
no technology is currently able to ‘eliminate’ high-level waste, this does not 
mean such technologies are not at least realistic. For example, a process called 
partitioning and transmutation (P&T) is being developed which could theoreti-
cally decrease total high-level waste volume as well as limit its lifetime to as little 
as 500-1000 years (Condé, Andersson, Sandström, & Norby 2004). This would 
constitute at least a partial elimination of the problem source and as such, could 
be part of a reconstruction strategy to undo the unwanted effects of high-level 
waste. While a fuel cycle including P&T would be more expensive than using a 
more traditional fuel cycle, and comes with its own security and safety concerns, 
it would at least be a step up in terms of undoing unwanted consequences in the 
form of long-term risks of high-level waste radiotoxicity (Taebi & Kadak 2010). 
The second point to be made concerns the manner in which containment of 
high-level waste is achieved in GD: it prohibits or at least makes it incredibly 
arduous to switch to a more reversible strategy in the future due to a lack of 
retrievability. For example, by the time P&T would actually be available on a 
large enough scale to make a significant difference, repositories could be largely 
or completely closed. And even if retrievability was fully implemented and 
maintained, the possibility of reprocessing/recycling/destroying some high-level 
waste would prove difficult, e.g., due to being stabilized in glass or concrete. 
Indeed, it would seem that the epitome of containment entails closure, not only 
of repositories and institutional orders, but also closure of different options for 
switching strategies for undoing (the effects) of high-level waste. 
 Let me make two qualificatory notes. First, a reconstruction-based technology 
like P&T is not likely to become a complete replacement of GD, or the strategy it 
represents. With HLW that remains radioactive for ‘only’ a couple of thousands 
of years, decent containment would still be necessary. As such, the containment 
strategy still has a place in the management of high-level waste, but only insofar 
as reconstruction’s potential has been exhausted first. Secondly, these new 
circumstances might open up options for the form a containment strat-
egy/technology may take, possibly loosening the lock-in of GD as the dominant 
final solution for high-level waste management. However, P&T’s infrastructural 
and institutional demands may institute their own path-dependent processes 
and possibly locked-in technologies, and have their own negative consequences 
other than long-term risks of radiotoxicity. In other words, optimizing one of the 
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conditions for reversible technologies might entail losing out on the other. 
Moreover, since, the operationalization of the two conditions do not allow for a 
comparison on one similar measuring scale, balancing the two conditions would 
likely need a careful exercise in practical and/or political reason. 
 There is currently some attention for the role of compensation in RWM (e.g., 
Kojo, Richardson, Oksa and Mihók 2013). While not usually linked to the re-
versibility debate outside of a public demand for retrievability provisions, I hope 
that the four strategies presented provide a clue as to how compensation features 
in reversible GD. It is a possible strategy for achieving more capacity of undoing 
unwanted consequences, but only to be applied when the other three are suffi-
ciently exhausted. Although there may be other principal and practical reasons 
like justice or social acceptance to resort to compensation outside of reversibility 
considerations, any claim to increased reversibility directly because of compensa-
tion should be treated with caution. 
 To conclude, it seems that the second reason (next to being significantly 
locked-in) that GD, even with reversibility provisions, apparently fails to meet the 
NEA’s own justification of reversibility is that its strategy for undoing unwanted 
consequences is less-than-ideal for two reasons. Firstly, a remediation- or 
reconstruction-based technology would at least in principle be more able to live 
up to the NEA’s justification of reversibility. Secondly, the way GD embodies 
containment is so severe that it disallows remediation or reconstruction of 
geologically disposed high-level waste at a point in the future at which these 
options would become viable. 
5.5. Conclusion 
At the start of this paper, the way reversibility features in GD was explored, and a 
number of critical discrepancies were noted between the reasons given for the 
inclusion of reversibility provisions in GD and GD’s ability to live up to these 
reasons. This prompted the question whether GD could be considered a rever-
sible technology, since such a reversible technology would arguably be able to 
fulfil the reasons given in section 5.2. It was then put forward that for GD to be 
considered reversible, two questions need to be answered affirmatively: 
 
• Would an authorized body be reasonably able to switch from GD to an 
alternative solution if problems with GD were to arise? 
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• Does GD exhaust the possibilities of undoing the consequences con-
nected to high-level waste, and the hazards that could come about due to 
the use of GD for managing this waste? 
 
Considering the second question, it was found that GD’s strategy for undoing 
high-level waste-related consequences was less-than-ideal, since it relies mainly 
on a strategy of containment rather than on eliminating the waste through 
reconstruction or remediation. And while it is true that no technology exists that 
embodies these more ideal strategies, the way GD’s containment works makes 
switching to these strategies for existing wastes rather difficult. Still, if and when 
such a technology eventually becomes available, could we not simply switch to it? 
The answer to the first question gives us reason to worry about this possibility. It 
would appear that GD is currently locked-in in the USA and quite possibly in 
other countries that espouse GD as well. The historical process of GD’s devel-
opment and operationalization has brought us to a point where these societies’ 
symbolic, institutional and material investment in GD makes it difficult and 
thus unlikely that GD will be replaced with an alternative any time soon. With at 
least one of the questions answered negatively the conclusion follows that despite 
laudable efforts to the contrary in the past decades, GD is currently a practically 
irreversible technology for RWM. Taking measures both to avoid lock-in situa-
tions as well as exhausting the (future) possibilities for reconstruction and 
remediation for undoing high-level waste-related consequences could be fruitful 
strategies for increasing RWM’s reversibility. However, optimizing both of these 
conditions of technological reversibility might prove difficult with some tech-
nologies, since scenarios are imaginable in which solutions in favour of one of 
the conditions decrease the potential of the other. For example, the future 
introduction of P&T could improve the ability to undo high-level waste-related 
consequences (since it is a reconstruction-based technology) and even lessen the 
severity of GD’s lock-in (if applicable). On the other hand, P&T relies on exten-
sive and complex infrastructures which could themselves become locked-in and 
have their own undesirable consequences. This creates an additional difficulty 
for finding truly reversible technologies or for balancing the two aspects in a way 
that is satisfactory, since an affirmative answer to both questions is necessary to 
truly speak of technological reversibility. 
 Of course, it must be remembered that this paper is focussed specifically on 
reversibility. However, when deciding on the specific form an RWM technology 
is supposed to take, or even which one(s) to select, more values are bound to be 
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eligible for serious consideration. Indeed, issues of safety, justice, feasibility, 
efficiency, etc. also need to be considered, and might turn out to be partly 
incommensurable with a technology’s reversibility. As such, this paper is not 
meant as a plea for the sole consideration of reversibility in the GD debate. 
Rather, it provides a clarification of what technological reversibility entails and 
how it is to be achieved, which is essential if reversibility is to be considered next 
to other important values. 
 What does all this mean for the hypothetical experimenter the paper opened 
with? After all, if she is to be prepared for learning that the experiment is to be 
stopped, the technology she is experimenting with should be reversible. If the 
analysis presented in this paper is correct, reversibility can only be ensured by its 
proactive consideration, both in designing the nuclear energy technology in 
question (according to strategies for undoing undesirable consequences) as well 
as keeping alternative solutions viable and avoiding disproportionate institu-
tional and symbolic commitment (avoiding lock-in). This would mean that GD’s 
lock-in as well as its less-than-ideal prioritization of the containment strategy 
require careful revision. As it stands, however, the inclusion of reversibility in 
GD by the NEA is hardly adequate to the reasons provided for it, let alone to the 
standards of properly reversible experiments with RWM technology.  
 Lastly, to what extent do the results of this case-specific analysis carry over to 
the general framework of social experimentation with new technologies? While 
the recommendations for avoiding lock-in could work for other technologies due 
to their generality, the strategies for undoing consequences might need recon-
sideration. That is, some technologies may have different options for undoing 
consequences which invite different strategies for doing so, although this would 
have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. The original phrase by van de 
Poel “containment of hazards as far as reasonably possible” (2011 p. 289) turns 
out to be overly specific in this regard, since containment is just one possible 
strategy for undoing undesirable consequences. It must be noted, however, that 
responsible social experimentation demands more of a responsible experiment 
than it simply being reversible (van de Poel 2011). So, while (some) reversibility 
might be a necessary condition of responsible experimentation, it is by no means 
sufficient. 
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6 Conclusions 
This thesis set out to conceptualize and explore the notion of reversibility with 
regards to nuclear energy technologies. In doing so, it aimed to answer the 
following research question and corresponding subquestions: 
 
RQ:  What are the implications of reversibility for the responsible development 
and implementation of nuclear energy technologies? 
 
SQ1:  Under what conditions can nuclear energy technologies be considered  
 reversible? 
 SQ2:  Why should nuclear energy technologies be reversible? 
 SQ3:  If so, how could the reversibility of nuclear energy technologies be achieved? 
 
This chapter first summarizes the central findings of the thesis and how these 
help to answer the subquestions, after which it reflects on the complications and 
implications of reversibility considerations for the development and implemen-
tation of nuclear energy technologies. Next, it presents an answer to the main 
research question. Finally, it reflects upon the extent to which the results of this 
work can be further generalized and identifies some of their limitations. 
6.1. Subquestion 1: Under what conditions can nuclear energy technologies 
be considered reversible? 
The first subquestion asked under what conditions nuclear energy technologies 
can be considered reversible. To come to these conditions, a conceptualization of 
technological (ir)reversibility had to be developed that is a) suitable to the notion of 
social experimentation with nuclear energy technologies, which, as chapter 5 
shows, current approaches to reversibility in nuclear energy policy fail to do 
adequately, and b) can do justice to the importance of institutional, political and 
symbolic aspects of national nuclear histories, which many theoretical ap-
proaches to technological (ir)reversibility insufficiently incorporate. 
 Building on Giddens’ theory of structuration and Orlikowski’s work on the 
duality of technology, chapter 2 conceptualized technology development as a 
process of structuration of human aspirations, in which reflexive agents trans-
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form the world by introducing, reproducing and transforming technologies that 
consist of material, institutional and symbolic structural elements. According to 
this conception, technologies become irreversible when their constitutive ele-
ments become caught in circuits of reproduction. These circuits of reproduction 
tend to persist when there is little to no disalignment between the material, 
institutional and symbolic elements of a technology and/or when there is a 
concentration of resources with those agents in support of the technology, since 
these factors lower the chance of successful disruptive events occurring. When 
disruptive events do occur, they can break the circuit of reproduction and/or 
undo the structural elements that make up the technology. When the circuit of 
reproduction is not broken, but some elements of the technology are neverthe-
less undone, the technology can be considered partially reversed. 
 The applicability of this theoretical lens to the case of nuclear energy tech-
nologies was subsequently demonstrated by applying it three historical cases of 
nuclear energy technology development, i.e., in India, France and the USA.  
 Based on these insights, two general conditions for the reversibility of 
nuclear energy technologies were proposed, both of which should be fulfilled if 
such a technology is to be considered fully reversible: 
 
1) The ability to stop the further development and deployment of a nuclear 
energy technology in society. 
2) The ability to undo the undesirable outcomes of the development and de-
ployment of that nuclear energy technology. 
 
Two main features of the structurational conceptualization of (ir)reversibility 
provided inspiration for these conditions. First, the disruption of the circuit of 
reproduction is represented by the first condition and the undoing of the tech-
nology’s structural elements in the second one. Secondly, rather than defining 
reversibility as a feature of the technology, the conditions do so in terms of 
agency that, according to the framework, is constituted by the structures in which 
agents find themselves (technological or otherwise). As a consequence, reversi-
bility becomes context-dependent, and the same material technological artefacts 
or systems may have different degrees of reversibility in different cultural, 
institutional and infrastructural contexts. 
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6.2. Subquestion 2: Why should nuclear energy technologies be reversible? 
The second subquestion of this thesis was concerned with why nuclear energy 
technologies should be reversible, irrespective of whether they are considered 
experimental. The Levinasian analysis of the relation between responsibility and 
innovation in chapter 3 provided support, albeit indirectly, for the position that 
reversibility is indeed desirable for the responsible development and implemen-
tation of nuclear energy technologies. 
 It established that, while our responsibility to others necessitates the devel-
opment of technology, it also establishes technology as necessarily provisional and in 
need of change. It did so by structuring Emmanuel Levinas’ ethical phenomenol-
ogy into three mutually dependent ‘stages’, each described in terms of their 
leading experience and objectivation regime. This allowed for a more systematic 
appraisal of Levinas’ episodic reflections on technology and clarified the relation 
of technology to other important Levinasian themes such as responsibility, 
justice and politics. This analysis showed that techno-politics (i.e., technology 
and politics), while necessary for concretely fulfilling our responsibilities to 
others, also inevitably falls short of the infinite responsibility that inspires it. 
Abating this ethical dilemma in techno-political practice requires an openness to 
the questioning Other, which concretely implies (among other things) the need 
for a flexible technological set-up of the world that allows for specific technologies’ 
implementation to be stopped and their negative consequences to be undone. In 
short, it calls for technological reversibility. 
 As such, a Levinasian understanding of technology supports the idea of 
reversibility as a general requirement for technology. The desirability of reversi-
bility for nuclear energy technologies would thus simply follow from the fact that 
they are technologies. This does not rule out, however, that there are specific 
reasons to pay additional attention to the reversibility of nuclear energy tech-
nologies. Their track record of irreversibility (see chapters 2 and 5), potential for 
catastrophe (e.g., in case of reactor meltdown), effects on the openness of politics 
(their authoritarian tendencies do not sit well with Levinasian techno-politics), 
the potential harmful effects of their waste products on future others who cannot 
speak for themselves, and the large investment costs and infrastructural needs 
involved all serve to increase the moral desirability of reversibility while also 
making reversibility exceptionally difficult to practically achieve. In light of this, 
the question of how nuclear energy technologies could be made reversible seems 
exceedingly pertinent. 
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6.3. Subquestion 3: How could the reversibility of nuclear energy technolo-
gies be achieved? 
Having argued above that nuclear energy technologies should be reversible, the 
third subquestion needs to be answered: how can reversibility of nuclear energy 
technologies be achieved? Basically, this boils down to fulfilling both of the 
conditions for technological reversibility formulated in response to the first 
subquestion: 1) the ability to stop the further development and deployment of a 
nuclear energy technology in society, and 2) the ability to undo the undesirable 
outcomes of the development and deployment of that nuclear energy technology. 
The insights in this thesis on how these conditions can be fulfilled have been 
developed based on existing theory and case studies of nuclear energy technol-
ogy development and implementation. However, given nuclear energy technologies’ 
propensity for irreversibility, it was surmised that fulfilling the conditions for 
reversibility first and foremost implies a need for strategies that help to avoid 
such irreversibility. Therefore, rather than studying cases in which nuclear 
energy was successfully abandoned, the focus in this thesis was on nuclear 
energy development trajectories that have proven to be more or less irreversible. 
That is, the approach to answering the third subquestion was to first understand 
how nuclear energy technologies become irreversible, which subsequently 
inspired strategies to help avoid such an outcome. In what follows, the insights 
thus developed are presented separately for each condition for technological 
reversibility. 
6.3.1. Fulfilling the first condition for the reversibility of nuclear energy tech-
nologies 
The first condition for the reversibility of nuclear energy technologies is con-
cerned with the ability to stop the further development and deployment of such a 
technology in society. However, this ability can become severely hampered when 
technologies and their adoption in society exhibit certain characteristics. These 
characteristics were further explored in chapters 2, 4 and 5. 
 
Based on a structurational understanding of technology development, chapter 2 
theorized that it becomes increasingly difficult to reverse the development and 
deployment of a technology if it gets ‘caught’ in circuits of reproduction. That is, 
when reproduction of the technology (which consists of material, institutional 
and symbolic elements) by reflexive agents exhibits positive feedback, the tech-
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nology and its embedding in society become increasingly stable and difficult to 
overcome. Two specific factors were identified as contributing to the likelihood 
of the continuation of circuits of technology reproduction (and thus, making it 
more difficult to disrupt them):  
 
• a lack of disalignment between the symbolic, institutional and material 
elements of a technology. There is disalignment between two such ele-
ments if reproducing one would weaken the other. 
• the asymmetrical distribution of discursive, authoritative and allocative 
resources in favor of those who support the technology. Powerful agents 
in favor of the technology can more easily introduce and reproduce ele-
ments, but also have the resources to prevent others from acting upon 
disalignments (e.g. through secrecy or sanctions) or limit the effectiveness 
of such counter-efforts (e.g., by virtue of their influence on actual deci-
sion-making processes). 
 
This framework was then applied to historical cases of nuclear energy develop-
ment in India, France and the USA, which served to show how these theoretical 
insights play out in practice. 
 Nuclear energy development in India provided a case in which a lack of 
disalignment between the elements of nuclear energy technologies, combined 
with large discrepancies in resource distributions, kept the circuits of nuclear 
energy technology reproduction going. That is, in India, the symbolic connection 
of nuclear energy technologies to national pride, indigenous development and 
post-colonial independence was compatible with centralized technocratic gov-
ernance and faith in government policy decisions. This provided legitimacy to 
long-term planning of nuclear energy technology development and implementa-
tion (Homi Bhabha’s three-phase plan), ensuring that little disalignment 
between symbolic, institutional and material elements could arise. Institutional 
resources were concentrated with the DAE and the Prime Minister, thus central-
izing decision-making on nuclear development. This concentration of resources 
was further safeguarded by discouraging foreign players to enter the Indian 
nuclear energy market. Finally, stringent secrecy further deprived possible 
opponents of the nuclear regime of discursive resources, lowering the chance 
and effectiveness of opposition. As such, the strength of specific symbolic and 
institutional elements as well as large discrepancies in resource availability in 
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favor of those supporting the nuclear program were sufficient to continue 
India’s circuits of reproduction. 
 In the USA, on the other hand, the circuit of reproduction was actually 
broken based on increasing disalignment between the elements of the USA’s 
nuclear energy technologies and increasing institutional and discursive re-
sources for opponents. First, there was a disalignment between promises of 
cheap nuclear energy and safe nuclear energy, since regulations that were meant 
to increase safety also significantly increased costs. Secondly, there was a 
disalignment between those increasing costs of nuclear energy on the one hand, 
and the goal of creating a competitive and privatized nuclear energy industry on 
the other.  Around the same time that these disalignments were growing, the 
dissolution of the AEC and the assumption of its responsibilities by the NRC 
and ERDA constituted a significant change in the institutional set-up of the 
USA’s nuclear energy program. This, combined with increased opportunities for 
legal contestation (mainly based on new environmental legislation) and the 
limited secrecy necessitated by a privatized nuclear energy industry, provided 
institutional and discursive resources to opponents who could now act upon the 
above-mentioned disalignments and thus effectively oppose nuclear new-build. 
These factors made nuclear energy less attractive to private investors, which led 
to nuclear energy expansion in the USA grinding to a halt by the end of the 
1970’s, breaking the circuit of reproduction of nuclear energy technologies in 
the USA. 
 Lastly, the case of French nuclear energy technology development was 
interesting because it provided an example of what I have termed partial reversi-
bility. This means that its circuit of reproduction was not broken, but a limited 
set of structural elements of France’s nuclear energy technologies were neverthe-
less replaced in the 1960’s and 1970’s (see table 2.4). Specifically, the 
introduction of new symbolic elements like the ‘competitive kilowatt-hour’ and 
the conceptual separation of nuclear energy production from other nuclear 
applications created disalignments with other elements of French nuclear energy 
technologies (such as the CEA’s focus on plutonium production), which made it 
possible for EDF to wrest authority over power plant construction and operation 
from the CEA. This constituted a significant change in the institutional elements 
of French nuclear energy technology. It provided EDF with the discursive and 
institutional resources necessary to change some of the dominant material 
elements of French nuclear energy, i.e., making the PWR reactor (which was 
Conclusions 
145 
optimized for energy production) the dominant reactor type instead of the CEA’s 
UNGG reactors. 
 Based on these theoretical and empirical insights, chapter 2 provided two 
general strategies for fulfilling the first condition for technological reversibility. 
That is, increasing the ability to stop the further development and deployment of 
nuclear energy technologies in society (i.e., to break their circuits of reproduc-
tion) involves:  
 
1) avoiding excessive resource asymmetries between agents, and  
2) ensuring the possibility of introducing novel symbolic, institutional or 
material elements. 
 
This would for disalignments between structural elements and opens avenues 
for disruptive action. With this, chapter 2 provided quite general strategies for 
overcoming technological irreversibility by disrupting circuits of technology 
reproduction. It did not, however, provide much insight into how technologies 
get ‘caught’ in these circuits of reproduction in the first place. Moreover, it 
provides little insights into why agents reproduce a technology and the specific 
economic, political or other mechanisms that drive those adoption decisions.  
 
To find out how technologies initially get caught in circuits of reproduction, why 
agents adopt them and how those adoption decisions make those technologies 
more irreversible, chapter 4 looked deeper into another, compatible theoretical 
framework that explains the lock-in of technologies on the basis of positive 
feedback: technological path dependence.  
 The theory of technological path dependence was explored through the 
phenomenological lens of Alfred Schutz. It provided a phenomenological 
description of technology adoption, technology and the social environment in 
which it occurs. Technology adoption, understood in terms of subjective proc-
esses of choosing and acting, was seen as driving the positive feedback 
mechanisms in path dependent processes. In other words, mechanisms like 
economies of scale, learning effects and network externalities operate by virtue 
of technology adoption increasing the chance that that technology will be 
adopted again in the future (or lowering the chance that alternatives are se-
lected).  According to this analysis, the difficulty of stopping the further 
deployment of a technology in society and of switching to an alternative is an 
emergent outcome of numerous individual technology adoption decisions. The 
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conceptual resources developed in the phenomenological descriptions of tech-
nology adoption, technology and the social selection environment were 
subsequently connected to utilitarian, functional, legitimacy and power explana-
tions for path reinforcement. This provided insight into the reasons why certain 
technologies get increasingly adopted over alternative solutions163, and how 
power asymmetries can determine others’ technology adoption decisions. 
 This Schutzian rendition of technological path dependence is largely com-
patible with the notion of ‘circuits of reproduction’ of a technology described in 
chapter 2, since both describe processes of increasing technological inflexibility 
based on positive feedback and both assume a structurational notion of agency, 
i.e. iterational, projective and practical-evaluative (see section 4.2). Moreover, the 
subjective processes of ‘choosing’ and ‘deciding’ that form the basis of technol-
ogy adoption correspond to Giddens’ more encompassing notion of ‘reflexive 
monitoring of action’ (see fig 2.1), and chapter 2’s ‘aspirations’ correspond to 
Schutz’ notion of interests and plans as motivational relevances in technology 
adoption decisions. Moreover, the notion of ‘negative adoption’ can be seen as 
an important source of chapter 2’s ‘disruptive events’. 
 What chapter 4 adds to chapter 2 are insights concerning the subjective 
processes behind the circuits of  technology reproduction (in terms of choosing 
and acting and how these link to technology adoption), the mediating role of 
technological, social and plan hierarchies, and the differentiation between 
utilitarian, functional, legitimacy and power explanations for increasing techno-
logical irreversibility. Of the latter, power explanations are of special interest 
here, since they further specify the idea that resource asymmetries contribute to 
positive feedback by identifying the most important ways in which they do so: by 
a) allowing powerful agents to influence the social stock of knowledge (e.g., 
through propaganda or secrecy) and b) enrolling others into the social hierar-
chies connected to a technology. 
 Interestingly, all four types of explanations for path reinforcement can be 
recognized in the cases described in chapter 2. First, utilitarian explanations for 
____________________________________________________________________ 
163  In the case of nuclear energy technologies, alternatives could include alternative parts for the 
current technology, other nuclear energy technologies (see the case of France in chapter 2) or 
non-nuclear technologies that fulfil the same function. However, as chapter 4’s discussion of 
functional explanations indicates, the function according to which another technology is an 
alternative need not necessarily (only) be energy production, although the latter would 
probably be the most likely scenario. 
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path reinforcement are most straight-forwardly recognizable in the USA case. 
There, increased adoption of nuclear energy technologies (and PWRs in particu-
lar) not only made it possible to improve these technologies, but also decreased 
the capacities necessary for future adoption due to experience gained by previous 
users (i.e., learning-by-doing (Cowan, 1990)). More importantly, however, 
increased adoption was also expected to greatly decrease costs and increase 
profits (however optimistic those expectations were), increasing both the extent 
to which financial interests were expected to be fulfilled but also increasing the 
plausibility of project success (i.e., learning-about-payoffs (ibid.)). These dynam-
ics helped fuel the nuclear expansion described in chapter 2. Secondly, functional 
explanations were probably most evidently embodied in the case of India. An 
important reason for India to adopt an indigenous PHWR reactor type was not 
primarily that it excelled at efficiently producing energy, but rather that it ful-
filled a function in other projects than simply energy production. These projects 
included military developments, energy independence (through the three-phase 
plan), and cultivating indigenous industrial and engineering capacities. Third, 
legitimacy explanations could be seen at work in the case of France, where the 
positive adoption of nuclear energy as well as avoiding its negative adoption were 
reinforced by the legitimacy it received from its role in the ‘right and proper’ 
project of restoring the radiance of France. Lastly, given the prominent role of 
governmental institutions in the national nuclear histories discussed, it is not 
surprising to find elements of power explanations in each of them. For example, 
in the USA, the authority of nuclear elites in the industry and the AEC lent 
credibility to each other’s price projections (and also allowed them to define what 
was to be considered ‘safe’), leading to nuclear expansion. In France, the CEA 
enrolled patriotic French citizens into (the plan and social hierarchies connected 
to) its nuclear energy project to rebuild the Radiance of France, if only by having 
them not standing in the way of progress. In the Indian case, stringent secrecy 
avoided negative adoption of nuclear energy technology by depriving potential 
opponents of discursive resources. 
 In addition to the above, the theory of technological path dependence also 
provides an explanation for how technologies initially get ‘caught’ in circuits of 
reproduction, a problem not addressed in chapter 2. When one technology gains 
a small early lead vis-à-vis competing technologies due to ‘small historical events’ 
(whether contingent or strategic in origin), this may set history on a new techno-
logical path.  This path can then get further amplified by positive feedback 
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mechanisms based on utilitarian, functional, legitimacy and/or power considera-
tions, which may eventually lead to the technology being locked-in. 
 
To probe the usefulness of this notion of path dependence (and lock-in) in 
determining whether the first condition for reversibility is fulfilled for a nuclear 
energy technology, it was applied in chapter 5 to the case of geological disposal 
(GD) of high-level radioactive waste (HLW) in the USA. Focusing on the cumu-
lative effect of quasi-irreversible investments involved in decisions to adopt GD, 
it showed how alternative solutions to the HLW problem (disposal in the seabed 
or in ice sheets, extraterrestrial disposal, transmutation, etc.) became compara-
tively less well developed and less attractive the more GD was adopted. As such, 
in part due to its own particular history (see section 5.3), GD came to be seen as 
the only ‘realistic’ option available. At that point, an authorized body could not 
reasonably be expected to turn away from GD since it was locked-in. On this 
basis, it was concluded that the first condition for technological reversibility was 
not fulfilled in the case of GD in the USA. 
 On top of demonstrating the usefulness of path dependence for the purposes 
of this dissertation, this analysis showed how a technology can be locked-in by 
overwhelming commitment from relevant stakeholders, even when little to no 
working examples of the technology are present. This emphasizes the impor-
tance of the notion of aspirations (chapter 2) and of the possibility of adopting a 
technology as a future prospect (chapter 4). Moreover, it reiterates the impor-
tance of commitment to the symbolic and institutional elements that result from 
technology development (chapter 2) for the course of technological trajectories, 
e.g., in terms of the leading values of safety and security, and of embedding of 
GD in research programs, regulations, policy acts, etc. 
 
Taken together, chapters 2, 4 and 5 provide an explanation for why the first 
condition for technological reversibility, i.e., the ability to stop the further 
development and deployment of a nuclear energy technology in society, might 
be difficult to fulfil. This is likely to be difficult because nuclear energy technolo-
gies can easily get locked-in or caught in circuits of reproduction. As such, 
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fulfilling the first condition involves concrete efforts to avoid lock-in. Based on 
the above, such efforts would at the very least include164: 
 
• Keeping other technological options available and viable. As the case of geo-
logical disposal in chapter 5 shows, changing to an alternative technology 
becomes incredibly difficult when the alternatives are significantly under-
developed. 
• Avoiding asymmetrical resource distributions in favour of those who support the 
dominant technology. This is especially pertinent in terms of knowledge 
and legitimacy production and enrolling others into social hierarchies. 
See, for example, the AEC’s conflict of interest in the USA or France’s 
connection of nuclear energy to patriotism, both in chapter 2. 
• Keeping commitment to specific values and other symbolic elements flexible. 
For example, the early value commitments to safety and containment in 
the USA’s HLW and SNF management policy played a significant role in 
GD’s eventual lock-in (see chapter 5). 
• Ensuring possibilities for criticism of the technology by avoiding secrecy and 
including policy outsiders in the technology development and implementation 
process. This helps to avoid overly asymmetric resource distributions and 
improves the chances for disruptive events. Furthermore, there is norma-
tive support for this strategy in terms of chapter 3’s Levinasian techno-
politics. 
• Creating space for the creation and dissemination of novel discourse about the 
technology. For an example, see how EDF managed when it redirected dis-
course about French nuclear energy technologies away from explicitly 
political and towards more ‘neutral’ economic justification. 
6.3.2. Fulfilling the second condition for the reversibility of nuclear energy 
technologies 
Although this dissertation has mainly focused on the first condition for techno-
logical reversibility, chapter 5 also presented a number of possible strategies to help 
fulfil the second condition, i.e., the ability to undo the undesirable consequences of 
____________________________________________________________________ 
164  This list is by no means exhaustive. It is merely meant to show the types of concrete strategies 
that one could induce from the combined insights from chapters 2, 4 and 5. 
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a nuclear energy technology’s development and deployment. It focused specifi-
cally on the most notorious undesirable material consequence of nuclear energy 
technologies: the very real risks connected to HLW and SNF, including illness 
and death due to exposure to radiation or ingestion of radioisotopes. In order to 
assess the extent to which GD can fulfil the second condition for reversibility, 
four possible strategies were presented for ‘undoing’ undesirable consequences. 
In descending order of reversibility165, these were:  
 
1) Remediation: bringing (parts of) the system under consideration back to a 
previous state by eliminating the problem source and using (part of) the 
system’s internal dynamics to undo the unwanted effects of the technol-
ogy’s development and implementation. 
2) (Re)construction: bringing (parts of) the system under consideration back 
to the state by eliminating the problem source and actively reconfiguring 
system parts to reconstruct the previous state to undo the unwanted ef-
fects of the technology’s development and implementation. 
3) Containment: Containment of the problem source without eliminating it, 
shielding potential victims from its harmful effects. 
4) Compensation: Compensate victims for the undesirable consequences of 
the technology development project when even containment not possible. 
 
It was concluded that, since GD focuses on the containment strategy rather than 
on reconstruction (either through partitioning and transmutation (P&T) or by 
ensuring long-term retrievability), it did not fully exhaust the possibilities of 
undoing the risks connected to high-level waste. Hence, it did not fulfil the 
second condition for technological reversibility to the fullest and could not be 
considered completely reversible. Generally speaking, the more the possibilities 
for remediation and reconstruction are exhausted before relying on containment 
or compensation, the more the second condition for technological reversibility is 
____________________________________________________________________ 
165  See section 5.4. The ideal strategy for the ‘undoing of consequences’, i.e., simply going back in 
time and starting over, is impossible. However, the four strategies for undoing undesirable 
consequences presented in chapter 5 are meant to bring us closer to that ideal. Given that goal, 
strategies that also eliminate the problem source would be more reversible than those that do 
not because ‘starting over’ would imply that the problem source does not exist (yet).  
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fulfilled166. This can be done by taking remediation or reconstruction as guiding 
principles for designing the technology in question. 
6.4. Complications of Reversibility Considerations:  
context-sensitivity and three dilemmas of reversibility 
This dissertation has theorized what it means for nuclear energy technologies to 
be reversible, provided normative support for the position that their reversibility 
is desirable and presented strategies on how more reversibility could be 
achieved. It has, however, also identified a number of complications in requiring 
nuclear energy technologies to be reversible. 
 First, the formulation of the conditions already indicated that reversibility is 
not an inherent characteristic of technological artefacts but is rather constituted 
by the capabilities of agents, which in turn makes it heavily context-dependent. 
Given that this context is not static and co-evolves with the technology, however, 
efforts to ensure reversibility will at least need regular recalibration.  
 On top of this, both the progressive nature of path dependent processes as 
well as the ‘descending order of reversibility’ of the four strategies for undoing 
undesirable consequences (remediation, reconstruction, containment and 
compensation) indicate that technological reversibility is not an all-or-nothing 
affair. Rather, reversibility is a matter of degree, of technologies being more or 
less reversible. However, such an image of reversibility and irreversibility as the 
ends of a spectrum is further complicated by the fact that the two conditions for 
technological reversibility can be at odds with one another. That is, taking steps 
to fulfill one of the conditions for technological reversibility might decrease the 
ability to fulfill the other. One possible example of this is P&T being preferable 
to GD in terms of its strategy for undoing undesirable consequences, yet also 
running the risk of becoming at least as locked-in due to its large investment 
costs and complex infrastructural needs (see section 5.4). The possibility of the 
two conditions being at odds with each other represents the internal dilemma of 
the notion of technological reversibility presented in this thesis. It is important 
to note that reversibility is not the only consideration that can fall prey to such a 
____________________________________________________________________ 
166  One could of course argue that, if containment was guaranteed to work perfectly (which is 
doubtful in practice, if only due to the risk of human intrusion), then reconstruction would not 
be necessary. However, while both strategies may then be equally safe, they would still not be 
equally reversible. 
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dilemma. For example, adding safety systems to nuclear reactors can also add 
complexity, which could end up making the reactors more unsafe: the “paradox 
of safety systems” (Taebi & Kloosterman, 2015 p. 825). Along similar lines, the 
internal dilemma can be called the reversibility paradox. 
 In addition to the reversibility paradox, two more dilemmas haunt a call for 
more reversibility, one practical and one ethical. The practical dilemma of 
technological reversibility originates in the insight that some stability and 
reproduction of the set of structural elements of a technology is necessary for a 
technology to ‘work’. However, the more these elements are reproduced, the 
more irreversible the technology becomes. As such, the efficacy and reversibility 
of a technology may well be at odds. This has an important implication, i.e., 
while reversibility may be morally desirable, it is probably not effective to always 
maximize it. On top of this, the Levinasian analysis of technology in this disser-
tation also identified an ethical dilemma. That is, technology and the 
concomitant objectification of others is necessary for setting up the world in 
such a way that it can be used to help others in need, but it is unclear how 
technology’s capacity to do so is to be traded off against the need for openness of 
technology and politics to the Other (and the technological reversibility that 
implies). In other words, the question of how much technological reversibility is 
actually desirable is also dilemmatic, just like the problem of justice from which it 
sprang (see section 3.2.3).  
 In sum, technological reversibility is context-dependent and is subject to 
three dilemmas: internal, practical and ethical. From this, it can be concluded 
that while some reversibility is both desirable and feasible, ‘full’ technological 
reversibility would be neither. It also means that while developing and imple-
menting nuclear energy technologies, one cannot simply tick the proverbial 
‘reversibility’ box and be done with it. Rather, for those committed to reversibil-
ity, it presents an obligation that is both technology- and context-specific and 
requires infinite negotiation. 
6.5. Main Research Question:  
What are the implications of reversibility for the responsible  
development and implementation of nuclear energy technologies? 
This section provides an outline of the most important implications of these 
results for developing and implementing nuclear energy technologies in a 
responsible way. 
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 First, the extent of the implications of reversibility ultimately depends on 
whether nuclear energy technologies should be reversible at all, because if so, 
this would give us reason to incorporate reversibility considerations into their 
development and implementation. Chapter 3 gave us reason to do so167 if that 
development and implementation is to be done responsibly168. However, as the 
ethical dilemma that also follows from chapter 3 implies, the need for reversibil-
ity would still have to be weighed against other morally relevant factors, such as 
potential benefits, safety, security, possibilities for learning, etc. 
 On top of this, the Levinasian framework in chapter 3 has a number of 
general implications for how the responsible development and implementation 
of (nuclear energy) technologies is to be organized. That is, it calls for a subordi-
nation of technology development to a just politics that is open to the Other, 
allowing vulnerable others to influence the innovation of both politics and 
technology. For nuclear energy technologies, this might be particularly difficult 
to achieve (see section 6.2). 
 Consistent with this subordination of technology development to a just 
politics, this thesis has also demonstrated the importance of the ‘socio-political’ 
aspects of technology development and implementation for technological 
reversibility, Whether in terms of symbolic and institutional elements/micro-
irreversibilities in chapters 2 and 5, politics in chapter 3, or the social/plan 
hierarchies and social stock of knowledge in chapter 4, the way in which nuclear 
energy technologies are societally embedded was shown to have a profound 
impact on their reversibility, or more specifically, on the ability to fulfil the first 
condition of technological reversibility. 
 Despite the fact that some of the implications of the first condition for reversi-
bility refer to the development of technologies (e.g., in emphasizing the 
availability and viability of technological alternatives), the majority of strategies 
that were identified to help fulfill this condition (see section 6.3.1)169 do not 
____________________________________________________________________ 
167  To be sure, even if chapter 3 were insufficiently convincing to show the general desirability of 
technological reversibility, it would still be prima facie desirable based on the social experimen-
tation framework (see section 1.1). 
168  In saying this, I am not aiming at the ‘foundational’ relation between responsibility and 
innovation, since that is metaphysically given. This is about the ‘ethical’ relation between the 
two terms, which would hopefully also lead to better ‘structural’ outcomes of innovation. 
169  Most of these strategies for making nuclear energy technologies more reversible would also be 
compatible with a Levinasian techno-politics. 
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primarily refer to the characteristics of nuclear energy technologies themselves. 
Instead, they refer to the discourse(s) and institutions that accompany them, 
both before and after their initial implementation. As such, the first condition 
for technological reversibility has major implications for how to organize both the 
development and the implementation of nuclear energy technologies. 
 While fulfilling the first condition for reversible nuclear energy technologies 
mainly has implications for how we discursively and institutionally embed such 
technologies, the implications of the second condition centers on the way these 
technologies are designed. That is, the strategies identified in this dissertation 
for fulfilling the second condition indicate that maximizing the ability to undo 
the undesirable consequences of a nuclear energy technology involves designing 
that technology according to certain design strategies rather than others (i.e., 
remediation or reconstruction over containment and compensation). For exam-
ple, designing geological repositories so as to ensure long-term retrievability of 
SNF and HLW would give a more prominent role to the ‘reconstruction’ strategy 
over ‘containment’, allowing for retrieval in case the repository fails or P&T 
becomes viable (see sections 5.2 and 5.4)170. In sum, the second condition for 
reversibility mainly has implications for the development stage, with a focus on the 
design of nuclear energy technologies. 
 On top of all this, the internal dilemma of reversibility (also called the reversi-
bility paradox in section 6.4) implies that the concrete implications of 
reversibility for the responsible development and implementation of nuclear 
energy technologies are not only limited by having to weigh reversibility against 
other relevant considerations, but also by the fact that strategies to fulfill the 
conditions may be incompatible with one another. That is, strategies that would 
help to fulfill one of the conditions might impair the ability to fulfill the other, 
thus limiting the extent to which reversibility can be realized. With its discussion 
of P&T, chapter 5 provided at least one example of such an internally dilemmatic 
situation. That is, P&T might be preferable to GD in terms of undoing undesir-
able consequences, but it runs the risk of becoming at least as locked-in. Of 
course, whether other nuclear energy technologies will suffer similar difficulties 
and which condition should be given priority, however, depends on the specific 
context, consequences and technologies involved. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
170  In light of the ethical and practical dilemmas, the desirability of such a design change towards 
more reversibility ultimately depends on how it weighs up against other relevant considera-
tions, such as safety or the ability of the repository to actually work properly.  
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 In all, the context-dependence, technology-specificity and dilemmatic aspects 
of reversibility considerations prohibit a one-size-fits-all or algorithmic solution 
to the question of what reversibility’s concrete implications are. Still, the results 
suggest that reversibility considerations would require significant changes to the 
way these technologies are designed, the institutions through which we develop 
and implement them, the relation between those developing and implementing 
the technology and those that are not, and our readiness to accept when a 
nuclear energy technology should be reversed (or partially reversed)171. Even 
though these changes may be particularly challenging for nuclear energy tech-
nologies, I hope that the results of this dissertation can serve as guidelines for 
developing more concrete proposals towards the reversibility of nuclear energy 
technologies.  
6.6. Further Generalizations and Limitations 
All of the above has been focused on reversibility in one technological domain: 
nuclear energy technologies. Within that domain, it has specifically focused on 
technologies for energy production, fuel processing and radioactive waste 
management (and not, for example, uranium mining). In spite of this focus, 
some of the insights from this research are generalizable to other technological 
domains in which there is significant uncertainty about future risks, such as 
nanotechnology, biotechnology or ICT (Pieters, Hadziosmanovic, & Dechesne, 
2014; Robaey, 2016b; Spruit, 2017). If innovators wish to experiment responsibly 
with such innovations in society, they should also be prepared for learning that 
the experiment is no longer responsible or desirable (e.g., Jacobs et al., 2010; 
Robaey, 2016a; van de Poel, 2016). In other words, experimenting responsibly 
with these new technologies also requires some degree of reversibility. The 
Levinasian reflection on technology in this dissertation corroborates this general 
need for technological reversibility. That is, the dilemmatic structure of techno-
politics (inherited from the Levinasian conception of justice) prescribes that all 
technology and politics be open to change. However, the concrete applicability of 
this particular take on the issue is inevitably limited. That is, the ‘transcendental’ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
171  In section 6.4, it was said that ‘full’ reversibility was not feasible. However, this is not the 
meaning of ‘reversed’ that is aimed for here. Rather, ‘reversed’ refers here to the two condi-
tions for reversibility being fulfilled, whereas ‘partially reversed’ refers to only the second one 
being fulfilled (see section 6.1). 
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approach to philosophy of technology that the Levinasian analysis represents 
tends not to provide the practical insights necessary to navigate the ethical 
dilemmas that it identifies (Verbeek, 2005). For example, it provides little 
guidance on how to balance a technology’s reversibility with its concrete (ethical) 
efficacy, and it does not discriminate between different technologies and how 
they necessitate more or less reversibility considerations. 
 As such, this thesis leaves a number of concrete and ethically relevant 
questions unanswered that ideally would be the subject of future research. For 
one, it is still unclear how reversible a technology should be, practically speaking. 
That is, while it is clearly morally desirable to increase reversibility as long as it 
does not interfere with the fulfillment of other values, it is unclear how much 
weight reversibility carries in necessary value trade-offs. Such trade-offs would 
require additional ethical reflection (cf. Manders-Huits, 2011). Also, while the 
conditions for technological reversibility are sufficiently general to be applicable 
to other technological domains, it is still unclear to what extent they should each 
be fulfilled separately and how they are to be balanced in case they are at odds 
with one another.  On top of all this, the conditions for technological reversibility 
do not prescribe who should fulfill them. For GD, it was proposed that an 
‘authorized body’ should fulfil the first condition, whereas the second condition 
was discussed in terms of design strategies. However, while this may be applica-
ble to technologies like GD that are subject to centralized management and 
control, it is doubtful whether it is equally applicable to technologies that lack 
such a centralized governance structure, such as nanoparticles (Spruit, Hoople, 
& Rolfe, 2016) or genetically modified seeds (Robaey, 2014). Moreover, while the 
ability of an ‘authorized body’ to fulfil the conditions is sufficient for reversibility 
in principle, this focus on central authority ignores other aspects that contribute 
to reversibility, such as the opportunities for policy outsiders to influence the 
continuation of experiments with technology in society (see chapter 2). As such, 
while the ‘anonymity’ of the conditions for technological reversibility means that 
they are generalizable to other technological domains, they require case-specific 
and theory-appropriate operationalization before they can become useful in 
assessing and guiding experiments with these technologies (as this dissertation 
partially did for GD).  
 Lastly, some of the insights developed for answering the third subquestion 
can also be applied to technology more generally. For example, the conceptuali-
zation of technology development as a process of structuration of human 
aspirations or the phenomenological perspectives on path dependence developed 
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in this thesis are largely neutral with respect to the technology discussed. How-
ever, a number of limitations still apply. For one, this dissertation focuses on 
explanations for technological irreversibility based on positive feedback. As such, 
they are more focused on how irreversibility arises (which is relevant in avoiding 
irreversibility) than on how it is maintained. Also, it must be reiterated that there 
are theories of technological or institutional irreversibility that do not rely 
primarily on positive feedback to adoption, such as those based on sunk costs or 
structural inertia (Sydow et al., 2009). For some technologies, these theories 
may be more appropriate for understanding their irreversibility and would thus 
lead to different recommendations on how to avoid it. Secondly, the focus on 
nuclear energy technologies in this thesis invited theory development with an 
emphasis on symbolism and power. However, this may also have led to an 
insufficient appreciation of the economics of nuclear energy technologies in 
explaining their irreversibility (Collingridge, 1983; Cowan, 1990). As such, it 
may have missed opportunities for formulating strategies to avoid lock-in based 
on nuclear energy’s economic specificities (e.g. long lead times, large investment 
costs, etc.). A third point concerning the recommendations on how to avoid 
irreversibility focusses on the design strategies for undoing undesirable conse-
quences, i.e., remediation, reconstruction, containment and compensation. 
These are limited to material consequences of nuclear energy development and 
deployment, more specifically the risks connected to HLW. However, given that 
technology development (as conceptualized in this work) results in institutional 
and symbolic elements next to the material ones, additional strategies would 
need to be developed on how to make it possible to ‘undo’ those. 
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7 Implications of Reversibility for  
Responsible Experimentation 
As established in chapter 3, nuclear energy technologies should be reversible to 
an extent. Without further analysis and reflection, however, this dissertation 
cannot conclude much more regarding the general desirability of such technolo-
gies in and of themselves. Nevertheless, it does provide relevant insights on the 
implications of reversibility for responsibly experimenting with nuclear energy 
technologies in society. These implications can be divided into two broad catego-
ries: one concerning the implications of this dissertation’s conceptualization of 
reversibility and how to achieve it, and the other about the desirability of the 
reversibility of nuclear energy technologies and its relation to the other condi-
tions for responsible experimentation. Both are briefly discussed below. 
7.1. Implications of the two conditions for technological reversibility 
In answering the first and third subquestions, this thesis presented a novel 
notion of technological reversibility in terms of two conditions, and a number of 
strategies for fulfilling them. The first condition for technological reversibility is 
concerned with the ability to stop the further development and deployment of a 
nuclear energy technology in society. Fulfilling this condition requires practical 
strategies aimed at keeping other technological options available and viable, 
avoiding asymmetrical resource distributions in favour of those who support the 
dominant technology, keeping value commitments flexible, and ensuring 
possibilities for criticism and novel discourse about it. The second condition 
involves the ability to undo the undesirable outcomes of the development and 
deployment of the nuclear energy technology in question. For material outcomes 
at least, fulfilling this condition involves designing nuclear energy technologies 
according to the preferable strategies for undoing their undesirable conse-
quences (i.e., remediation and reconstruction rather than containment and 
compensation). For HLW and SNF management at least, this could affect the 
way we design and implement GD by allowing for long-term retrievability, but 
could likewise affect the entire fuel cycle by demanding P&T.  
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 At least some of these conditions for technological reversibility and the 
strategies for fulfilling them should be included in the more general list of 
conditions for responsible experimentation. They could either directly serve as 
new conditions for responsible experimentation with nuclear energy technolo-
gies (insofar as they are not already integrated into the list in table 1.1) or they 
could simply provide inspiration for the formulation of other new conditions. 
For example, the strategy of ‘keeping other technological option available and 
viable’ might inspire the following condition for responsible experimentation: 
“There must be at least one technological alternative available that could replace 
the experimental technology”. However, it is not entirely clear which are the best 
candidates for being turned into conditions for responsible experimentation: the 
two more general conditions for technological reversibility or the more practi-
cally-oriented strategies for fulfilling them. The current list of conditions for 
responsible experimentation in table 1.1 (van de Poel, 2016) offers conditions at 
different levels of abstraction, some resembling the conditions for reversibility, 
others resembling strategies for action. For example, condition 6 (flexible set-up 
of the experiment and avoidance of lock-in of the technology) could easily be 
construed as a strategy for achieving condition 3 (possibility and willingness to 
adapt or stop the experiment).  
 Nevertheless, this difficulty has an interesting implication for the general 
framework of responsible experimentation with new technologies in society. 
That is, the distinction employed in this thesis between a) conditions for reversi-
bility in terms of capabilities and b) more technology- and context-specific 
strategies for fulfilling these conditions may actually provide a useful template 
for an extension of the framework for responsible experimentation with new 
technologies in society. The current framework links its conditions to relevant 
values, which allows for their mutual revision based on reflection and experience 
(van de Poel, 2016)172. Explicitly adding a level of practical strategies that oper-
ationalize the conditions allows for a more structured inclusion of these 
considerations in the mutual revision of the values, conditions and the way in 
which those conditions are to be fulfilled. This could potentially increase context-
____________________________________________________________________ 
172  Such a dynamic of normative learning and justification is similar to the one found in Wide 
Reflective Equilibrium (WRE), an approach to ethical reflection and justification that seeks 
coherence between ethical background theories, moral principles and considered judgements 
through their mutual revision (Daniels, 1979, 1996). This dynamic was already a model for 
normative learning in the responsible experimentation framework (van de Poel, 2016 p. 683). 
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sensitivity of the framework and facilitate normative learning (Taebi, 2016), help 
to improve and justify the case-specific operationalization of the conditions 
(Doorn & Taebi, 2017), and support the inclusion of stakeholder into the moral 
debate on real-life experiments with new technologies (Barilan & Brusa, 2011; 
Cotton, 2009; Doorn, 2010; Doorn & Taebi, 2017; van de Poel & Zwart, 2010). 
Of course, all of this could also facilitate responsible experiments with nuclear 
energy technologies in society. 
7.2. Implications of the desirability of reversibility 
In addition to formulating the conditions for technological reversibility and the 
strategies to fulfil them, this dissertation provided support for the position that it 
is desirable for nuclear energy technologies to exhibit a degree of reversibility. 
On the other hand, it also established that these technologies cannot be com-
pletely reversible. Based on this, one could conclude that responsible 
experimentation with nuclear energy technologies in society is impossible, since 
a reversibility condition for responsible experimentation with nuclear technolo-
gies can never be completely fulfilled. By extension, since the unattainability of 
complete reversibility is not limited to nuclear energy technologies, this line of 
reasoning would prohibit any responsible experiment with new technologies in 
society. Clearly, this is an unsatisfactory conclusion. Nevertheless, it does point 
to the fact that reversibility conditions for responsible experimentation require 
qualification. The practical and ethical dilemmas inherent to technological 
reversibility (see section 6.4) already implied as much by showing that reversibil-
ity necessitates trade-offs between (ethical) efficacy and reversibility. Likewise, 
trade-offs between reversibility and other values are possible, e.g., between 
reversibility and short-term safety in considering retrievability considerations in 
GD. Reversibility conditions are, however, not unique in being impossible to 
completely fulfill or involving trade-offs. For example, condition 4 in table 1.1 
(containment of risks as far as reasonably possible) is qualified by a reasonability 
constraint based on the ALARA principle173 (as low as reasonably 
achievable)(e.g., ICRP, 1977, 2007) because risks cannot be completely elimi-
____________________________________________________________________ 
173  The ALARA principle has a rich history in radiological protection, where it provides important 
ethical and precautionary constraints to radiation exposure (e.g., Eggermont & Feltz, 2008). 
However, its application extends beyond nuclear energy-related activities and into other fields 
such as radiation protection in healthcare and exposure to environmental pollutants. 
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nated and even their partial containment comes at a cost. Along similar lines, I 
would propose that reversibility conditions be subject to an ARARA principle (as 
reversible as reasonably achievable), where the reasonableness is determined by 
the effect of more stringent reversibility measures on the expected benefits of the 
experiment, the nature and magnitude of possible hazards, and the possibility of 
fulfilling the other conditions for responsible experimentation with nuclear 
energy technologies. However, given that these hazards and benefits are not 
entirely understood when experimenting with new technologies in society, the 
utilitarian considerations that usually guide ALARA application (e.g., using cost-
benefit analysis to weigh costs of reducing radiation exposure against other 
social and economic factors)(Hansson, 2013; Lierman & Veuchelen, 2005) are 
probably not a great fit for the context of experimentation . Moreover, the effects 
of increased reversibility on the possibility of fulfilling the other conditions for 
responsible experimentation does not lend itself well to a translation into clear 
‘costs and benefits’. As such, while the need for a qualifying reasonability con-
straint like the ARARA principle is implied by some of the outcomes of this 
dissertation (i.e., the dilemmas of reversibility and the need to weigh the need 
for reversibility against other relevant considerations), guidelines for actually 
performing it cannot be directly imported from current practice with ALARA 
and have to be relegated to future work. 
 Concerning the latter considerations, it must be noted that this thesis has not 
systematically investigated how exactly reversibility relates to the other condi-
tions for responsible experimentation with new technologies in society. 
Nevertheless, a significant number of those conditions is clearly compatible with 
reversibility as understood in this thesis, while none straight-forwardly contra-
dict it174. For example, the demand for experiments to be adaptable and 
stoppable, a flexible set-up of the experiment, and the reversibility of harm all 
contribute directly to fulfilling the two conditions for technological reversibility 
developed in this thesis. Along similar lines, ‘consciously scaling up the experi-
ment’ can help to avoid path dependence and lock-in. The ‘containment of risks’ 
echoes one of the four strategies for the undoing of undesirable outcomes 
proposed in chapter 5. This indicates that the ‘containment of risks’ condition 
____________________________________________________________________ 
174  However, most of these ‘compatible’ conditions for responsible experimentation lean towards 
one of the two conditions for technological reversibility. As such, the internal dilemma of 
reversibility indicates that fulfilling one of these ‘compatible’ conditions does not necessarily 
lead to an overall increase in reversibility. 
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should either fall under the ‘reversibility of hazards’ condition, or deserves to be 
reformulated in terms of risk avoidance rather than their containment. Lastly, 
the focus on democratically approved bodies, informing experimental subjects 
and providing opportunities for them to influence the experiment are compatible 
with avoiding resource asymmetries between agents as well as helping to avoid 
lock-in based on power explanations for path reinforcement. For the remaining 
conditions for responsible experimentation, such as better monitoring while 
addressing privacy concerns or the fair distribution of risks and hazards, how-
ever, it remains unclear how they relate to reversibility. Nevertheless, they 
should presumably provide limitations on how much reversibility is actually 
desirable or justifiable. 

 165 
References 
Adler, E. (1988). State Institutions , Ideology , and Autonomous Technological 
Development : Computers and and Nuclear Energy in Argentina and 
Brazil. Latin American Research Review, 23(2), 59–90. 
Aparicio, L. (Ed.). (2010). Making nuclear waste governable - Deep underground 
disposal and the challenge of reversibility. Andra. Retrieved from 
http://www.andra.fr/download/andra-international-
en/document/editions/381-va.pdf 
Araujo, L., & Harrison, D. (2002). Path Dependence , Agency and Technological 
Evolution. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 14(1), 37–41.  
Arthur, W. B. (1989). Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in 
by historical events. The Economic Journal, 99(394), 116–131.  
Arthur, W. B. (1990). Positive Feedbacks in the Economy. Scientific American, 
262, 92–99. 
Arthur, W. B. (1994). Increasing returns and path dependence in the economy. Ann 
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.  
Arts, B., Leroy, P., & Tatenhove, J. (2006). Political Modernisation and Policy 
Arrangements: A Framework for Understanding Environmental Policy 
Change. Public Organization Review, 6(2), 93–106. 
Barilan, Y. M., & Brusa, M. (2011). Triangular reflective equilibrium: a 
conscience-based method for bioethical deliberation. Bioethics, 25(6), 
304–19.  
Barthe, Y. (2010). Nuclear waste: The meaning of decision-making. In L. 
Aparacio (Ed.), Making nuclear waste governable - Deep underground 
disposal and the challenge of reversibility. Andra. Retrieved from 
http://www.andra.fr/download/andra-international-
en/document/editions/381-va.pdf 
Beauchamp, T. L., & Childress, J. F. (2013). Principles of biomedical ethics. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Bergen, J. P. (2016a). Reversibility and Nuclear Energy Production Technologies: 
A Framework and Three Cases. Ethics, Policy & Environment, 19(1), 37–
59. 
Bergen, J. P. (2016b). Reversible Experiments: Putting Geological Disposal to the 
Test. Science and Engineering Ethics, 22(3), 707–733.  
Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality: A treatise in 
the sociology of knowledge. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
166 
Bergmans, A. (2008). Meaningful communication among experts and affected 
citizens on risk: challenge or impossibility? Journal of Risk Research, 
11(1–2), 175–193.  
Blok, V. (2014). Look who’s talking: responsible innovation, the paradox of 
dialogue and the voice of the other in communication and negotiation 
processes. Journal of Responsible Innovation, 1(2), 171–190.  
Blok, V., & Lemmens, P. (2015). The Emerging Concept of Responsible 
Innovation. Three Reasons Why It Is Questionable and Calls for a 
Radical Transformation of the Concept of Innovation. In B.-J. Koops, I. 
Oosterlaken, H. Romijn, T. Swierstra, & J. van den Hoven (Eds.), 
Responsible Innovation 2: Concepts, Approaches, and Applications. Cham: 
Springer International Publishing.  
Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future. (2012). Disposal 
Subcommittee Report to the Full Commission. Washington, D.C. Retrieved 
from http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/disposal_report_ 
updated _final.pdf 
Bonin, B. (2010). The Scientific Basis of Nuclear Waste Management. In D. 
Cacuci (Ed.), Handbook of Nuclear Engineering. Springer US. 
Borup, M., Brown, N., Konrad, K., & Van Lente, H. (2006). The sociology of 
expectations in science and technology. Technology Analysis Strategic 
Management, 18(3–4), 285–298.  
Bredehoeft, J. D. (2003). From Models to Performance Assessment: The 
Conceptualization Problem. Ground Water, 41(5), 571–577.  
Brook, B. W., Alonso, A., Meneley, D. A., Misak, J., Blees, T., & van Erp, J. B. 
(2014). Why nuclear energy is sustainable and has to be part of the 
energy mix. Sustainable Materials and Technologies, 1, 8–16.  
Brown, N., & Michael, M. (2003). A Sociology of Expectations: Retrospecting 
Prospects and Prospecting Retrospects. Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management, 15(1), 3–18. 
Callon, M. (1991). Techno-economic networks and irreversibility. In J. Law (Ed.), 
A sociology of monsters - Essays on power technology and domination (Vol. 
38, pp. 132–161).  
Campo, E. (2015). Relevance as Social Matrix of Attention in Alfred Schutz. 
SOCIETÀ MUTAMENTO POLITICA, 6(12), 117–148.  
Cantner, U., & Vannuccini, S. (2016). Innovation and lock-in. Jena Economic 
Research Papers, (18), 1–30.  
Cardis, E., & Richardson, D. (2000). Health effects of radiation exposure at 
uranium processing facilities. Journal of Radiological Protection, 20(2), 
95–97.  
Carter, J. (1977). Nuclear Power Policy Statement on Decisions Reached 
Following a Review. Retrieved from 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7316 
References 
167 
Cecere, G., Corrocher, N., Gossart, C., & Ozman, M. (2014). Lock-in and path 
dependence: an evolutionary approach to eco-innovations. Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, 24, 1037–1065. 
Cézanne-Bert, P., & Chateauraynaud, F. (2010). The argumentative trajectory of 
reversibility in radioactive wate management. In L. Aparicio (Ed.), 
Making nuclear waste governable - Deep underground disposal and the 
challenge of reversibility. Andra. Retrieved from 
http://www.andra.fr/download/andra-international-
en/document/editions/381-va.pdf 
Clarfield, G. H., & Wiecek, W. M. (1984). Nuclear America: military and civilian 
nuclear power in the United States, 1940-1980. New York, NY: Harper & 
Row. 
Collingridge, D. (1980). The social control of technology. London: Frances Pinter. 
Collingridge, D. (1983). Technology in the policy process: controlling nuclear power. 
New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press. 
Collingridge, D., & James, P. (1991). Inflexible energy policies in a rapidly-
changing market. Long Range Planning, 24(2), 101–107. 
Condé, H., Andersson, T. L., Sandström, R., & Norby, S. (2004). Partitioning, 
transmutation—an alternative to final disposal. An Issue in Focus. In 
Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste (Ed.), Nuclear Waste, State-
of-the-Art Report 2004. Stockholm, Sweden. Retrieved from 
http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/05/25/63/4b726e9d.pdf 
Correljé, A., Cuppen, E., Dignum, M., Pesch, U., & Taebi, B. (2015). Responsible 
Innovation in Energy Projects: Values in the Design of Technologies, 
Institutions and Stakeholder Interactions. In B.-J. Koops, I. Oosterlaken, 
H. Romijn, T. Swierstra, & J. van den Hoven (Eds.), Responsible 
Innovation 2: Concepts, Approaches, and Applications. Cham: Springer 
International Publishing.  
Costello, G. J., & Donnellan, B. (2008). Seeking the Face of Innovation with the 
Ethical Compass of Emmanuel Lévinas. In G. León, A. M. Bernardos, J. 
R. Casar, K. Kautz, & J. I. De Gross (Eds.), Open IT-Based Innovation: 
Moving Towards Cooperative IT Transfer and Knowledge Diffusion: IFIP 
TC8 WG 8.6 International Working Conference October 22--24, 2008, 
Madrid, Spain. Boston, MA: Springer.  
Cotton, M. (2009). Ethical assessment in radioactive waste management: a 
proposed reflective equilibrium based deliberative approach. Journal of 
Risk Research, 12(5), 603–618.  
Cowan, R. (1990). Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-in. 
The Journal of Economic History, 50(3), 541–567.  
Daniels, N. (1979). Wide reflective equilibrium and theory acceptance in ethics. 
The Journal of Philosophy, 76(5), 256–282.  
Daniels, N. (1996). Justice and justification. Reflective equilibrium in theory and 
practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
168 
David, P. A. (1985). Clio and the Economics of QWERTY. The American 
Economic Review, 75(2), 332–337. 
David, P. A. (1994). Why are institutions the “carriers of history”?: Path 
dependence and the evolution of conventions, organizations and 
institutions. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 5(2), 205–220. 
David, P. A. (2001). Path dependence, its critics and the quest for “historical 
economics.” In Evolution and path dependence in economic ideas: Past and 
present (Vol. 15, p. 40). Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar. 
David, P. A. (2007). Path dependence: a foundational concept for historical 
social science. Cliometrica, 1(2), 91–114.  
Desjardins, E. (2013). Reflections on Path Dependence and Irreversibility : 
Lessons from Evolutionary Biology, 78(5), 724–738. 
Deutch, J., Moniz, E., Ansolabehere, S., Driscoll, M., Gray, P., Holdren, J., … 
Todreas, N. (2003). The Future of Nuclear Power. An MIT 
Interdisciplinary Study, Retrieved from http://web. Mit. Edu/nuclearpower. 
Dewey, J. (1998). The pattern of inquiry. In L. A. Hickman & T. M. Alexander 
(Eds.), The Essential Dewey, Volume 2: Ethics, Logic, Psychology. 
Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univeristy Press. 
Dobusch, L., & Schüßler. (2013). Theorizing path dependence: a review of 
positive feedback mechanisms in technology markets, regional clusters, 
and organisations. Industrial and Corporate Change, 22(3), 617–647. 
Doorn, N. (2010). A Rawlsian approach to distribute responsibilities in 
networks. Science and Engineering Ethics, 16(2), 221–49.  
Doorn, N., & Taebi, B. (2017). Rawls’s Wide Reflective Equilibrium as a Method 
for Engaged Interdisciplinary Collaboration. Science, Technology, & Hu-
man Values. 
Downer, J. (2015). The unknowable ceilings of safety: Three ways that nuclear 
accidents escape the calculus of risk assessments. In B. Taebi & S. 
Roeser (Eds.), The Ethics of Nuclear Energy - Risk, Justice and Democracy 
in the post-Fukushima Era. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Downer, J. (2017). The Aviation Paradox: Why We Can “Know” Jetliners But Not 
Reactors. Minerva, 55(2), 229–248.  
Dreher, J. (2011). Alfred Schutz. In G. Ritzer & J. Stepnisky (Eds.), The Wiley-
Blackwell Companion to Major Social Theorists. Oxford, UK: Wiley-
Blackwell.  
Dreher, J. (2013). Reflections on a Phenomenology of Power. Schutzian Research, 
5, 103–119. 
Dreher, J., & López, D. G. (2015). Subjectivity and Power. Human Studies, 38(2), 
197–222.  
Eggermont, G., & Feltz, B. (Eds.). (2008). Ethics and Radiation Protection. 
Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-Bruylant. 
References 
169 
Faure, M., & Fiore, K. (2008). The civil liability of European nuclear operators: 
which coverage for the new 2004 Protocols? Evidence from France. 
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 8(3), 
227–248. 
Felt, U. (forthcoming). Living a Real-World Experiment: Post-Fukushima 
Imaginaries and Spatial Practices of “Containing the Nuclear.” In I. Van 
de Poel, L. Asveld, & D. C. Mehos (Eds.), New Perspectives on Technology 
in Society: Experimentation Beyond the Laboratory. Routledge. 
Felt, U., Wynne, B., Callon, M., Gonçalves, M. E., Jasanoff, S., Jepsen, M., … 
Tallacchini, M. (2007). TAKING EUROPEAN KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 
SERIOUSLY - Report of the Expert Group on Science and Governance to the 
Science, Economy and Society Directorate, Directorate-General for Research, 
European Commission. Brussels. 
Florman, S.C. (2013). The Existential Pleasures of Engineering. Ebook edition. New 
York, NY: Souvenir Press. 
Foxon, T., & Pearson, P. (2008). Overcoming barriers to innovation and 
diffusion of cleaner technologies: some features of a sustainable 
innovation policy regime. Journal of Cleaner Production, 16(1), S148–
S161.  
Frantzeskaki, N., & Loorbach, D. (2010). Towards governing infrasystem 
transitions: Reinforcing lock-in or facilitating change? Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 77(8), 1292–1301.  
Garud, R., Kumaraswamy, A., & Karnøe, P. (2010). Path Dependence or Path 
Creation? Journal of Management Studies, 47(4), 760–774.  
Geertz, C. (1973). Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of Culture. 
In The interpretation of cultures: selected essays. New York, NY: Public 
Books. 
Genus, A. (1995). Walls and bridges: towards a multi-disciplinary approach to 
the concept of flexibility. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 
7(3), 287–306. 
Giddens, A. (1979). Central Problems in Social Theory. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of 
Structuration. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Goettlich, A. (2011). Power and powerlessness - Alfred Schutz’s theory of 
relevance and its possible impact on a sociological analysis of power. 
Civitas - Revista de Ciências Sociais, 11(3), 491–508. 
Gopalakrishnan, a. (2002). Evolution of the Indian Nuclear Power Program. 
Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, 27(1), 369–395. 
Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic action and social structure: the problem of 
embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3), 481–510. 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
170 
Grinbaum, A., & Groves, C. (2013). What Is “Responsible” about Responsible 
Innovation? Understanding the Ethical Issues. In R. Owen, J. Bessant, 
& M. Heintz (Eds.), : Managing the Responsible Emergence of Science and 
Innovation in Society. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Hale, B. (2011). Fukushima Daiichi, Normal Accidents, and Moral Responsi-
bility: Ethical Questions about Nuclear Energy. Ethics, Policy and 
Environment, 14(3), 263–265.  
Hall, B. H., & Kahn, B. (2003). Adoption of New Technology. In D. C. Jones 
(Ed.), New Economy Handbook. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 
Hansson, S. O. (2007a). Ethics and radiation protection. Journal of Radiological 
Protection, 27(2), 147–156.  
Hansson, S. O. (2007b). Philosophical Problems in Cost–Benefit Analysis. 
Economics and Philosophy, 23(2), 163–183.  
Hansson, S. O. (2013). ALARA: What is Reasonably Achievable? In D. Oughton 
& S. O. Hansson (Eds.), Social and Ethical Aspects of Radiation Risk Man-
agement. Oxford: Elsevier. 
Hecht, G. (1998). The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity 
after World War II. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Hecht, G. (2006). Nuclear Ontologies. Constellations, 13(3), 320–331. 
Hecht, G. (2007). A Cosmogram for Nuclear Things. Isis, 98(1), 100–108.  
Heidegger, M. (1977). The Question Concerning Technology. In W. Lovitt (Ed.), 
The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. New York, NY: 
Harper. 
Horst, W. J. R., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of 
Planning. Policy Sciences, 4(2), 155–169. 
Hossain, T., & Morgan, J. (2009). The Quest for QWERTY. The American 
Economic Review, 99(2), 435–440. 
Hughes, T. P. (1969). Technological Momentum in History : Hydrogenation in 
Germany 1898-1933. Past & Present, 44, 106–132. 
Hughes, T. P. (1994). Technological Momentum. In M. R. Smith & L. Marx 
(Eds.), Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological 
Determinism, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
IAEA. (1956). The Statute of the IAEA. Retrieved May 7, 2015, from 
https://www.iaea.org/node/9642 
IAEA. (2006). Nuclear Power and Sustainable Development. Vienna, Austria. 
Retrieved from https://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/Pess/assets/06-
13891_NP&SDbrochure.pdf 
IAEA. (2008). Estimation of Global Inventories of Radioactive Waste and Other 
Radioactive Materials. Vienna, Austria. Retrieved from http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/te_1591_web.pdf 
References 
171 
IAEA. (2009). Classification of Radioactive Waste General Safety Guide. Safety 
Standards Series No. GSG-1. Vienna, Austria. Retrieved from 
http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1419_web.pdf  
IAEA. (2016). Nuclear Power and the Paris Agreement. Vienna, Austria. Retrieved 
from https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/16/11/np-
parisagreement.pdf 
Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management. (1978). Report to the 
President by the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management. 
TID-28817. Washington, D.C. 
ICRP. (1977). Recommendations of the ICRP. ICRP Publication 26. Annals of the 
ICRP 1(3). 
ICRP. (2007). The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection. ICRP Publication 103. Annals of the ICRP 37 (2–
4). 
ICRP. (2013). Radiological protection in geological disposal of long-lived solid 
radioactive waste. Annals of the ICRP, 42(3). 
Jacobs, J. F., Van De Poel, I., & Osseweijer, P. (2010). Sunscreens with Titanium 
Dioxide (TiO2) Nano-Particles: A Societal Experiment. Nanoethics, 4(2), 
103–113. 
Jasanoff, S., & Kim, S.-H. (2009). Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical 
Imaginaries and Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea. 
Minerva, 47(2), 119–146. 
Katz, B. M. L., & Shapiro, C. (1985). Network Externalities, Competition, and 
Compatibility. The American Economic Review, 75(3), 424–440. 
Kay, A. (2005). A critical of the use path dependency in policy studies. Public 
Administration, 83(3), 553–571.  
Kay, N. M. (2013). Rerun the tape of history and QWERTY always wins. Research 
Policy, 42(6–7), 1175–1185.  
Kneese, A. V. (2006). The Faustian Bargain - Risk, Ethics and Nuclear Energy. 
In W. Oates (Ed.), The RFF Reader in Environmental and Resource Policy 
(2nd edition). Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
Koch, L., & Stemerding, D. (1994). The sociology of entrenchment: a cystic 
fibrosis test for everyone? Social Science & Medicine, 39(9), 1211–1220. 
Kojo, M., Richardson, P., Oksa, A., & Mihók, P. (2013). The Use of an Added 
Value Approach During a Repository Development Process  : Exploring 
Stakeholder Views and Concerns. Retrieved from 
http://www.ippaproject.eu/sites/default/files/deliverables/IPPA-
Deliverable-4_3-20-dec-2013.pdf 
Krohn, W., & Weyer, J. (1994). Society as a laboratory: The social risks of 
experimental research. Science and Public Policy, 21(3), 173–183.  
Latour, B. (1990). Drawing Things Together. In M. Lynch & S. Woolgar (Eds.), 
Representation in Scientific Practice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
172 
Latour, B. (1999). Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World. In M. 
Biagioli (Ed.), The Science Studies Reader. New York, NY: Routledge. 
Lawrence, A., Sovacool, B., & Stirling, A. (2016). Nuclear energy and path 
dependence in Europe’s “Energy union”: coherence or continued 
divergence? Climate Policy, 16(5), 622–641. 
Lenzen, M. (2008). Life cycle energy and greenhouse gas emissions of nuclear 
energy: A review. Energy Conversion and Management, 49(8), 2178–2199.  
Levidow, L., & Carr, S. (2007). GM crops on trial: Technological development as 
a real-world experiment. Futures, 39(4), 408–431.  
Levinas, E. (1969). Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority. Pittsburgh, PA: 
Duquesne University Press. 
Levinas, E. (1981). Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
Levinas, E. (1987). Collected Philosophical Papers. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers. 
Levinas, E. (1988). The Paradox of Morality: an interview with Emmanuel 
Levinas. In R. Bernasconi & D. Wood (Eds.), The Provocation of Levinas: 
Rethinking the Other. London: Routledge. 
Levinas, E. (1989). The Levinas Reader. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.  
Levinas, E. (1993). The Rights of Man and the Rights of the Other. In Outside the 
Subject. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Levinas, E. (1994). Sur l’Esprit de Genève. In Les Imprévus de l’histoire. Saint-
Clément-de-Rivière: Fata Morgana. 
Levinas, E. (1996). Basic Philosophical Writings. (A. T. Peperzak, S. Critchley, & 
R. Bernasconi, Eds.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univeristy Press. 
Levinas, E. (1998a). Entre Nous: On Thinking of The Other. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press. 
Levinas, E. (1998b). Secularization and Hunger. Graduate Faculty Philosophy 
Journal, 20/21 (2/1), 3–12. 
Levinas, E. (2000). God, Death, and Time. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Levinas, E. (2003). On escape. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Levinas, E., Bouchetoux, F. & Jones, C. (2007). Sociality and money. Business 
Ethics: A European Review 16, 203–207. 
Liebowitz, S. J., & Margolis, S. E. (1990). the Fable of the Keys. Journal of Law 
and Economics, 30(1), 1–26. 
Liebowitz, S. J., & Margolis, S. E. (1995). Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History. 
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 11(1), 205–226. 
References 
173 
Liebowitz, S. J., & Margolis, S. E. (2013). THE TROUBLED PATH OF THE 
LOCK-IN MOVEMENT. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 9(1), 
125–152.  
Lierman, S., & Veuchelen, L. (2005). The optimisation approach of ALARA in 
nuclear practice: an early application of the Precautionary Principle. Sci-
entific uncertainty versus legal uncertainty. Water Science and 
Technology, 52(6), 81–86. 
Lilienthal, D.E. (1947, May 4) We must grasp the the facts about the atom, The 
New York Times Magazine, p. 7. 
Macfarlane, A. M., & Ewing, R. C. (Eds.). (2006). Uncertainty Underground - 
Yucca Mountain and the Nation’s High-Level Nuclear Waste. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Macnaghten, P., Owen, R., Stilgoe, J., Wynne, B., Azevedo, A., Campos, A. de, … 
Velho, L. (2014). Responsible innovation across borders: tensions, 
paradoxes and possibilities. Journal of Responsible Innovation, 1(2), 191–
199.  
Mahoney, J. (2000). Path dependence in historical sociology. Theory and Society, 
29(4), 507–548. 
Manders-Huits, N. (2011). What Values in Design? The Challenge of 
Incorporating Moral Values into Design. Science and Engineering Ethics, 
17(2), 271–287.  
Martin, R. (2010). Roepke Lecture in Economic Geography—Rethinking 
Regional Path Dependence: Beyond Lock-in to Evolution. Economic 
Geography, 86(1), 1–27.  
Martin, R., & Sunley, P. (2010). The Place of Path Dependence in an 
Evolutionary Perspective on the Economic Landscape. In R. Boschma & 
R. Martin (Eds.), Handbook of Evolutionary Economic Geography. 
Chichester: Edward Elgar. 
McKinley, I., Alexander, W., & Blaser, P. C. (2007). Development of geological 
disposal concepts. Radioactivity in the Environment, 9(6), 41–76.  
Metlay, D. (1985). Radioactive Waste Management Policymaking. In U.S. 
Congress Office of Technology Assessment, Managing the Nation’s 
Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
Miller, H. S., Fahnoe, F., & Peterson, W. R. (1954). Survey of Radioactive Waste 
Disposal Practices. Nucleonics, 12(1), 68. 
Mulder, K., & Knot, M. (2001). PVC plastic: a history of systems development 
and entrenchment. Technology in Society, 23(2), 265–286.  
National Research Council. (1957). The Disposal of Radioactive Waste on Land. 
Washington D.C.: National Academy Press. Retrieved from 
http://dels.nas.edu/Report/Disposal-Radioactive-Waste/10294 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
174 
National Research Council. (1966). Review of Radioactive Waste Disposal 
Technology - Report to the Division of Reactor Development and Technology. 
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
National Research Council. (1970). Disposal of Solid Radioactive Wastes in Bedded 
Salt Deposits. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Nwosu, B. C. E. (1991). Issues and Experiences Concerning Nuclear Energy and 
Nuclear Proliferation. In K. S. Shrader-Frechette (Ed.), Nuclear Energy 
and Ethics. Geneva: World Council of Churches Publications. 
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. (1995). The Environmental and Ethical Basis of 
Geological Disposal of Long-Lived Radioactive Wastes. Retrieved 
October 10, 2014, from https://www.oecd-
nea.org/rwm/reports/1995/geodisp.html 
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. (2011). Reversibility and Retrievability (R&R) for 
the Deep Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Fuel. Paris. 
Retrieved from http://www.oecd-nea.org/rwm/rr/ 
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. (2012). Reversibility of Decisions and Retrievability 
of Radioactive Waste. Paris. Retrieved from http://www.oecd-
nea.org/rwm/reports/2012/7085-reversibility.pdf 
Oregon Department of Energy. (2014). Hanford Cleanup: The first 25 years. Salem, 
OR. Retrieved from 
http://www.oregon.gov/energy/NUCSAF/docs/Hanford25YearReportA
LL.pdf 
Orlikowski, W. J. (1992). The Duality of Technology: Rethinking the Concept of 
Technology in Organizations. Organization Science, 3(3), 398–427.  
Orlikowski, W. J. (2007). Sociomaterial Practices: Exploring Technology at 
Work. Organization Studies, 28(9), 1435–1448. 
Owen, R., Stilgoe, J., Macnaghten, P., Gorman, M., Fisher, E., & Guston, D. 
(2013). A Framework for Responsible Innovation. In Responsible 
Innovation. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  
Page, S. E. (2006). Path Dependence. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 1, 87–
115.  
Parkins, J. R., & Haluza-delay, R. (2011). Social and Ethical Considerations of 
Nuclear Power Development. University of Alberta, Department of Rural 
Economy Staff Paper. Retrieved from 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/103237/2/StaffPaper11-01.pdf. 
Parsons, R. M. (1995). History of Technology Policy - Commercial Nuclear 
Power. Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering Education and Prac-
tice, 121(2), 85–98. 
References 
175 
Pellé, S. (2016). Process, outcomes, virtues: the normative strategies of respon-
sible research and innovation and the challenge of moral 
pluralism. Journal of Responsible Innovation 3(3), 233-254. 
Pellé, S., & Reber, B. (2016). From Ethical Review to Responsible Research and 
Innovation. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.  
Perrings, C., & Brock, W. (2009). Irreversibility in Economics. Annual Review of 
Resource Economics, 1(1), 219–238.  
Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of 
Politics. The American Political Science Review, 94(2), 251–267. 
Pieters, W., Hadziosmanovic, D., & Dechesne, F. (2014). Cyber Security as 
Social Experiment. In NSPW ’14 Proceedings of the 2014 workshop on New 
Security Paradigms. New York, NY: ACM.  
Pinch, T., & Bijker, W. (1987). The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts. In 
W. Bijker, T. Hughes, & T. Pinch (Eds.), The Social Construction of Tech-
nological Systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Ramana, M. V. (2007). Nuclear Power in India: Failed Past, Dubious Future. In 
H. Sokolski (Ed.), Gauging U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation. Carlisle, 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute. 
Richardson, P., Michie, E., Minhans, A., Kallenbach-Herbert, B., & Andersson, 
K. (2011). The IPPA Knowledge Base. Retrieved from 
http://www.ippaproject.eu/sites/default/files/deliverables/IPPA-
Deliverable-1_1.pdf 
Rixen, T., & Viola, L. A. (2014). Putting path dependence in its place: toward a 
Taxonomy of institutional change. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 26(3), 1–
23. http://doi.org/10.1177/0951629814531667 
Robaey, Z. (2014). Looking for Moral Responsibility in Ownership: A Way to 
Deal with Hazards of GMOs. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental 
Ethics, 28(1), 43–56. 
Robaey, Z. (2016a). Gone with the Wind: Conceiving of Moral Responsibility in 
the Case of GMO Contamination. Science and Engineering Ethics, 22(3), 
889–906. 
Robaey, Z. (2016b). Transferring Moral Responsibility for Technological 
Hazards: The Case of GMOs in Agriculture. Journal of Agricultural and 
Environmental Ethics, 29(5), 767–786. 
Roeser, S. (2011). Nuclear Energy, Risk, and Emotions. Philosophy & Technology, 
24(2), 197–201.  
Rogers, E. M. (1995). Diffusion of Innovations (4th ed.). New York, NY: The Free 
Press. 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
176 
Sarkar, J. (2014). A Bullock Cart on Nuclear-Powered Wheels: Nuclear Science, 
Indigeneity and the National Development Narrative in India. In M. 
Mayer, M. Carpes, & R. Knoblich (Eds.), International Relations and the 
Global Politics of Science and Technology (Vol. 2, pp. 21–30). Berlin 
Heidelberg: Springer.  
Schneider, M. (2010). Nuclear Power Made in France: A Model? In H. D. 
Sokolski (Ed.), Nuclear Power’s Global Expansion: Weighing Its Costs and 
Risks. Strategic Studies Institute. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York, NY: 
Harper & Brothers.  
Schutz, A. (1946). The well-informed citizen; an essay on the social distribution 
of knowledge. Social Research, 13(c), 463–478. 
Schutz, A. (1952). Santayana on Society and Government. Social Research, 19(2), 
220–246. 
Schutz, A. (1973). Collected Papers: The Problem of Social Reality. (M. Natanson, 
Ed.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Retrieved from 
https://books.google.com/books?id=1H1bAAAAIAAJ 
Schutz, A. (1976). Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory. (A. Brodersen, 
Ed.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Schutz, A. (2011). Collected Papers V. Phenomenology and the Social Sciences. (L. 
Embree, Ed.). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Schutz, A., & Luckmann, T. (1973). The Structures of the Life-World - Volume 1. 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Schutz, A., & Luckmann, T. (1989). The Structures of the Life-World - Volume 2. 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Scrase, I., & Smith, A. (2009). The (non-)politics of managing low carbon socio-
technical transitions. Environmental Politics, 18(5), 707–726.  
Shrader-Frechette, K. (1993). Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case Against 
Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste. Berkely, CA: University of 
California Press. 
Shrader-Frechette, K. (2000). Duties to future generations, proxy consent, intra- 
and intergenerational equity: The case of nuclear waste. Risk Analysis, 
20(6), 771–778. 
Shrader-Frechette, K., & Persson, L. (2002). Ethical, logical and scientific 
problems with the new ICRP proposals. Journal of Radiological 
Protection, 22(2), 149. 
Soete, L. (2013). Is innovation always good? In J. Fagerberg, B. R. Martin, & E. S. 
Andersen (Eds.), Innovation Studies: Evolution & Future Challenges. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sørensen, K. H. (2004). Cultural Politics of Technology: Combining Critical and 
Constructive Interventions. Science Technology and Human Values, 29(2), 
184–190.  
References 
177 
Sovacool, B. K. (2008). Valuing the greenhouse gas emissions from nuclear 
power: A critical survey. Energy Policy, 36(8), 2950–2963.  
Sovacool, B. K., & Valentine, S. V. (2010). The socio-political economy of nuclear 
energy in China and India. Energy, 35(9), 3803–3813.  
Spruit, S. L. (2017). Choosing between precautions for nanoparticles in the 
workplace: complementing the precautionary principle with caring. 
Journal of Risk Research, 20(3), 326–346.  
Spruit, S. L., Hoople, G. D., & Rolfe, D. A. (2016). Just a Cog in the Machine? 
The Individual Responsibility of Researchers in Nanotechnology is a 
Duty to Collectivize. Science and Engineering Ethics, 22(3), 871–887.  
Stewart, R. B., & Stewart, J. B. (2011). Fuel cycle to nowhere: US law and policy on 
nuclear waste. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. 
Stirling, A. (2008). “Opening up” and “closing down”: Power, participation, and 
pluralism in the social appraisal of technology. Science, Technology & 
Human Values, 33(2), 262–294.  
Strauss, L.L. (1954, September 17) In: Abundant power from atom seen; It will 
be too cheap for our children to meter. New York Times, p.5. 
Swedish National Council for Nuclear Waste. (2010). Nuclear Waste State-of-the-
Art Report 2010 - challenges for the final repository programme. Stockholm.  
Swierstra, T., & te Molder, H. (2012). Risk and Soft Impacts. In S. Roeser (Ed.), 
Handbook of Risk Theory. Dordrecht: Springer Academic Publishers.  
Sydow, J., Schreyögg, G., & Koch, J. (2009). Organizational Path Dependence. 
Academy of Management Review, 34(4), 689–709. 
Taebi, B. (2012). Multinational Nuclear Waste Repositories and Their Complex 
Issues of Justice. Ethics, Policy & Environment, 15(1), 57–62.  
Taebi, B. (2016). Bridging the Gap between Social Acceptance and Ethical 
Acceptability. Risk Analysis. doi: 10.1111/risa.12734 
Taebi, B., Correljé, A., Cuppen, E., Dignum, M., & Pesch, U. (2014). Responsible 
innovation as an endorsement of public values: the need for 
interdisciplinary research. Journal of Responsible Innovation, 1(1), 118–
124.  
Taebi, B., & Kadak, A. C. (2010). Intergenerational considerations affecting the 
future of nuclear power: Equity as a framework for assessing fuel cycles. 
Risk Analysis, 30(9), 1341–1362.  
Taebi, B., & Kloosterman, J. L. (2008). To Recycle or Not to Recycle? An 
Intergenerational Approach to Nuclear Fuel Cycles. Science and 
Engineering Ethics, 14(2), 177–200. 
Taebi, B., & Kloosterman, J. L. (2015). Design for Values in Nuclear Technology. 
In J. van den Hoven, P. E. Vermaas, & I. van de Poel (Eds.), Handbook of 
Ethics, Values, and Technological Design: Sources, Theory, Values and 
Application Domains. Dordrecht: Springer.  
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
178 
Teräväinen, T., Lehtonen, M., & Martiskainen, M. (2011). Climate change, 
energy security, and risk—debating nuclear new build in Finland, 
France and the UK. Energy Policy, 39(6), 3434–3442. 
Thorstensen, E. & Forsberg, E.-M. (2016). Social Life Cycle Assessment as a 
resource for Responsible Research and Innovation. Journal of Responsible 
Innovation 3(1), 50-72.  
Tomar, R. (1980). THE INDIAN NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM : MYTHS 
AND MIRAGES. Asian Survey, 20(5), 517–531. 
U.K. Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. (2008). National policies on the long-
term management of higher activity wastes. Retrieved from 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/publication/national-policies-on-the-long-term-
management-of-higher-activity-wastes-april-2008/ 
U.K. Nuclear Decommissioning Authority. (2013). Geological Disposal - How the 
world is dealing with its radioactive wastes. Retrieved from 
http://www.nda.gov.uk/publication/how-the-world-is-dealing-with-its-
radioactive-wastes/ 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. (1962). Civilian Nuclear Power: A Report to the 
President, 1962. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. (1974). High-level radioactive waste 
management alternatives. In WASH-1297. Washington D.C. 
U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment. (1985). Managing the Nation 
â€TM s Commercial High-Level Radioactive Waste. Washington D.C.: 
DIANE Publishing.  
U.S. Department of Energy. (1991). A Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility: 
Technical Background Information. Washington, D.C.  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (1975). Reactor Safety Study - An 
Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants. 
Washington D.C. 
Valentine, S. V., & Sovacool, B. K. (2010). The socio-political economy of nuclear 
power development in Japan and South Korea. Energy Policy, 38(12), 
7971–7979. 
van de Poel, I. (2011). Nuclear Energy as a Social Experiment. Ethics, Policy & 
Environment, 14(3), 285–290. 
van de Poel, I. (2013). Why new technologies should be conceived as social 
experiments. Ethics, Policy & Environment. Taylor & Francis.  
van de Poel, I. (2015). Morally experimenting with nuclear energy. In B. Taebi & 
S. Roeser (Eds.), The Ethics of Nuclear Energy - Risk, Justice and 
Democracy in the post-Fukushima Era. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
van de Poel, I. (2016). An Ethical Framework for Evaluating Experimental 
Technology. Science and Engineering Ethics, 22(3), 667–686.  
References 
179 
van de Poel, I., & Zwart, S. D. (2010). Reflective Equilibrium in R & D Networks. 
Science, Technology, & Human Values, 35(2), 174–199. 
van Merkerk, R., & Van Lente, H. (2005). Tracing emerging irreversibilities in 
emerging technologies: The case of nanotubes. Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change, 72(9), 1094–1111. 
van Oudheusden, M. (2014). Where are the politics in responsible innovation? 
European governance, technology assessments, and beyond. Journal of 
Responsible Innovation, 1(1), 67–86.  
Vandenbosch, R., & Vandenbosch, S. E. (2007). Nuclear waste stalemate: Political 
and scientific controversies. University of Utah Press Salt Lake City, UT. 
Verbeek, P.-P. (2005). What Things Do - Philosophical Reflections on Technology, 
Agency and Design. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press. 
Verbeek, P.-P. (2011). Moralizing Technology: Understanding and Designing the 
Morality of Things. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 
Vergne, J. P. (2013). QWERTY is dead; long live path dependence. Research 
Policy, 42. 
Vergne, J. P., & Durand, R. (2010). The Missing Link Between the Theory and 
Empirics of Path Dependence: Conceptual Clarification, Testability 
Issue, and Methodological Implications. Journal of Management Studies, 
47(4), 736–759. 
Vergne, J. P., & Durand, R. (2011). The Path of Most Persistence: An 
Evolutionary Perspective on Path Dependence and Dynamic 
Capabilities. Organization Studies, 32(3), 365–382. 
von Schomberg, R. (2011). Towards Responsible Research and Innovation in the 
Information and Communication Technologies and Security 
Technologies Fields. In Research and Innovation in the Information and 
Communication Technologies and Security Technologies Fields. 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 
von Schomberg, R. (2013). A Vision of Responsible Research and Innovation. In 
Responsible Innovation. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Walker, J. S. (1992). Containing the Atom: Nuclear Regulation in a Changing 
Environment, 1963-1971. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Walker, J. S. (2009). The road to Yucca Mountain: the development of radioactive 
waste policy in the United States. University of California Press Berkeley, 
CA. 
Walker, W. (1999). Nuclear Entrapment: THORP and the politics of commitment. 
London: Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Walker, W. (2000). Entrapment in large technology systems: institutional 
commitment and power relations. Research Policy, 29(7–8), 833–846. 
Wattal, P. (2013). Indian programme on radioactive waste management. 
Sadhana, 38(October), 849–857. 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
180 
Winner, L. (1980). Do artifacts have politics? Daedalus (Boston), 109(1), 19–39. 
World Nuclear Association. (2012a). Nuclear power in India. Retrieved June 5, 
2012, from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf53.html 
World Nuclear Association. (2012b). Nuclear power in France. Retrieved July 14, 
2012, from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/info40.html 
World Nuclear Association. (2013). Nuclear power in the USA. Retrieved March 
9, 2013, from http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-
Profiles/Countries-T-Z/USA–Nuclear-Power/#.UVqowWfYF8E 
 
 181 
About the Author 
As of December 2017, Jan Peter Bergen is a post-doctoral researcher in philoso-
phy of technology at the University of Twente. He completed his PhD in ethics 
of technology at Delft University of Technology between March 2012 and De-
cember 2017. Generally speaking, his work is influenced by philosophical 
pragmatism, 20th century phenomenology and social theory, STS, and technol-
ogy dynamics. For more recent activities, however, he has also drawn inspiration 
from liberal philosophy of law, value-sensitive design theory, and the philosophy 
and sociology of death. 
 Besides his research, Jan has is an avid educator, having coordinated or 
assisted in a wide array of university level courses. Thematically, these ranged 
from strategic management and technology/impact assessment to the ethics and 
philosophy of science, engineering and design. 
 Jan has a multidisciplinary educational background. He holds a Bachelor’s 
and Master’s degree in Product Development from the University College of 
Antwerp. He also holds an MSc in Industrial Ecology from Leiden University. 
 

 183 
Acknowledgements 
In spite of what the author list on my papers might lead one to suspect, my 
dissertation only came about thanks to the many wonderful people around me. 
Folded deep into its chapters are thousands of conversations at the office, in a 
classroom, in emails, at home, at a bar, on the train, at the coffee machine and at 
innumerable other places. These conversations and the relationships that were 
built through them have shaped me and my thoughts, gave me the bravery to 
chase some of my interests or gave me the good sense not to chase others, and 
helped me to accomplish more than would ever have been possible on my own. 
To those involved, I would like to extend my thanks. 
 
First, I would like to thank my promotor and co-promotor. I am extremely 
grateful to Ibo for having me as part of his VICI project and for keeping me on 
the right track while simultaneously giving me the freedom to go down philo-
sophical paths which were locally less travelled. My sincere thanks go to Behnam 
for his endless patience, for showing me that the ethics can be in the technical 
details, and for keeping my feet as close to the ground as could reasonably be 
expected. 
 Next, my deepest gratitude goes to my sisters-in-arms, paranymphs and 
precious peers that I look up to and respect. Zoë and Shannon, I could not have 
wished for a more awesome pair of comrades to explore the philosophical seas 
with. It is simply impossible to list all the things I am grateful to you for, but let 
me name a few. Zoë, thanks for all those silly moments in the office, for your 
trust and hospitality, and for making sure that however much I was struggling at 
work, I never did so alone. And Shannon, thank you for all the laughs, for you 
unending critical support, for being a wonderful guide and travel companion in 
China, and for being an example I can aspire to regarding a plethora of PhD 
skills. 
 To Philip, my late philoso-bro and partner in continental crime, I am truly 
grateful for having had the chance to get to know you and become your friend. 
Your philosophical rigour, humorous style and critical joie-de-vivre will remain 
an inspiration to me always. I dedicate this dissertation to you. 
 I would also like to thank my current and former TU Delft philosophy 
colleagues for playing a part in making these past years as valuable as they have 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
184 
been. A big thank you to Taylor, Cees, Georgy, Yan, Jonas, Thijs, Sofia, Scott, 
Koen, Janna, Giuseppe, Nicole, Giulio, , Janna, Emily, Emad, Neelke, Maarten, 
Mark, Veronica, Henk, Sabine, Wim, Pieter, Gert-Jan, Udo, Jelle, Filippo, Sjoerd, 
Aimee, Jeroen and Seamus, and former colleagues Michael, Nia, Gwen, Luca, 
Catalina, Muniza, Lalaine, Hendrik, Thomas, Michele, Jathan, Ilse, Lotte, Stefan, 
Donna, Phil, Noemi, David, Peter and Jessica. I would also like to thank our 
visiting researchers for bringing even more fun and variety to our group. Now, 
some of this collegial gratitude deserves a bit more specification. A special 
thanks to Udo for all the feedback and for suggesting the possibility of doing this 
PhD in the first place. I simply would not have begun this journey without you. 
Thanks Otto, for your continued guidance and support on the bewildering topic 
of Levinas. On a related note, a thank you to Cees for the animated and insight-
ful discussions on the same topic. I am grateful to Peter for being a 
philosophical father figure and for knowing when to listen rather than argue 
(and for years of W&C, of course). Thank you Sjoerd for the bouts of spirited 
drunken philosophy at section events. Thanks Mark, for convincing me that a 
career in academia is possible without giving up on one’s more particular 
philosophical proclivities. Thank you Phil for what was certainly the most 
intense and empowering philosophy course I ever took. Taylor, thanks for a 
great time in China and for providing me with a roof over my head in Delft on 
numerous occasions. Thanks Neelke, Lotte and Donna for all the good advice 
you gave me as post-docs in the project (and otherwise). And finally, a special 
shout-out to Christine simply for being awesome. 
 I am also grateful for all the help I received from Diana, Henneke, Monique, 
Nathalie, and Anneke. Given my level organisational talent, I was truly grateful 
for their capacity to navigate the sometimes murky waters that are the TU Delft 
bureaucracy. I am equally grateful for their hospitality and their help in organis-
ing the Mekel Prize and the VICI project’s conference. 
 
I was lucky enough to meet many more great people in the process of doing my 
PhD, too many to name here. Nevertheless, I will mention some.  
 First, my fellow 4TU PhD students, including Eva, Marjolein, Olya, Sven, 
Melis, Mayli, Agata, Jilles, and many more. Then, my former fellow PhD council 
members for TPM and the OZSW, including Binod, Samaneh, Yashar, Michael, 
Hedwig, Daphne and Tjidde. All of them have been an integral and enjoyable 
part of activities that thoroughly enriched my PhD life. 
Acknowledgements 
185 
 A profound thank you goes to Mary Sunderland and Bill Kastenberg for 
inviting a Delft contingent, including me, to Berkeley. My deep gratitude also 
goes to Sheila Jasanoff for accepting me as a visiting fellow at the Harvard STS 
program. On a related note, I would like to thank Shana for her prompt com-
munication there and the other STS fellows for the interesting and invigorating 
discussions (with special thanks to Melanie, Matthew, Nicole and Mylène). My 
love and thanks to David, the best Levinasian roomie, whose reading of T.S. Eliot 
made me re-appreciate the value of the feelz for doing philosophy right.  
 
My gratitude also goes out to my family (of course, that also includes you, 
Turnhout) for their support, interest, and patience. Thank you Moeder and 
Vader, for supporting my curiosity, for the opportunities and support during my 
development from the child I was to the big boy (I think) I have now become, 
and instilling in me the sense of justice that inspired me to get into ethics. 
Thanks Famke, Ben, Lieselotte and Joeri for making me feel at home, even when 
I felt lost in thought. And thank you to little Nel and Wanne for lighting up my 
life and for proving beyond a doubt the value of living in the moment. 
 I would also like to give a shout-out to my friends who, over a nice beer or 
coffee, always confirmed the welcome fact that there is a worthwhile world 
outside of academia and that philosophy only goes so far. Thank you Brecht, 
Sofie, Benne, Lara, Annelies (and Cleo), Bastien, Vicky and many others for 
being fun, patient, supportive and before all else, lovely people. 
 Finally, this list would be nowhere near complete without an expression of 
my heartfelt gratitude to my loving and supportive wife, Dagmar. The things I 
want to thank her for are too numerous to recount and transcend this disserta-
tion infinitely. What’s more, distilling her specific contributions to the 
realization of this dissertation would require me to imagine what the past six 
years would have been without her. Even if I could do so (which I don’t think I 
can), it would pain me to even try. Dagmar, let me simply say this: thank you, for 
everything. 
 
P.S. 
Arguably, this would not be much of a project in the philosophy of technology if 
I were to completely ignore the non-human agents that, directly or indirectly, 
contributed to the completion of this dissertation. First and foremost, I would 
like to thank my trusty Bonneville for clearing my head when it was a mess, for 
some exciting holidays (even if one of them included a slight detour into a ditch) 
Reflections on the Reversibility of Nuclear Energy Technologies 
186 
and for providing me with transport when the train became difficult to afford. 
Next, my thanks go to the three laptops that it took to complete this dissertation. 
You probably served me better than I served you. I also want to acknowledge 
both the plants in my garden and the philosophical/royal specimens of Gallus 
Gallus that inhabited it. You have provided me with the necessary physical work 
to keep me from going too mental. Similarly, I would like to acknowledge the 
value of Jamie the Gender-Neutral Plant. (S)(he/i)(t) served as a reminder of the 
good ol’ times in the office after Shannon and Zoë had preceded me to bigger 
and better things. And last but not least, I would like to thank both coffee and 
alcohol. Specifically, my thanks go to coffee for keeping me awake, alert and 
focused on the job, and to alcohol for effectively doing the opposite when neces-
sary. 
 187 
Samenvatting 
De ontwikkeling van kernenergietechnologieën in de tweede helft van de 20e 
eeuw bracht hoge verwachtingen met zich mee inzake het wederopbouwen van 
naties die getroffen waren door het geweld van de Tweede Wereldoorlog of die 
recent van de koloniale heerschappij waren bevrijd. In landen als Frankrijk, 
India, de USA, Canada, Rusland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk werd kernernergie 
het symbool van ontwikkeling naar een moderne en technologisch geavanceerde 
toekomst. Desalniettemin, na meer dan zes decennia ervaring met het opwekken 
van kernenergie, en in de nasleep van de kernramp in Fukushima, kan worden 
gesteld dat het opwekken van kernenergie niet zonder problemen verloopt. 
 Sommige van deze problemen vinden hun oorsprong in de feitelijke 
stoffelijkheid van de technologieën in kwestie. Zo brengen de hoogradioactieve 
materialen die worden gebruikt niet alleen risico’s mee voor de huidige 
generatie (e.g., in de kans op een ramp bij kernsmelting van reactoren), maar in 
de vorm van hoog-radioactief afval van kernenergieproductie vormen ze ook een 
serieus intergenerationeel probleem waarvoor een acceptabele eindoplossing of 
de implementatie daarvan voorlopig ontbreekt. Daarenboven hebben 
kernenergietechnologieën ook bepaalde sociale en politieke gevolgen.  Zo zijn ze 
bijvoorbeeld als autoritaire technologieën bestempeld (Winner, 1980) die 
centrale autoriteit, geheimhouding en technocratische besluitvorming vereisen. 
 Terwijl sommige van deze problemen konden worden voorzien vóórdat 
kernenergietechnologieën werden geïntroduceerd in de samenleving, staken 
andere problemen pas de kop op wanneer deze technologieën al verweven zaten 
in de sociale en technische structuur van ons leven. Daarbovenop worden er nog 
steeds nieuwe technologieën ontwikkeld (zoals reactoren van generatie III, III+ 
en IV), welke op hun beurt nieuwe en onzekere gevaren en risico’s met zich 
meebrengen. Onwetendheid en onzekerheid over de mogelijke nadelige 
gevolgen van het introduceren van nieuwe technologieën zijn dan ook 
onvermijdelijk, zeker wanneer de technologie complex is, het over lange 
tijdsspannes gaat, of de risico’s afhangen van sociale of politieke factoren die 
tijdens het ontwerpproces niet werden voorzien. Dat dient het ontwikkelen en 
implementeren van nieuwe technologieën echter niet in de weg te staan. Het 
zou ons eerder moeten motiveren om dit soort ‘experimenten’ met nieuwe 
technologieën in de samenleving (van de Poel, 2011, 2015) zo te organiseren dat 
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we zo effectief en verantwoord mogelijk kunnen leren over de mogelijke gevaren 
en risico’s. Zo wordt het mogelijk om risico’s te minimaliseren en om 
ongewenste morele, sociale of politieke ontwikkelingen te vermijden. Het 
verantwoord organiseren van zulke experimenten houdt evenwel in dat we op 
een bepaald moment mogelijk moeten concluderen dat het experiment niet 
meer verantwoord of wenselijk is. Moeten we op dat scenario voorbereid zijn, en 
zo ja, hoe doen we dat dan? Eén mogelijke strategie om hiermee om te gaan is 
het omkeerbaar maken van de technologie en haar introductie in de samenleving. 
Deze dissertatie stelt zich dan ook als doel om deze strategie verder te verkennen 
door een antwoord te bieden op de volgende onderzoeksvraag (RQ) en 
bijhorende deelvragen (SQ): 
 
RQ:  Wat zijn de implicaties van omkeerbaarheid voor het verantwoord 
ontwikkelen en implementeren van kernenergietechnologieën? 
 
SQ1:  Onder welke voorwaarden kunnen kernenergietechnologieën als omkeerbaar 
worden beschouwd? 
SQ2:  Waarom zouden kernenergietechnologieën omkeerbaar moeten zijn? 
 SQ3:  Zo ja, hoe kan de omkeerbaarheid van kernenergietechnologieën worden 
bereikt? 
 
Na het inleidende hoofdstuk 1 leveren de hoofdstukken die het hart van deze 
dissertatie vormen allen een een specifieke bijdrage aan het beantwoorden van 
de drie deelvragen en zodoende ook aan het beantwoorden van de hoofdvraag. 
Onderbouwd door drie historische casestudy’s over de ontwikkeling van 
kernenergietechnologie (i.e., India, Frankrijk en de USA) beantwoordt hoofdstuk 
2 de eerste onderzoeksvraag door het formuleren van de twee voorwaarden waar 
kernenergietechnologieën aan moeten voldoen om als omkeerbaar beschouwd te 
worden, i.e., 1) het moet mogelijk zijn om de verdere ontwikkeling en 
implementatie van de technologie in de samenleving stop te zetten, en 2) het 
moet mogelijk zijn om de ongewenste gevolgen (materieel, institutioneel of 
symbolisch) van de ontwikkeling en implementatie van de technologie ongedaan 
te maken. Hierna behandelt hoofdstuk 3 de tweede onderzoeksvraag door de 
algemene wenselijkheid van technologische omkeerbaarheid aan te tonen op basis van 
de relatie tussen technologische omkeerbaarheid en verantwoordelijkheid in de 
ethische fenomenologie van Emmanuel Levinas. Hoofdstuk 3 stelt namelijk dat 
technologieontwikkeling een antwoord is op onze verantwoordelijkheid dat die 
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verantwoordelijkheid echter steeds tekortdoet, wat onophoudelijk de vraag naar 
technologische en politieke verandering oproept. Nadat zo beargumenteerd is 
dat kernenergietechnologieën idealiter omkeerbaar zouden moeten zijn, 
ontwikkelen hoofdstukken 4 en 5 specifieke strategieën om technologische 
omkeerbaarheid te bereiken. Om te beginnen onderzoekt hoofdstuk 4 de 
processen die het moeilijk maken om de verdere verdere ontwikkeling en implementatie 
van een kernenergietechnologie in de samenleving stop te zetten, en levert zo input 
voor het vervullen van de eerste voorwaarde voor de omkeerbaarheid van 
kernenergietechnologieën. Het doet dit door een fenomenologisch perspectief 
op technologie en haar adoptie te ontwikkelen, gebaseerd op het werk van Alfred 
Schutz. Daarnaast verkent het ook verschillende manieren waarop de 
padafhankelijke processen die leiden tot technologische lock-in door 
technologieadoptie worden aangestuwd. Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de 
geschiedenis  van geologische berging van hoogradioactief afval in de USA. Het 
identificeert daarbij een aantal concrete valkuilen voor beleidsvorming die 
kunnen leiden tot lock-in en dus moeten worden vermeden. Het presenteert ook 
een aantal algemene ontwerpstrategieën die het ongedaan maken van de ongewenste 
gevolgen van een technologie kunnen faciliteren, en draagt zo bij aan het vervullen 
van de tweede voorwaarde voor de omkeerbaarheid van kernenergie-
technologieën.  
 Hoofdstuk 6 vat de belangrijkste bevindingen van de dissertatie samen en 
geeft aan hoe deze bijdragen aan het beantwoorden van de onderzoeksvragen. 
Daarbij reflecteert het ook op een aantal complicaties die de kop opsteken bij 
omkeerbaarheidsoverwegingen. Op basis hiervan kan worden gesteld dat de 
kwestie van onomkeerbaarheid en omkeerbaarheid context- en technologie-
specifiek is, en geen binair gegeven maar eerder één van gradatie. Het hoofdstuk 
sluit af met algemenere implicaties en beperkingen van de onderzoeks-
resultaten. Als laatste reflecteert hoofdstuk 7 op de implicaties van de resultaten 
van deze dissertatie voor verantwoord experimenteren met kernenergie-
technologieën in de samenleving. 
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Simon Stevin (1548-1620) 
'Wonder en is gheen Wonder' 
                                                                                  
This series in the philosophy and ethics of technology is named after the Dutch / 
Flemish natural philosopher, scientist and engineer Simon Stevin. He was an 
extraordinary versatile person. He published, among other things, on arithmetic, 
accounting, geometry, mechanics, hydrostatics, astronomy, theory of measure-
ment, civil engineering, the theory of music, and civil citizenship. He wrote the 
very first treatise on logic in Dutch, which he considered to be a superior lan-
guage for scientific purposes. The relation between theory and practice is a main 
topic in his work. In addition to his theoretical publications, he held a large 
number of patents, and was actively involved as an engineer in the building of 
windmills, harbours, and fortifications for the Dutch prince Maurits. He is 
famous for having constructed large sailing carriages. 
 
Little is known about his personal life. He was probably born in 1548 in Bruges 
(Flanders) and went to Leiden in 1581, where he took up his studies at the uni-
versity two years later. His work was published between 1581 and 1617. He was 
an early defender of the Copernican worldview, which did not make him popular 
in religious circles. He died in 1620, but the exact date and the place of his burial 
are unknown. Philosophically he was a pragmatic rationalist for whom every 
phenomenon, however mysterious, ultimately had a scientific explanation. 
Hence his dictum 'Wonder is no Wonder', which he used on the cover of several 
of his own books. 
